Cultural Group Selection Plays an Essential Role in Explaining Human Cooperation: A Sketch of the Evidence by Demps, Kathryn
Cultural group selection plays an
essential role in explaining human
cooperation: A sketch of the evidence
Peter Richerson
Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California–
Davis, Davis, CA 95616
pjricherson@ucdavis.edu
www.des.ucdavis.edu/faculty/richerson/richerson.htm
Ryan Baldini
Graduate Group in Ecology, University of California–Davis, Davis, CA 95616
ryanbaldini@gmail.com https://sites.google.com/site/ryanbaldini/
Adrian V. Bell
Department of Anthropology, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT 84112
av.bell@gmail.com http://adrianbell.wordpress.com/
Kathryn Demps
Department of Anthropology, Boise State University, Boise, ID 83725
kathryndemps@boisestate.edu
http://sspa.boisestate.edu/anthropology/faculty-and-staff/kathryn-
demps/
Karl Frost
Graduate Group in Ecology, University of California–Davis, Davis, CA 95616
kjfrost@ucdavis.edu https://sites.google.com/site/karljosephfrost/
Vicken Hillis
Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California–
Davis, Davis, CA 95616
avhillis@ucdavis.edu http://vickenhillis.weebly.com
Sarah Mathew
School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University,
Tempe, AZ 85287
sarah.mathew@asu.edu http://www.sarahmathew.net/Site/Home.html
Emily K. Newton
Department of Psychology, Dominican University of California, San Rafael, CA
94901
emily.newton@dominican.edu http://emilyknewton.weebly.com/
Nicole Naar
Department of Anthropology, University of California–Davis,
Davis, CA 95616
nanaar@ucdavis.edu
Lesley Newson
Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California–
Davis, Davis, CA 95616
lgnewson@ucdavis.edu lesleynewson@gmail.edu
https://www.researchgate.net/proﬁle/Lesley_Newson/
Cody Ross
Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501
ctross@ucdavis.edu
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=xSugEskAAAAJ
Paul E. Smaldino
Department of Anthropology, University of California–Davis, Davis, CA 95616
paul.smaldino@gmail.com http://www.smaldino.com/
Timothy M. Waring
School of Economics, University of Maine, Orono, ME 04469
timothy.waring@maine.edu http://timwaring.wordpress.com/
Matthew Zefferman
National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, University of
Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996
matt@zefferman.com http://www.zefferman.com/
Abstract:Human cooperation is highly unusual. We live in large groups composed mostly of non-relatives. Evolutionists have proposed a
number of explanations for this pattern, including cultural group selection and extensions of more general processes such as reciprocity,
kin selection, and multi-level selection acting on genes. Evolutionary processes are consilient; they affect several different empirical
domains, such as patterns of behavior and the proximal drivers of that behavior. In this target article, we sketch the evidence from
ﬁve domains that bear on the explanatory adequacy of cultural group selection and competing hypotheses to explain human
cooperation. Does cultural transmission constitute an inheritance system that can evolve in a Darwinian fashion? Are the norms that
underpin institutions among the cultural traits so transmitted? Do we observe sufﬁcient variation at the level of groups of
considerable size for group selection to be a plausible process? Do human groups compete, and do success and failure in competition
depend upon cultural variation? Do we observe adaptations for cooperation in humans that most plausibly arose by cultural group
selection? If the answer to one of these questions is “no,” then we must look to other hypotheses. We present evidence, including
quantitative evidence, that the answer to all of the questions is “yes” and argue that we must take the cultural group selection
hypothesis seriously. If culturally transmitted systems of rules (institutions) that limit individual deviance organize cooperation in
human societies, then it is not clear that any extant alternative to cultural group selection can be a complete explanation.
Keywords: competition; culture; evolution; group selection; heritable variation; institutions; norms
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A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree
the spirit of patriotism, ﬁdelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were
always ready to aid one another, and to sacriﬁce themselves for the
common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this
would be natural selection.
— Charles Darwin (1874, pp. 178–79)
1. Introduction
Few scholars doubt that the scale of cooperation found in
contemporary human societies is unusual. We typically
live in large, rule-bound, anonymous societies in which
the mean genetic relatedness between members is low
(Moffett 2013). Ethnographic evidence from hunter-gath-
erer societies suggests that our Late Pleistocene ancestors
already had many interactions with non-kin that were reg-
ulated by systems of norms and institutions, even in socie-
ties numbering only a few hundred to a few thousand (Hill
et al. 2014). If that is the case, then there are two key evo-
lutionary questions: (1) How did cooperation among non-
kin evolve in small-scale societies in prehistoric times,
and (2) how did small-scale societies evolve into much
larger and more complex societies during the Holocene?
We outline here the evidence that supports the hypothesis
that cultural group selection (CGS) was and still is an im-
portant force in the evolution of human societies. We
compare CGS to other evolutionary mechanisms that
have been proposed to account for human sociality. See
Boehm (2012), Bowles and Gintis (2011), and Cronk and
Leech (2013) for reviews of the various mechanisms pro-
posed to date.
Heretofore, the debate about the importance of CGS
relative to competing explanations for human cooperation
has not been fully engaged. Some debates have focused
on narrow issues such as the interpretation of experimental
results (Hagen & Hammerstein 2006) and the assumptions
of mathematical models (Boyd et al. 2011; Lehmann et al.
2008). Reviews of evolutionarily plausible accounts of
human cooperation often do not discuss CGS (e.g.,
Sigmund 2007) or treat it as an unsupported conjecture
or semantic error (e.g., West et al. 2007). Even the sympa-
thetic commentator, E. A. Smith (2010), remarks that CGS
is under-theorized and in need of much more empirical
analysis. We provide a guide to the relevant theory and
argue that the empirical evidence from a range of
domains provides robust qualitative support for the point
that CGS describes real and important processes in
human social evolution. In many domains, the best evi-
dence is quantitative. We cannot provide a precise quanti-
tative account of the importance of CGS compared to
competing (but generally not mutually exclusive) processes
in the evolution of human cooperation. That is an ongoing
project with recent pioneering studies in critical areas. We
will discuss the following hypotheses:
1. Cultural group selection. The CGS hypothesis is an
updated version of the one that Darwin (1874) formulated
in The Descent of Man, the essentials of which are quoted in
our epigraph (Richerson & Boyd 2010). Darwin lacked the
modern distinction between genes and culture, but in
Descent he argued that the organic differences between
human groups were small, while the differences in
durable cultural features – customs and traditions were
the terms he used –were large. He also noted that
human groups – he uses the term tribe in the quote in
our epigraph – compete. If this is the case, then group se-
lection on cultural variation is an important force. We
sketch the CGS hypothesis in more detail in section 2.
2. Culture doesn’t evolve in the Darwinian sense.
One critique of cultural evolutionary hypotheses generally
is that transmitted culture, if it exists, lacks the properties
to evolve in a Darwinian fashion at all, much less at the
group level (Brown & Richerson 2014; Pinker 2012;
Tooby 2014; Tooby & Cosmides 1992). The objection of
some evolutionary biologists to CGS (e.g., West et al.
2011) seems to turn on a similar argument. If culture is
taken to be a proximate mechanism rather than an ultimate
cause, and if it is true that proximate mechanisms cannot
inﬂuence the ultimate evolutionary processes, then
culture cannot play any active role in the evolutionary
process. For a general response to this argument, see
Laland et al. (2011).
3. Kin selection and reciprocity sufﬁce. Many
alternatives to CGS argue that the familiar evolutionary
processes acting on genes – reciprocity and inclusive
ﬁtness – which generally explain cooperation in nonhu-
mans, are also sufﬁcient to explain the case of human co-
operation (e.g., Alexander 1987). Henrich et al. (2003)
provide a useful discussion of the most prominent of
these. The issue here is not whether effects such as nepo-
tism, reputation building, and other mechanisms of coop-
eration supported by reciprocity and inclusive ﬁtness
exist – no one doubts this – but whether they are sufﬁcient
to explain the large-scale cooperation in human societies.
Some hypotheses hold that CGS became important fairly
late in human evolution and that a considerable amount of
cooperation evolved earlier due to kin selection and reci-
procity (Tomasello et al. 2012). Campbell (1975) suggest-
ed that CGS only became important once state-level
societies developed, about 5,000 years ago. In simpler so-
cieties at least, individuals might bargain and negotiate
their way to efﬁcient social equilibria, as some game the-
orists argue (see Bowles & Gintis 2011, Ch. 5 for a critical
review).
4. Pleistocene social mechanisms mismatched in
Holocene environments. A related alternative hypothesis
holds that our innate social psychology evolved in the Pleis-
tocene in societies that were so small that the familiar
mechanisms mentioned previously could entirely account
for their cooperative aspects. Subsequently, in the radically
different environments of the Holocene, the cognitive
mechanisms that evolved in the Pleistocene often caused
people to behave in novel ways in environments that
were outside the range of those in which the mechanism
evolved. Some evolutionary psychologists argue that
large-scale cooperation may be a by-product of a Pleisto-
cene cognitive mechanism expressed in much larger,
more anonymous Holocene societies (Delton et al. 2011;
Krasnow et al. 2012; Tooby & Cosmides 1989; but see Zef-
ferman 2014a).
5. A role for genetic group selection. Some alternate
theories invoke genetic group selection (on groups larger
than those composed of close kin) as at least a partial expla-
nation for human sociality (Rushton 1989; D. S. Wilson
2002; E. O. Wilson 2012). Several authors have imagined
hybrid models in which culturally transmitted institutions
reduce within-group phenotypic variation to such low
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levels that modest amounts of between-group genetic var-
iation can come under selection (Boehm 1997; Bowles &
Gintis 2011, Ch. 7; D.S. Wilson & Knifﬁn 1999). We
propose that CGS can exert selection on genes via cultural-
ly transmitted cost and beneﬁt schedules (coevolutionary
social selection). Culture-led gene-culture coevolution
could produce much the same result as group selection
more directly on genes.
6. Trigger hypotheses. Many hypotheses regarding
human origins invoke some key selection event deep in
our evolutionary history that set us on a path that led to
modern human culture and societies. Proposals of this
sort include: bipedality (Washburn 1959); intelligence
(Pinker 2010); cooperative breeding (Burkart et al. 2009);
cooperative hunting (Stanford 1999), language (Smith
2010); cooking (Wrangham 2009); and docility (Simon
1990). Such hypotheses are difﬁcult to test independently
of the coevolutionary extension of the CGS hypothesis. In
living hunter-gatherers, and other modern humans,
culture is closely involved in all of these phenomena (Hill
et al. 2009). The paleoanthropological record is remarkably
hard to interpret with regard to the order in which the
various components of modern human sociality evolved
and which components coevolved. Bipedal locomotion
may have been necessary, but it was not a sufﬁcient
trigger because bipedality evolved in the Australopithecine
lineage well before the record contains evidence of any
advance in cultural behavior over that in nonhuman apes.
On the other hand, even the most innatist theories of lan-
guage evolution imagine a culture-led gene-culture coevo-
lutionary process driving language evolution (Pinker &
Bloom 1990). Thus, we have little to say about hypotheses
of this type.
In sum, if CGS is an active process in human social evo-
lution, then we should see evidence that: (1) culture acts as
an inheritance system; (2) group-variable culturally trans-
mitted social norms and institutions are among the
domains of culture so transmitted; and (3) success or
failure in intergroup competition is frequently caused by in-
stitutional variation. As a result of these three features, we
should also ﬁnd evidence of: (4) group-level functionality in
cultures, particularly in their social norms and institutions.
The CGS hypothesis is thus vulnerable to disproof in
several empirical domains. Competing hypotheses argue
that cultural systems lack one or more of these features,
or possess them to such a limited extent that the explana-
tion for human sociality must depend in the main on
other processes.
2. The cultural group selection hypothesis
In this section, we characterize the CGS hypothesis. Three
distinct CGS processes exist, united by being driven by
group-level heritable cultural variation, but differing in
the mechanism of selection. Two of these forms are
driven by human choices – choices in part based on proso-
cial emotions like Darwin’s sympathy and patriotism.
Because prosocial impulses play such a large role in CGS,
it is important to account for their evolution. In the
second part of this section, we describe the “tribal social in-
stincts hypothesis,” a modernization of Darwin’s proposal,
which can, in principle, explain the evolution of prosocial
emotions.
Humans exhibit a wide variety of culturally transmitted
organizational phenomena larger than, and different
from, those reﬂecting biological relatedness and close pair-
wise partnerships. These include corporate kin groups, eth-
nicities, nations, classes, castes, religions, clubs, nations,
and empires. CGS is potentially acting on more than one
of these groups simultaneously, leading many authors to
speak of multi-level selection. The most ancient groups
are the ethnolinguistic tribes into which simpler societies
are generally divided. As we discuss below, selection on
tribes can account for the innate foundation of our social
psychology via the process of gene-culture coevolution.
The evolution of complex societies in the last ﬁve millennia
has generated a diverse array of social groups that can vary
culturally, compete, and be subject to group selection. We
discuss business ﬁrms and religions as examples. While
modern nations and the subgroups of which they are com-
posed differ in many ways from ancestral tribes, they rest
on the innate foundations that evolved from competition
between ethnolinguistic units (Richerson & Boyd 1999).
Given their short history, selection on modern groups will
not have had a major impact on genes, but we argue that
it has been very important in the ongoing evolution of
complex societies.
2.1. How human culture facilitates CGS
How do cultures generate the group-level variation that
CGS requires, and what sort of selective processes act on
that variation? In this section, we deﬁne the CGS hypothe-
sis by reviewing the mechanisms that make cultural inher-
itance and cultural evolution quite different from genetic
evolution.
The mechanisms that maintain intergroup variation are
the following:
1. Accurate, rapid social learning. Human cognition
includes adaptations for imitation and teaching that allow
the cumulative evolution of complex traits, including
norms and institutions that regulate social behavior (Tom-
asello 1999). See section 3.
2. Conformist social learning. If people tend to dif-
ferentially copy locally common behaviors, the homogeniz-
ing effect of migration will be reduced and group
differences will be maintained (Boyd & Richerson 1985).
3. Coordination payoffs. If the payoff to any strategy
depends on the local frequency of its use, then even sub-
populations in identical environments may reach different
stable equilibria over time. Frequency-dependent payoffs
and multiple stable equilibria are probably very common
in human social institutions (Cooper 1999).
4. Punishment of deviant behaviors. Punishment of
those who engage in uncommon behaviors can stabilize es-
sentially any norm within a group, regardless of its other
adaptive consequences (Boyd & Richerson 1992b). Since
these norms will often be inﬂuenced by historical happen-
stance, groups will often end up with different sets of
morally enforced customs. Punishment is a strong force if
the punishing is cheap to the punishers but costly to the
punished.
5. Strong prestige bias or one-to-many transmis-
sion. If people learn disproportionately from those who
are most prestigious or successful in their local population,
then the “effective size” of the cultural population may be
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small and cultural drift will diversify populations (Cavalli-
Sforza & Feldman 1981).
6. Symbolic markers of group boundaries. As
groups differentiate, the importance of learning the
locally proper behaviors and customs becomes increasingly
important. If neutral marker traits correlate with behavioral
norms that are difﬁcult to observe, then selection may favor
attentiveness to these markers as reliable signals of whom
to imitate (McElreath et al. 2003). Dialect is an example
(see sect. 4.2). This contributes to group differentiation
by facilitating in-group assortment and reducing the
chances that migrants are imitated, especially in those
regions where neighboring groups interact.
7. Institutional complexity that generates inertia
and reduces borrowing. Institutions are often a
complex array of norms organized to solve cooperation di-
lemmas and navigate the intricacies of coordination (see
sect. 4.3). The functioning of complex institutions is
highly dependent on tacit knowledge (Aoki 2001). Even
in-group members may have an incomplete explicit under-
standing of how an institution works, and the overall rules
driving the institution may be distributed among the
norms of various specialized participants. This makes the
institution quite opaque to out-groups, limiting the diffu-
sion of institutions between societies.
The high group-level variation between human groups
sets the stage for the evolution of group-beneﬁcial behav-
iors. There are three distinct processes by which group-
beneﬁcial behavior can spread:
1. Natural selection. Groups exhibit variation in be-
haviors that affect the rate at which they grow, produce
daughter groups, overcome resource constraints, avoid in-
ternal political conﬂict, succeed in war, and ultimately
replace other groups. This provides a relatively slow form
of selection for traits that contribute to group success
(Soltis et al. 1995).
2. Selective imitation of successful groups. If people
prefer to copy successful individuals, and if they have some
contact with out-group members, then members of less
successful groups will sometimes copy members of more
successful groups. This favors the spread of group-beneﬁ-
cial norms and institutions (Boyd & Richerson 2002).
This force may be especially powerful if the new cultural
characteristic is adopted by particularly inﬂuential group
members who are more likely to be copied by others in
their group.
3. Selective migration between groups. Individuals
in dysfunctional groups may migrate to another group if
they observe that the other group more successfully main-
tains behaviors that beneﬁt all members (Boyd & Richerson
2009). The resulting diminution of unsuccessful groups
may weaken their competitive ability and/or encourage
leaders to adopt successful foreign norms, strengthening
the two processes deﬁned previously.
All three selective processes will tend to reduce group-
level variation. Thus, the standing group-level variation is
a balance between variation-creating and variation-reduc-
ing forces. It is an empirical matter whether cultural evolu-
tionary processes can maintain substantial between-group
variation or whether, as is the case with genetic variation,
appreciable group variation is hard to maintain. See
section 4.1, particularly for a quantitative discussion of
this issue.
Throughout the remainder of this article, we will gener-
ally use economic terms, such as “cost,” “beneﬁt,” and
“success,” to characterize the contribution of traits to
CGS. Evolutionary biologists generally express such terms
in the currency of genetic ﬁtness. Cultural evolution and
gene-culture coevolution are considerably more complex.
A cultural variant that attracts many imitators has a repro-
ductive success which is not necessarily tied to biological
reproduction. For example, prosocial leaders gain prestige,
which may attract imitators not related genetically to
the leader. In the case of the three mechanisms of CGS
and the mechanism of gene-culture coevolution, we can
use models to specify the costs, beneﬁts, and success of
cultural variants in terms of changes in their frequency.
Model-ﬁtting approaches have been used to estimate the
strength of complex evolutionary forces in laboratory cul-
tural evolution experiments (McElreath et al. 2008). So
far, too few quantitative studies have been performed on
CGS and competing processes to allow for much but qual-
itative judgments. One of our purposes here is to make the
case that qualitative investigations already performed
amply support the pursuit of more deﬁnitive quantitative
data. We will discuss the relatively small number of pio-
neering quantitative studies of cultural evolution that
have been conducted to date (see, e.g., our Figure 1 in
section 4.1 of this article). This work has demonstrated
the feasibility of quantitative work on every phase of cultur-
al evolution. For example, ambitious efforts are underway
to use historical and archaeological data to construct syn-
thetic time series that will be suitable for quantitative
model ﬁtting investigations (Collard et al. 2010; Turchin
2009; Turchin et al. 2012).
Note that many cultural evolutionary processes generate
cultural variation and cause evolution. CGS is only relevant
to situations in which groups compete; it is not a complete
theory of the evolution of cultural variation.
2.2. The tribal social instincts hypothesis
If the three CGS processes described in the previous
section have operated over spans of time consistent with
the evolution of genes, then culture-led gene-culture co-
evolution may have favored genes that encourage group ad-
vantageous behavior.
How did human culture become evolvable at the group
level? Richerson and Boyd (1998) proposed a “tribal
social instincts” hypothesis to account for the emergence
of innate social predispositions that support the norm-
and institution-bound social life of humans. Once humans
could culturally transmit elementary norms, simple moral
communities would exist. Moral norms that evolved
under the inﬂuence of CGS would exert social selection
on human genes via mechanisms such as selective child
neglect, mate choice, and punishment (Feldman &
Laland 1996; Newson 2013). Perhaps the earliest cultural
norms merely solidiﬁed the bonds of kinship and reciproc-
ity that were evolving through participation in systems of
cooperative breeding (Chapais 2008; Hrdy 2009). Infants
younger than one year prefer puppets that are helpful to
others over those that are antisocial (Hamlin et al. 2011),
suggesting that our social predispositions are partly
innate. See section 4.2 for more evidence on this point.
The complexity of technology that a group can maintain
is a function of its size (Henrich 2004; Shennan 2001).
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Docile individuals more inclined to conform to norms
would ﬁnd it easier to enter larger more norm-bound
groups and hence be able to acquire more sophisticated
technology (Simon 1990). A population of more docile in-
dividuals could then permit the cultural evolution of slightly
more sophisticated and effective norms. This would allow
groups to maintain more reliable cooperation and tools,
which would, in turn, be favored by CGS acting on this
variation.
A recent quantitative estimate of rates of cultural evolu-
tion using a large body of historical and archaeological
data showed that it evolves considerably faster than genes
(Perreault 2012). Cultural evolution will thus tend to be
the leading process, and genetic evolution the lagging
process, in gene-culture coevolution. Over repeated
rounds of such coevolution, stretching back perhaps
several hundred thousand years, our Pleistocene ancestors
came to have institutionalized social systems with (if ethno-
graphic analogs are reliable) complex sets of linked norms
organizing tribal societies of a few hundred to a few thou-
sand people (Hill et al. 2014). At some point, language
became sufﬁciently rich that complex norms could be ex-
plained to children, and participants could make promises,
negotiate conﬂicts, and discuss institutional innovations
(see sect. 6.1).
Several hypotheses compete with this coevolutionary
account. Ayala (2010) argues that natural selection acted
directly on human cognitive capacities to the point that
all of the innate underpinnings necessary for the mainte-
nance of norms and institutions were in place before the
cultural transmission of them was important. Other ac-
counts root human sociality in genetically evolved skills
for social exchange, with no important role for cultural evo-
lution (Tooby & Cosmides 1992).
Evidence currently exists that supports the hypothesis of
culture-led gene-culture coevolution for a few simple
genetic traits whose function is well known, but unfortu-
nately not yet for genes related to behavior. The best under-
stood examples of culture-led gene-culture coevolution are
adult lactase persistence (Durham 1991) and the hemoglo-
bin polymorphisms that confer resistance tomalaria (Allison
1964). Recent molecular evidence suggests that the genes
associated with these and other phenotypic changes swept
to appreciable frequencies in the Holocene, as agricultural
diets exerted selective pressures on digestive physiology
(Itan et al. 2009; Tishkoff et al. 2007) and human popula-
tions became dense enough to carry epidemic diseases
(Wolfe et al. 2007). The dramatic changes of modern envi-
ronments are resulting in detectable selection on genes
related to health and fertility (Byars et al. 2010; Kohler
et al. 1999). Genome-wide scans for genes under selection
and comparative studies on chimpanzee–human differenc-
es detect strong recent selection at a large number of loci
affecting genes that are expressed in the nervous system
and in hormone producing glands. These are candidates
to test the tribal social instincts hypothesis and its competi-
tors, but the speciﬁc functions of the selected alleles are as
yet unknown (Laland et al. 2010; Ross & Richerson 2014).
For example, if genes for docility were selected early in
the hominin lineage before we have evidence for sophisti-
cated culture, they are less likely to have been a product
of culture-led gene-culture coevolution than if they
evolved in the last 150,000 years as culture increased to
modern levels of sophistication.
Several possible cases of genes related to behavior
coming under culture-induced selection in the Holocene
have been proposed. Cochran and Harpending (2009)
suggest that the rise of modern urban occupations have
favored genes for higher intelligence in some populations.
Chiao and Blizinsky (2010) argue that neural processing
of social status cues differs between more and less hierar-
chical societies. The genetic mechanism proposed as a
cause of such differences is variation in a serotonin trans-
porter gene.
Genomic tools promise to substantially improve our
ability to test the tribal social instincts hypothesis by allow-
ing us to estimate the dates at which major selective events
occurred (Richerson et al. 2010). Ongoing advances in
whole genome sequencing will provide much larger and
higher resolution samples of genomes. Improvements in
statistical and modeling techniques promise to improve
the resolution for detecting signatures of selection, and
for discovering their selective consequences more easily
(Pritchard et al. 2010). Over the next decade, we can
expect a ﬂood of new data that can be used to test hypoth-
eses related to gene-culture coevolution.
3. Culture acts as an inheritance system
Two quite distinct lines of evidence show that human
culture acts as an inheritance system. First, evidence
from developmental studies shows how a cognitive
system for imitation arises in the ﬁrst 12 months of life
and dovetails with adult behaviors that support children’s
social learning. Other apes have a much more rudimentary
social learning system. Second, historical evidence shows
that human culture exhibits a phylogenetic pattern of
descent with modiﬁcation in which ancestral commonalities
can be traced back thousands of years. Together, these lines
of evidence cast strong doubt on the idea that most human
behavioral differences have arisen via an extreme version of
the “evoked culture” hypothesis (Tooby & Cosmides 1992).
By “evoked culture,” these authors mean that human minds
have a universal psychological architecture, selected in
Pleistocene environments, which allows for the expression
of phenotypic differences during development in various
evolutionarily relevant domains such as social exchange
and mate choice. It is also difﬁcult to see how the develop-
mental and historical evidence can be reconciled with an
extreme version of the later improvisational intelligence hy-
pothesis of Cosmides and Tooby (2001). Individual humans
might invent complex adaptations on the spot as needed,
with little or no need to depend on cultural inherited tradi-
tions. If this were so, children would have little need to
acquire complex adaptations with a system adapted for
high-ﬁdelity imitation. Nor would we observe deep phylo-
genetic patterns in comparative and historical data; high
rates of individual improvisational innovation would
rapidly erase any historical signal due to culture transmis-
sion by accurate imitation. This is not to defend a blank
slate hypothesis. Gene-based cognitive constraints on cul-
tural evolution are surely many. Nor do we mean to
imply that humans are not highly intelligent. Nor are we
even sure that anyone defends extreme versions of the
evoked culture or improvisational intelligence hypotheses.
It is easy to imagine that a phenomenon like religion is
co-produced by genetically inherited cognitive biases and
Richerson et al.: Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation
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the cultural transmission of speciﬁc religious doctrines
(Gervais et al. 2011), and the great speed of cultural relative
to genetic evolution no doubt owes much to our capacity
for foresightful innovation (Perreault 2012).
3.1. A cognitive system for accurate, voluminous cultural
transmission
Children have powerful cognitive systems evolved to
acquire quite complex cultural knowledge from their
elders. Adults and knowledgeable children also appear to
be adapted to behave in ways that scaffold the learning of
naïve children (Csibra & Gergely 2011; Dean et al. 2012;
Kline 2015). The transmission of complex cultural informa-
tion and its cumulative evolution requires accurate imita-
tion (Tennie et al. 2009). Nonhuman social learners
tested so far lack the skills necessary to acquire a large rep-
ertoire of complex skills, and there are so far no reports of
nonhumans having acquired complex traits (traits com-
posed of more than two or three separate innovations) by
social learning. Human children routinely learn concepts
with help from knowledgeable others that qualitatively
transcend innate intuitions (Carey 2009). In the 1970s
and 1980s, a highly innatist hypothesis for language learn-
ing was a major part of the cognitive revolution (Pinker
1994). It has failed to account, however, for the wide diver-
sity of syntactic devices comparative linguists have since
discovered (e.g., Evans & Levinson 2009; Newmeyer,
2004). Most grammatical constructions appear to be cultur-
al features underpinned only indirectly by rather general
cognitive features (e.g., Hurford 2011). Research over the
last two decades has produced a fairly detailed picture of
how human imitation develops over the ﬁrst 12 months
of life (Carey 2009; Tomasello et al. 2005) and how older
individuals support the imitative efforts of children
(Csibra & Gergely 2011). The same basic system seems
to operate across all domains of culture (Harris 2012).
Human social learning contrasts sharply with that of chim-
panzees and other nonhuman animals. Chimpanzee social
learning focuses primarily on goal-related behaviors, such as
retrieving food. In comparative studies with human children,
chimpanzees tended to imitate only thebehaviors necessary to
reach a goal, while children diligently imitated all of an adult’s
behaviors whether or not they directly resulted in reaching a
tangible goal (Whiten et al. 2009). If adults suggest that it is
important, children will replicate adult actions in ritualistic
detail (Herrmann et al. 2013). This ﬁnding initially seems
counterintuitive – humans appear to unnecessarily “over-
imitate,” while chimpanzees seem better able to boil down a
streamof actions to only the necessary, goal-relatedbehaviors.
However, over-imitation is probably an essential adaptation
for building a repertoire of elementary skills and maneuvers
that will eventually be incorporated into complex crafts and
social institutions (Harris 2012).Many cultural adaptations are
so complex that the functional signiﬁcance of many elements
of them is opaque to learners and often to accomplished prac-
titioners as well. Carefully following demonstrated recipes
preserves functionality, albeit at some cost of replicating
non-functional elements.
Thus, studies of child development strongly suggest that
human social learning does accurately transmit cultural var-
iants over a wide range of design space in many domains
(Carey 2009). In section 4.2, we address the issue of the
cultural transmission of social norms.
Many experimental studies of human social learning
have been conducted on adults, mostly student volunteers
(Kempe & Mesoudi 2014). Individuals use a variety of
strategies to acquire social information, tending to favor
success-based strategies when such information is available
to them; conformist strategies are typically employed when
payoff-based information is unavailable or uninformative
(Molleman et al. 2014).
3.2. Descent with modiﬁcation
Darwinian evolutionary processes shape adaptations incre-
mentally. Marginal change occurs over each small time step
in history, followed by reasonably faithful transmission and
further marginal changes. Over many such time steps, the
evolving system can, but need not necessarily, change dra-
matically. Often successful lineages split, often repeatedly,
to formmany sister groups. The Romance language societies
are an example. A necessary but not sufﬁcient test of theCGS
hypothesis is whether the social systems of human societies
follow a phylogenetic pattern, the way genes do, thus demon-
strating descent with modiﬁcation. If the transformational
processes operating in human history were as strong as the
improvisational intelligence hypothesis (Cosmides & Tooby
2001; Pinker 2010) holds, then humans would routinely
switch such things as their political organization quite
rapidly and in large jumps, thus not leaving a phylogenetic
pattern. Similarly, the evoked culture hypothesis holds that
human behavioral variation is based on a pan-human
evolved psychology that is expressed in different ways in dif-
ferent environments (Tooby & Cosmides 1992). If this hy-
pothesis were true, phylogenetic patterns would also be
weak or undetectable; variation would reﬂect current
ecology, not cultural history. A pattern of descent with mod-
iﬁcation by itself does not test the CGS process against com-
peting evolutionary processes acting at lower levels of
organization than groups; it only establishes the action of an
evolutionary rather than a non-evolutionary process.
Historical linguists established that languages evolved by
descent with modiﬁcation before Darwin and his contem-
poraries began to apply the idea to biological evolution
(Müller 1862). Recently, phylogenetic methods, originally
borrowed from biology, have been applied to detecting
descent-with-modiﬁcation patterns in cultural data (Mace
& Jordan 2011). These methods have reached a high
degree of sophistication (e.g., Bouckaert et al. 2012). Lan-
guage phylogenies appear to be a reasonable proxy for pop-
ulation movements, often matching phylogenetic patterns
based on genes reasonably well (Cavalli-Sforza et al.
1988), albeit not perfectly.
The phylogenies of several large language families have
been investigated, including Bantu (Holden 2002), Austro-
nesian (Gray et al. 2009), Tupi (Walker et al. 2012), and
Indo-European (Bouckaert et al. 2012). The Walker et al.
study is notable for quantitatively estimating rates evolution
in several Tupi cultural domains (usually less than ﬁve tran-
sitions in 10 millennia). From the correspondence of lin-
guistic time-depth estimates and archaeological dates,
each of these language families appears to constitute a cul-
tural adaptive radiation based upon agricultural subsistence
and associated social-organizational features. These innova-
tions allowed their speakers to expand at the expense of
hunter-gatherers in the Early and Middle Holocene. In
the case of the eastern Austronesians, expansion was
Richerson et al.: Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation
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partly to remote, previously uninhabited oceanic islands.
Early farmers in Europe were clearly the result of a
demic expansion (Haak et al. 2010). Currie and Mace
(2009) found that the area over which a language is
spoken is more closely related to its political complexity
than to any other variable tested, consistent with the hy-
pothesis that CGS on social organization features correlat-
ed with language played an important role in the creation of
patterns of linguistic diversity. Historically attested expan-
sions of empires, typically accomplished by a mixture of
military conquest, assimilation of conquered peoples, and
migration into the more prosperous dominant society,
appear to exhibit all three CGS processes (Turchin 2006).
Language trees can be used as a foundation for studying
other kinds of cultural evolution. Such studies show that
features of social organization often include strong phyloge-
netic signals that are correlated with the linguistic signal.
Again, this is a necessary but not sufﬁcient condition for
CGS to have been an important process. Guglielmino
et al. (1995) studied 47 cultural traits, many of them
related to social organization, in 277 African societies.
They used correlation with language groups to estimate
“vertical” (within-culture) transmission, similarity to neigh-
boring groups to estimate “horizontal” diffusion from
linguistically unrelated groups, and correlation with vegeta-
tion type to infer the effects of adaptation to local environ-
ments. They detected a strong effect of vertical inheritance
of cultural traits related to family and kinship and the
economy, and a medium vertical effect on traits related
to social stratiﬁcation and house type. The effect of hori-
zontal diffusion was high on the division of labor by sex
and house type. The direct effect of environments was
strongest on economy-related traits and medium to low
on other traits. In other words, the effect of either vertical
or horizontal transmission was strong on all traits examined.
Currie et al. (2010) used the rise and fall of political com-
plexity in Austronesian societies to directly test the
descent-with-modiﬁcation hypothesis. They found that in
the best-ﬁtting model, political complexity increased and
decreased in incremental steps. The second-best-ﬁtting
model allowed for decreases (but not increases) in com-
plexity to skip intermediate steps.
Asmore historical and archaeological data are converted to
time series suitable for quantitative analysis, tests of descent
with modiﬁcation will become more common and more
precise (Turchin 2008). It should also be possible to estimate
the parameters of mechanistic evolutionary models to such
data tomore directly test the CGShypothesis and its compet-
itors. See Bouckaert et al. (2012) for a simple example. Of
particular interest will be investigations that trace the evolu-
tion of Roman law and similar institutions, as they were trans-
mitted both vertically and horizontally. Certainly, no
evidence carefully examined to date suggests that non-evolu-
tionary patterns dominate the archaeological and historical
record, as would be suggested by strong versions of the
evoked culture and improvisational intelligence hypotheses.
4. Culture exhibits group-level variation
If CGS processes are to operate on cultural variation, thenwe
must document appreciable variation at the level of groups.
Group selection on genes is generally implausible because
migration between groups prevents substantial genetic
variation from arising in groups larger than those composed
of close kin. In section 2.1 we reviewed the mechanisms by
which cultural systems can preserve much more variation
between groups of unrelated or distantly related individuals
than can genetic inheritance. Here we review the evidence
that between-group cultural variation is large enough to
support group selection and that the facility with which chil-
dren learn the norms of their own group shows how the cul-
tural inheritance system maintains CGS relevant variation.
4.1. Quantitative evidence of cultural differences between
groups
The more groups differ, the more effective CGS is likely to
be. The Price equation, a general depiction of selection op-
erating on multiple levels, can be re-arranged to express the
required conditions for a group-beneﬁcial trait to be
favored by selection in the face of individual-level selection
against the trait (Bell et al. 2009; Bowles 2006):
Group Benefit
Individual Cost
.
1− FST
FST
(1)
where FST is the fraction of the total variance that is
between groups. If groups do not differ at all for some
trait, then FST = 0, and if the groups have nothing in
common, then FST = 1. Developed to measure inbreeding
and genetic differences between populations, FST can
also be used to measure cultural differences. Equation
(1) says that traits will be favored if they have zero individ-
ual costs and positive group beneﬁts. Traits with some det-
rimental individual-level effect on reproduction and/or
survival can also be favored if group beneﬁts are sufﬁciently
large to satisfy the inequality. Figure 1 describes the level of
between-group variation required and plots the relation-
ship between the minimum required beneﬁt-to-cost ratio
and the level of cultural differences represented in Equa-
tion (1). Note that the scope for group selection is sensitive
to changes in low values of FST, because the minimum con-
dition declines geometrically with a linear increase in FST.
This relationship suggests that evolutionary forces that
create relatively small differences between similar groups
Figure 1. The scope for group selection. The curve is the
minimum variation required for a group-beneﬁcial trait to be
favored by natural selection as a function of the level of cultural
differences between groups (FST). The points are cultural FST
measurements across several kinds of group identities. For
details, see the appendix.
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can provide some scope for group selection in cases where
group beneﬁts are high relative to costs.
Aside froma fewcases (e.g.,Edgerton1971), computing cul-
tural FST from ethnographic data is not possible because most
ethnographers studying simple societies report only normative
behavior and neglect individual variation. Ethnographers and
historians tacitly assume that individual variation for normative
behaviors is typically small within groups, is large between
groups, and grows larger with time in most lineages. If this is
correct, the scope for CGS is large. To test the assumption,
we used publically available datasets to measure variation in
normative beliefs and behaviors within and between contem-
porary populations. These data capture within- and between-
group differences at various scales, from the national level to
small political groups within larger communities.
We calculated the cultural FST of a wide range of neigh-
boring groups for a wide range of beliefs and behaviors
(Fig. 1) using data from responses to international and
state-level surveys, such as the World Values Survey, the
AfroBarometer, the Public Policy Institute of California
statewide surveys, the Scottish Health Survey, and the
Anwar Sadat Chair Arab Public Opinion Surveys, among
many others. Together, these datasets provide a compre-
hensive report of opinions and behaviors in group-level or-
ganizations that are important in human societies: political,
religious, ethnic, geographic, and socioeconomic identities.
Some measurements are based on responses to one or two
questions in a survey, analogous to one or two loci for a
genetic FST. Others are based on many questions and
thus reﬂect broader level differences between groups. All
measurements select questions that relate to a particular
theme relevant to group performance, such as attitudes
toward immigration, a state-controlled economy, or the
adoption of strict religious codes. Details can be found in
the table in the appendix of this article.
Consistent with the hypothesis that individual variation
for many normative beliefs and behaviors is small within
groups and large between groups, we ﬁnd large between-
group differences among all groups of all scales (Fig. 1).
Among small political or ethnic groups, nations, and reli-
gious majorities, we consistently report FST values
greater than 0.01, with some traits showing FST scores
above 0.6. These values are important, as small increases
in cultural FST beyond 0.01 increase the possibility for
CGS dramatically. Our data reach well into the plateau of
the L-shaped region of the group selection condition.
The large cultural differences measured in this analysis
suggest a wide scope for CGS. Our average measurements
of cultural FST place the group-beneﬁt-to-cost requirement
well within range of some important cultural behaviors. As
described in section 5 further on in this article, some cultural
variants provide a distinct advantage over other groups, out-
weighing the individual costs of implementation. Bell et al.
(2009) compared cultural FST from the World Values
Survey with genetic FST from Cavalli-Sforza et al.’s (1994)
classic study. For neighboring groups that might actually
compete, culturalFST is approximately an order ofmagnitude
larger that genetic FST. These data suggest that the scope for
CGS is substantially higher than for genetic group selection.
4.2. The transmission of social norms
Social norms are among the cultural traits that children
readily acquire from adults and other children. Young
children are strikingly inﬂexible with social norms and
rules, resulting in young moral absolutists (Levy et al.
1995). Human children are also motivated to engage
with others to pursue a shared goal without any reward,
apart from the enjoyment of engaging with another
person socially (Tomasello & Carpenter 2007). For
example, children as young as 14 months will readily
provide instrumental help to an adult, and children of
18 months will help and cooperate with unfamiliar
adults. Chimpanzees’ abilities in this regard are more
limited (Warneken & Tomasello 2009). Attempts to
raise chimpanzee infants as if they were children are un-
successful because young chimpanzees rather quickly
mature into independent individuals that are not very re-
sponsive to being taught social norms, much less adopting
them spontaneously (e.g., Hayes 1951).
Not all potential providers of social learning are
equal. Even very young children prefer teachers and
social partners who belong to their own social group.
For example, preschool children preferred to learn
both linguistic and non-linguistic information from indi-
viduals who spoke with the same accent as themselves
(Kinzler et al. 2011), and 12-month-olds preferentially
copy the food selection choices of adult native speakers
of their own language (Shutts et al. 2009). The effects of
out-group discrimination and in-group preference based
upon cultural categories like race are evident as early as
3 years of age, when children begin to implicitly associ-
ate same-race faces with positive facial expressions and
different-race faces with negative facial expressions
(Hugenberg & Bodenhausen 2004). Children show
adult levels of racial in-group bias by age 6 (Dunham
et al. 2008), although language difference seems to be
a more intuitively salient marker than differences in
skin color (Kinzler et al. 2009).
By the time people are adults, much experimental
work by social identity theorists shows that, in many
social situations, individuals’ behavior is substantially in-
ﬂuenced by their affect-laden social group identiﬁcations
(Haslam 2001). “Who are we?” is an important compo-
nent of the question “who am I?” The accurate imitation
of cultural variation, especially group identities and
social norms, is the basis for heritable cultural variation
between groups upon which CGS can act. Social learning
biases, such as those described previously, act as a
general force adapting culture to local environments.
They tend to preserve locally successful social behaviors
and reduce the diffusion of cultural variation from one
social group to another (see sects. 2.1 and 6.1). Identiﬁ-
cation with a group sometimes results in derogation of
other groups. Attitudes toward out-groups are certainly
not invariably invidious, however, contrary to some the-
ories of ethnocentrism (Brewer 2007).
Norm transmission has not been extensively studied in
adults or undergraduate volunteers. However, early exper-
iments showed a strong conformity effect (Jacobs & Camp-
bell 1961), and rather ﬁrm socialization pressure with
normative content is observed in some experiments
(Baum et al. 2004; 2012). Insko et al. (1983) demonstrated
the evolution of institutions in a multi-generation experi-
ment designed to mimic the origin of states. Efferson
et al. (2008) showed experimentally that symbolic
markers and in-group favoritism coevolve. Derex et al.
(2014) showed that cultural transmission increases
Richerson et al.: Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation
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substantially in between-group competition compared to
within-group competition treatments.
4.3. Institutions are group-level cultural traits
Scott (2001, p. 48) provides a formal deﬁnition of institu-
tions: “Institutions are social structures that have attained
a high degree of resilience. [They] are composed of cultur-
al-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, to-
gether with associated activities and resources, provide
stability and meaning to social life.” Institutions are impor-
tant because they create and maintain variation between
groups while simultaneously damping down variation
among individuals within groups. Institutions only function
when large numbers of people conform to them. Institu-
tional economists often characterize institutions as equilib-
rium solutions to social games that include rewards and
punishments that act to induce individual conformity to
the institution’s norms (Aoki 2001; Greif 2006). As a
system of commonly accepted norms, they are a property
of a group and often vary qualitatively from group to
group. Institutions are probably an ancient feature of
human social life, ancient enough to have generated the co-
evolution of genes related to social behavior. The social life
of living hunter-gatherers is certainly heavily institutional-
ized (Hill et al. 2009).
Game theory tells us that in repeated games without
ﬁxed end points, the number of equilibria multiplies inordi-
nately. This is easiest to see in the case of institutions in-
volving moralistic punishment. If punishing is sufﬁciently
cheap for punishers and sufﬁciently costly to the punished,
punishment can stabilize any behavior (Boyd & Richerson
1992b). The empirical literature on village-scale commons
management is particularly well developed and shows that
the institutional diversity predicted by theory is amply man-
ifest on the ground (Ostrom 2005). Similarly, ethnographers
have documented ample institutional diversity between
small-scale societies that are our closest living approxima-
tions to Late Pleistocene societies (e.g., Jorgensen 1980).
Modern institutions vary substantially cross-culturally (e.g.,
Nivette 2011).
Henrich et al. (2004; 2006) have systematically investigated
cross-cultural variation using experimental games, including
dictator, ultimatum, third-party punishment, and public
goods games. These studies suggest that institutional variation
creates substantial differences in behavior. For example,
Paciotti et al. (2005) conducted ultimatum game experiments
in a Tanzanian village with two ethnic groups. The Sukuma,
who are an expanding population of agro-pastoral colonizers,
were found to have one of the highest average offers in the ul-
timatumgameevermeasured. ThePimbwe, in contrast,made
quite low offers. Interestingly, the Sukuma have a unique,
elaborate institution of village governance, which the Pimbwe
lack, and the Sukuma organize the provision of public goods
much more effectively than the Pimbwe.
Herrmann et al. (2008) compared the behavior of partic-
ipants in public goods game experiments in 16 diverse soci-
eties. Participants were given the opportunity to punish
other members of their group. Groups from societies that
achieved high rates of cooperation over the 10 rounds of
the game had high rates of punishment of non-contributors.
However, in some societies, participants sanctioned high
contributors as well as low contributors. In such societies,
rates of cooperation in the games were low. The authors
also compared the 16 societies by using responses to the
World Values Survey to construct indices of civic coopera-
tion and rule of law. They found that societies where exper-
iment participants used punishment to promote cooperation
also scored higher on these indices than societies in which
some experimental participants punished cooperators.
In section 2.1, we outlined how various mechanisms can
generate and maintain between-group variation in the face
of migration. One important institutional mechanism with
substantial empirical support is the marking of group
members through differences in dialect, dress, religion,
and similar symbols. These markings are often readily ob-
served and hard-to-fake symbols (e.g., Iannaccone 1994)
that are emotionally salient to their bearers. Symbolic
markers thus serve to identify members of distinct social
groups and subgroups and to deﬁne who is and who is not
entitled to beneﬁts from the activities of the organization.
Institutions from one group are often quite difﬁcult for
other groups to copy. The tendency of cultural items to
diffuse between groups is favored by “observability” and “tri-
alability” (Rogers & Shoemaker 1971). The institutions of
another society are often hard to observe because outsiders
can seldom see the entire system of rules working together.
Institutions are hard to try out, because for an institution to
be effective, some critical mass of group members has to
adopt its rules. Considerable collective decision-making and
learning effort must be expended to integrate a novel institu-
tionwith the other institutions of the adopting society. Greif’s
(2006) study of the evolution of early modernMediterranean
trading systems notes that institutional evolution occurs when
ongoing changes destabilize an equilibrium previously regu-
lated by an institution. Evolution then takes the form of a col-
lective, culturally local search for a replacement institution.
For example, the Genoese trading systemwas long regulated
by personal reputations. As the Genoese traders grew
wealthy, reputation monitoring became too time-consuming
to mesh with the increasing management responsibilities of
traders. Eventually they settled on a familiar formal legal
system modeled on Roman law as preserved by the Church
in the form of canon law.
If culturally transmitted institutions had a major coevolu-
tionary impact on the innate components of our social psy-
chology (see sect. 2.2), then for some part of our
evolutionary history humansmust have lived in institutionally
structured groups of a few hundred to several thousand indi-
viduals that were symbolically marked and shared a common
identity. Some authors argue that institutions only arose in
the Holocene (Runciman 2005), although archaeological ev-
idence and ethnographic insights from living foragers sug-
gests that tribal-scale societies were common in the
Pleistocene. Even the Shoshone, often used as an example
of the simplest sort of family-band society (Steward 1955),
had supra-familial institutions involving upwards of 15 sepa-
rate families to cooperatively hunt in winter camps and a
system for incorporating stranger families into these camps
(Murphy & Murphy 1986); because of the high mobility of
families, winter camps regularly incorporated co-ethnic
strangers. The Ju/’hoansi (!Kung), another primarily family-
band society, frequently organize at the camp- and region-
al-level when drought forces them to aggregate at permanent
water holes (Lee 1972). In 32 present-day foraging societies,
Hill et al. (2011) found evidence of frequent inter-band rela-
tions, low group genetic relatedness of co-residents within a
band, and substantial interaction networks consisting of
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unrelated individuals, all structured by institutions that differ
from society to society. Even “acephalous” societies (those
lacking formal leadership roles) use egalitarian institutions
to create societies with quite large-scale activities (Mathew
& Boyd 2011). See section 5.1.
How similar modern foragers are to Pleistocene foragers
is difﬁcult to say with certainty. However, a reasonable as-
sumption is that Late Pleistocene foragers exhibited a
range of institutional complexity comparable to modern-
day foragers. Archaeological data suggest that during the
Middle Paleolithic to Upper Paleolithic transition, about
45 k.y.a, coherent cultural groups with stylistically different
technology were moving about the Western Eurasian land-
scape (Tostevin 2013). African evidence suggests that
human use of symbolic markers goes back to about 164
k.y.a (Marean 2010). CGS could well have been an active
process as far back as symbolic marking is evident.
The strategies used to formulate tribal institutions are
widely applied to modern organizations such as churches,
villages, neighborhoods, clubs, business organizations, and
bureaucracies. For example, class and regional variations
are usually marked by linguistic differences (Labov 2001).
These institutional differences among groups in turn facil-
itate CGS via any of the three processes identiﬁed in
section 2.1. The increase in institutional size and complex-
ity in many societies in the Holocene is striking, but the ev-
idence does suggest that the organization of anonymous
societies using institutions has roots in the Pleistocene.
A theoretically signiﬁcant set of institutions are those that
regulate family life and small-scale partnerships. Mathew
et al. (2013) note that humans routinely engage in a
broader set of small-scale cooperative activities than do
our primate relatives, and they argue that institutionalized
third-party rewards and punishments often regulate such
activities. Marriage and kinship are examples. Almost all
cultures have one or a small number of standard, legitimate
marriage contracts. Mating according to such a contract
confers social beneﬁts of the cooperative breeding system
on the couple, and mating outside it is often signiﬁcantly
sanctioned. Kinship institutions specify the responsibilities
of family members toward each other. Dispute resolution is
an example of the institutionalization of small-scale reci-
procity. Many societies have such institutions of varying
degrees of formality (Nader 1969). If human cooperation
could rest entirely on innate adaptations for kin cooperation
and reciprocity, then why should these intimate relation-
ships require institutional support? More likely, institution-
al support is required if people are to enjoy the beneﬁts of
highly cooperative interactions even in small social units.
Marriage is a credible signal of commitment, for example,
because of institutionalized third-party enforcement.
Large groups will beneﬁt from maintaining institutions
that encourage their members to cooperate at the level of
small groups or families to the extent cooperation at such
scales is important economically and to the quality of
child rearing. For the case of marriage, see Henrich et al.
(2012b); for dispute resolution, see Gambetta (1993).
5. Social groups in competition
Here we consider examples of group competition in
modern humans through the three processes outlined in
section 2.1: selective borrowing between groups, migration
of individuals between groups, and selective extinction and
proliferation of groups. This evidence suggests that CGS
occurs wherever signiﬁcant cultural variation exists
between neighboring and competing groups.
5.1. Warfare
The two conditions needed for warfare to cause CGS are
(1) that variation in cultural traits between groups inﬂuenc-
es variation in success in warfare, and (2) that variation in
success in warfare inﬂuences the spread of cultural traits.
Losers of military competitions are sometimes killed out-
right and are sometimes voluntarily or involuntarily incor-
porated into the victorious society. Success and failure
are often due to variation in the competing societies’ tech-
nology, norms, and institutions. Losers or potential losers
will also often attempt to emulate the technology and insti-
tutions of stronger societies.
Humans can make war because we solve collective action
problems at large scales. Combatants experience the hazards
of war, but the beneﬁts of victory are widely shared, even by
those who avoid the risks. Human societies that successfully
suppress and sanction within-group violence, can still suffer
high mortality from intergroup conﬂict. For instance, in the
Turkana, a tribe of about one million people living in north-
ern Kenya, 1% of mortality among Turkana men is from vi-
olence among Turkana, whereas 50% is from inter-ethnic
raids (Mathew & Boyd 2011).
Formal models indicate that genetic group selection can
only support warfare in groups of, at most, a few dozen in-
dividuals (Choi & Bowles 2007). However, lethal inter-
group violence occurs between large human groups
within which genetic relatedness is low and individuals do
not know each other personally. For example, one WWII
engagement alone, the Battle of Stalingrad, involved
more than 1.7 million soldiers and produced over two
million military and civilian casualties (Glantz & House
1998). CGS can favor the evolution of warfare between cul-
tural groups comprising hundreds to millions of mostly ge-
netically unrelated individuals.
Even in politically un-centralized societies, CGS on
simple institutions can support large-scale conﬂicts. The
Turkana frequently raid neighboring ethnic groups for
cattle (Mathew & Boyd 2011). The scale of such raids
can be very large despite the absence of hierarchical insti-
tutions. The average raid includes 315 men, with some
raids including up to a thousand. Most participants are
not close kin, and participants come from a wide swathe
of Turkana society, including multiple sub-territories.
This means that reciprocity based on warriors’ reputations
cannot by itself maintain cooperation in the raiding party.
Instead, the Turkana have cultural norms that discourage
cowardice, norms that are enforced by peers who sanction
violators in their local group. In vignette studies, Turkana
raiders had very positive attitudes toward warriors who
raided animals from another ethnic group and very nega-
tive attitudes toward those who raided another Turkana
territory, even though the respondents’ own territory
would beneﬁt from the spoils in both situations. This
pattern strongly supports CGS operating among the
Turkana and neighboring groups having similar patterns
of ethnolinguistic-scale cattle raiding. The common
ethnic identity of Turkana combined with effective norms
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and institutions are the proximate cultural mechanisms that
make large-scale raiding possible.
Archaeological and ethnographic data suggest that
warfare occurred in a sufﬁciently wide range of societies
for long enough (Gat 2008) to be a gene-culture coevolu-
tionary force. Warfare occurs in societies pre-dating agri-
culture and sedentary living (Keeley 1997). Nevertheless,
the direct evidence for warfare in the Pleistocene is very
limited, and doubts about war’s importance before the Ho-
locene persist (Guthrie 2005).
As a consequence of warfare, the cultural traits of the
successful groups often spread and the cultural traits of de-
feated groups and polities often decline. Similarly, groups
with institutions that more effectively foster cooperation
are most likely to be the victor (Turchin 2003; 2006). Vic-
torious groups often expand their borders and absorb con-
quered peoples. The Mongols (Turchin 2006) and Nuer
(Kelly 1985) are examples of militarily successful societies
that absorbed defeated groups. Absorption may be
passive, in which defeated people adopt the identity of
the dominant group through marriage and/or migration,
or it can be coercive. Slaves captured by the Comanche,
and their subsequent offspring, became Comanche them-
selves after one or two generations (Hämäläinen 2008).
Cultural systems associated with Islam and Christianity
have also spread in part through military conquests, facili-
tated by coercive as well as voluntary conversion of
peoples dominated by the victors. Soltis et al. (1995) esti-
mated group extinction rates from the differential group
extinction and conversion of losers in a sample of societies
in Papua New Guinea. They found that the estimated ex-
tinction rates would allow a group beneﬁcial cultural trait
to spread to most of a meta-population in 500–1,000
years. This is consistent with the gradual increase in the
complexity and size of societies over the last 10 millennia.
Variation in economic systems and political institutions
between societies also affects military success. Agricultural-
ists ﬁnd it easier to stockpile resources to feed standing
armies than herders (Turchin 2006). Tilly (1992) argues
that sovereign territorial states out-competed both
empires and feudal societies because they were better
able to raise capital for military campaigns.
Over the past 200 years, democracies have been replac-
ing autocracies. Part of the reason may be because democ-
racies have been more likely to win wars (Reiter & Stam
2002). Democratic leaders seem to be better at picking
the wars they ﬁght, and they are more politically account-
able when wars are lost. Soldiers from democratic nations
also seem to ﬁght more effectively than soldiers from
non-democratic nations, even after controlling for wealth
and other measures of power, perhaps because they more
consistently report that they ﬁnd their government’s war
policies legitimate (Reiter & Stam 2002).
To summarize, warfare clearly demonstrates the require-
ments for CGS. Cultural traits that affect military success
are highly variable, and success in war tends to spread
such traits by all three forms of CGS.
5.2. Competition between economic organizations
Competition between human organizations is certainly not
restricted to violent conﬂict. Economic competition is an
important and typically peaceful form of CGS. Economic
CGS has a long history (Curtin 1984) and is very important
in modern societies. It is partly responsible for ongoing
rapid evolution in the domains of organizational rules,
structure, business practices, and technology.
Economists have noted that competition among ﬁrms
creates a Darwinian dynamic (Nelson & Winter 1982;
Schumpeter et al. 1934; Veblen 1898). Well-run ﬁrms
proﬁt and survive, while poorly run ﬁrms with losses
expire. This selection of ﬁrms in the market was part of
what Schumpeter et al. (1934) called “creative destruction.”
Some of the success and failure of individual ﬁrms is caused
by the structure, management style, institutions, and other
aspects of the culture of the ﬁrm itself. Business organiza-
tions have been a focus of social identity research and re-
search on the impact of social identity on organization
performance (Ashforth et al. 2008). New employees
acquire the ﬁrm’s culture through formal and informal
socialization and incorporate the ﬁrm’s culture as part of
their social identity. When those cultural differences inﬂu-
ence a ﬁrm’s success, CGS will occur. Nelson and Winter’s
(1982) highly cited classic argues that much of the impor-
tant know-how inﬂuencing ﬁrm success is tacit, embedded
in the skills of individuals and informal routines of interac-
tion. This information is hard to acquire by borrowing from
successful ﬁrms and even selective hiring. Hence, cultural
differences between ﬁrms tend to persist, and differential
expansion and contraction of ﬁrms is very active despite at-
tempts to acquire the practices of more successful ﬁrms.
Economists routinely study all three mechanisms of CGS
in competitive market systems. The differential prolifera-
tion (market entry and split) and extinction (market exit
and bankruptcy) of ﬁrms inﬂuences the future population
of ﬁrms and frequencies of business practices. Empirical
studies of selection on economic organizations owe much
to the pioneering work of Hannan and Freeman (1993),
which has attracted thousands of citations. An example is
the evolution of the synthetic dye industry in the 19th
century (Murmann 2003). The earliest synthetic dye ﬁrms
were British, but German ﬁrms lobbied provincial govern-
ments to support research chemists in their universities.
The students of the chemists often found jobs in German
dye companies, leading to the development of the ﬁrst in-
dustrial research and development (R&D) laboratories. As
a result, German companies were able to out-innovate their
British counterparts, and by 1900 they dominated the
global market. Inspired by successful large-scale R&D
during WWII, British and American governments, univer-
sities, and ﬁrms started to copy German R&D institutions
on a large scale (Murmann 2003).
The natural selection of ﬁrms occurs when corporate cul-
tures do not match the needs of the external environment
(e.g., McGovern 2007). Valuable information also ﬂows
between ﬁrms through selective imitation and best-practice
adoption (e.g., Bolton 1993; Haunschild 1993) as well as
patent licensing and corporate espionage. Information
also migrates with employees through processes such as
talent raiding (Gardner 2003) and spin-off companies.
Klepper and Sleeper (2005) showed that, in the laser indus-
try, spin-off companies do indeed inherit the capacities of
their parent organizations.
Substantial quantitative evidence for CGS within eco-
nomic systems comes from research on competition
between technology ﬁrms. For example, Derfus et al.
(2008) observed that the market for hard disk drives
created a headlong competitive race to stay near the
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forefront of technology; failure to keep up led to bank-
ruptcy. Such competition led to various market-level out-
comes, such as leapfrogging, in which organizations
competing from a lagging position were more responsive
to competition than better-positioned competitors
(Barnett & Pontikes 2008). A history of competitive
success tends to create a tendency for increased mistakes.
Higher failure and exit rates have been observed in compa-
nies with less competitive experience, such as monopolists
(Barnett & McKendrick 2004). Murmann (2003) found
that the originally dominant British dye ﬁrms suffered
through their lack of exposure to competition. A higher
rate of market entry and exit in the German dye industry
led to a greater exploration of different business practices,
resulting in greater variation and stronger selection. The
success of Silicon Valley derives from Valley-wide “ecosys-
temic” institutions that accelerate all three forms of CGS
(Hwang & Horowitt 2012). For example, new ﬁrms form
easily in order to exploit promising ideas, and investors, en-
trepreneurs, and founding employees expect that most will
fail. An efﬁcient system of gossip ensures a general aware-
ness of individuals’ reputation, reducing the risk that the
high mobility generated by rapid ﬁrm turnover will be ex-
ploited by unscrupulous individuals.
Modern nations intentionally regulate and promote CGS
in the economic domain (Motta 2004). Regulators force busi-
nesses to compete through anti-monopoly legislation. Patent
systems attempt to induce the socially optimal amount of
R&D. During the patent period, ﬁrms can recover large
R&Dcosts, but eventually everyone can use the off-patent in-
novation. Collusion and anti-poaching agreements between
companies are outlawed in order to guarantee competition.
International free-trade agreements attempt to limit national
protection of domestic companies at the expense of foreign
competitors. Therefore, the mechanisms of CGS are not
just present in modern economies, but are the deliberate
focus of institutional design at the national and international
level. In general terms, these policies, at least in principle,
beneﬁt ordinary citizens by tailoring economic group selec-
tion to meet common social goals. These national regulations
may themselves constitute another level of organizational se-
lection above the ﬁrm, in which governments, industries, and
other domestic organizations are selected over time via differ-
ential success, learning, and migration between countries.
The interplay between CGS at the level of the ﬁrm and the
level of the nation is the subject of much national and inter-
national political discussion.
5.3. Religious competition
The action of CGS on variation in religious institutions has
been observed in a number of historical and contemporary
populations, often resulting in the expansion of one cultural
group relative to others. Religious ethical systems are often
integrated into the basic norms and institutions of a society.
It is common for different religions to have different birth
or death rates, and they often compete for converts.
Scholars have suggested many examples of the role of re-
ligion in competition between groups. The advent of “Axial
Age” universalistic religions around 500 B.C.E. created
overarching ethical systems. They introduced the innova-
tion of doctrinal mode rituals that could unite formerly dis-
parate cultures and thus favored expansion of empires to
units large enough to resist Central Asian invaders, who
had perfected horse archery (Turchin 2009; Whitehouse
2002). Christians in the Roman Empire were more likely
to practice mutual aid and economic cooperation than
non-Christians (Stark 1997). Christian cooperators posi-
tively assorted through association in spiritual communities.
Non-cooperators were punished with ostracism. This com-
bination led to greater success in dealing with resource
scarcity and disease and thus to higher survival, reproduc-
tion, and conversion rates that eventually led to Christianity
being the state religion of the Empire and its successor pol-
ities. Early Islam promoted strict sacred norms of fairness
and unity among co-religionists, leading to its remarkably
rapid expansion. Reduced small-scale tribal warfare, in-
creased external defense, and the creation of institutions
that greatly facilitated long distance trade facilitated mate-
rial success, intergroup military success, and large conver-
sion rates (Ibrahim 1990).
Recent history suggests that competition between groups
based on variation of religious belief and ritual practice con-
tinues today. An analysis of demographic data from more
than 800 communes in the United States over a 200-year
period revealed a strong correlation between costly ritual
displays and the longevity of the commune (Sosis & Bressler
2003). Finke and Stark’s (1992) study of U.S. religious
history documented an overall increase in churchgoing
since independence, as well as large shifts among denomina-
tions. Hout et al. (2001) conducted a pioneering quantitative
micro-evolutionary study of the relative expansion and con-
traction of Protestant churches in the United States during
the 20th century. They found that variation in birth-rates
rather than conversion rates mainly drove the changes. Pro-
natal norms and strong cultural isolation are leading to rapid
demographic expansion of the more traditional or “Old
Order” Anabaptists (Kraybill & Bowman 2001) relative to
almost all other North American subcultures. The Anabap-
tist Hutterites are North America’s most successful commu-
nal movement. They have very high population growth rates
resulting from strongly pronatal norms and low apostasy, ar-
guably caused by their strongly isolationist practices (Sato
et al. 1994). The number of Evangelical Protestant churches
increased relative to that of Roman Catholic churches in
Latin America during the 20th century, mainly due to
their stronger emphasis on missionary work (Stoll 1990).
Not surprisingly, given the breadth of evidence, religious
variation is frequently cited as one of the most important
examples of CGS (e.g., Wilson 2002).
6. Evidence for group-level functionality
If CGS has operated on human cultures directly, and indi-
rectly on human genes via gene-culture coevolution, then
we would expect to ﬁnd clear examples of design for group
function. Arguments for group selection in humans have
often stressed the evidence from design (e.g., Wilson
2002), whereas we have so far stressed process-level evi-
dence. However, the evidence from design is also impor-
tant and compelling. We discuss language, social control,
and religion as examples.
6.1. Language
Language reﬂects the operation of CGS in three different
ways. First, language is necessary for sophisticated norms
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and institutions to function. Second, language only func-
tions if there is a considerable degree of trust among speak-
ers, who comprise groups far larger than families. Third,
language differences are among the most important
markers of group boundaries, and limited linguistic com-
munication makes the diffusion of institutions between so-
cieties more difﬁcult.
Humans use language to formulate and transmit social
norms and to operate institutional systems of reward and
punishment that stabilize these norms. Maynard Smith
and Szathmáry (1995) nominated language as the key inno-
vation leading to human societies arriving at a new level of
biological organization. Smith (2010) reviews the ample ev-
idence that language plays an important role in solving col-
lective action problems. Norms and institutions are
articulated publicly so that individuals can understand
them. Individuals who appear not to understand them are
typically subjected to verbal reprimands. Institutional
change is advocated and discussed in speeches and codiﬁed
by verbal consensus. In complex societies, written records
evolved to make possible quite intricate institutions. Even
the most selﬁsh political operators usually take care to
frame their public arguments to give the impression that
they are furthering the general welfare.
Much variation in norms and institutions is deeply em-
bedded in the vocabulary and syntax of languages (Wierz-
bicka 1992). Such linguistically encoded information is
often tacit knowledge that is shared by speakers but diffus-
es with difﬁculty to other languages. Language differences
thus help preserve the between-group variation that CGS
acts on. Expanding language families often mark the expan-
sion of a complex of technical and social innovations; the
Indo-European, Bantu, Tupi, and Austronesian families
are examples, as we have noted in section 3.2.
The evolution of the capacity for languages that can serve
cooperative functions is a considerable puzzle, because the
existence of human language presupposes cooperation
(Hurford 2007). Communication systems in animals are
largely restricted to costly signals or situations where decep-
tive signals can be detected and punished (Lachmann et al.
2001). In such systems, very little information is transmitted
and syntactic complexity is quite limited (Hurford 2007).
Unless listeners are able to trust speakers more often than
not, a complex symbolic language would be useless. If
most speech acts were self-serving and/or deceptive, listen-
ers would not bother to listen. Thus, at least a modicum of
trust and cooperation seems necessary before a low-cost
high-ﬁdelity communication system could begin to evolve.
Scholars often assume that language is the premier mecha-
nism for cultural transmission. If so, how could culture
itself, much less CGS, ever have gotten off the ground?
How could CGS have existed before language? A plausi-
ble answer is that culture was already tolerably complex
before the capacity for language began to evolve. Stone
tool manufacture may go back three million years, and
edge-wear evidence suggests that early stone tools were
used to make a toolkit of perishable materials such as
wood and hides. Merlin Donald (1991) hypothesizes that
Homo erectus and related Lower and Middle Pleistocene
hominins were talented mimics, and that mimesis served
as the evolutionary basis on which language could subse-
quently evolve. Donald reviews evidence that 19th-
century deaf-mutes could learn complex manual skills by
imitation alone. They also acquired basic social norms
and integrated themselves into complex institutions.
Dances and similar motor rituals are among the things
that pre-linguistic but highly mimetic humans could likely
acquire. Such rituals today have powerful group-bonding
effects and are therefore commonly incorporated into reli-
gious and secular patriotic celebrations (see sect. 6.3).
Thus, a scenario in which the capacity for complex trust-
worthy language evolved by CGS and culture-led gene-
culture coevolution (see sect. 2.2), is plausible. All the
recent evolutionary theories of the capacity for language,
beginning with Pinker and Bloom’s (1990) pioneering
article, are culture-led gene-culture coevolutionary hypoth-
eses. Theories differ mainly in the extent to which genes
have responded to the coevolutionary pressure with lan-
guage-speciﬁc cognitive structures.
Language diversity suggests that language is an important
component of CGS. The stunning diversity of languages
shows that differences between languages readily evolve
(Nettle 1999). Why? Following the arguments for the efﬁ-
ciency of having innate, information-rich cognitive
modules (Tooby & Cosmides 1992), having tight constraints
on languages ought to make them easier and quicker to learn
both for children and for people wanting to be able to speak
multiple languages. It is easy to imagine how tight, innate
constraints might affect language (Sampson 2005), but no
evidence of such constraints has been observed. Languages
are highly variable in every element that has been studied
closely (Newmeyer 2004). It might be that language differ-
ences, like other symbolic differences, evolve to limit com-
munication between groups (see sect. 2.1). Sociolinguists
ﬁnd that small but socially signiﬁcant dialect differences
emerge rapidly along social fault lines, implicating the
active evolution of symbolic marking rather than, or in addi-
tion to, drift-like differentiation of languages (Labov 2001).
Leaders of dialect evolution are typically individuals with
high local prestige. Social identity theorists have shown
leader charisma to be essentially a recognition by followers
that a leader is prototypical of the in-group (Steffens et al.
2014). The ensuing emotional identiﬁcation of followers
with their leaders probably leads to followers adopting the
speech variants of such leaders. The evolution of symbolic
boundaries to communication will help protect group-level
cultural variation from the homogenizing effects of migra-
tion, and thus favor the operation of CGS.
Linguistic variation is extremely important in maintain-
ing social structure and inﬂuencing social judgments, as
we saw in the case of children’s early learning biases
(sect. 4.2). In small-scale societies, language differences
generally mark the boundaries of groups that conﬂict
(Nettle 1999). It is as if CGS favors not being able to under-
stand those whom you likely cannot trust. Even at the scale
of businesses and similar groups whose members speak the
same language, group-speciﬁc jargon often distinguishes in-
siders from outsiders. Thus, an innate capacity for the rapid
cultural evolution of linguistic and other symbolic differ-
ences plausibly coevolved with group selection on cultural
variation (see sect. 2.2). Language variation helps maintain
between-group variation in other cultural domains, contrib-
uting to CGS, but it is also likely to be a product of it.
6.2. Crime, deviance, and punishment
Violent or peaceful competition between organizations
depends upon the preservation of between-organization
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differences, and to compete successfully, an organization
must solve dilemmas of cooperation among its members
(Wilson 2002). CGS will tend to favor societies that
produce public goods like defense, transportation infra-
structure, and a fair legal system. One of the most impor-
tant public goods produced in human societies are
institutions of order and justice that protect individuals
from predators and public goods from free-riders. All suc-
cessful small-scale common property systems have institu-
tions for monitoring and punishing defectors (Ostrom
1990). In contemporary societies, measures of culturally in-
herited trust are correlated with economic performance
(Algan & Cahuc 2010). Theoretical models (e.g., Boyd
et al. 2003) and experiments (Fehr & Gachter 2002)
suggest that moralistic punishment can be a very effective
mechanism for promoting cooperation. Thus, we expect
that the quality of institutions regulating crime and devi-
ance will play a signiﬁcant role in the performance of
human organizations. In experimental settings, people
readily migrate from model societies that do not have sanc-
tioning institutions to join ones that do (Gürerk et al. 2006).
In the coevolutionary long run, social institutions of moni-
toring, reward, and punishment were probably the main
factors exerting negative selection on genes that promote
antisocial behavior and positive selection on genes that
lead to prosocial dispositions (see sect. 2.2).
Punishers do not even need to be cooperative themselves
to furnish some of the beneﬁts of cooperation (Eldakar &
Wilson 2008), but many experiments have detected altruistic
punishment (Fehr & Gachter 2002). An important theme of
our argument is that the question of altruism as a proximate
mechanism is not central to the issue of CGS. CGS can
favor reputational and other motivational systems that alter
individual incentives, thereby reducing or eliminating the
need for altruism (Fehr & Henrich 2003; Panchanathan &
Boyd 2004). Altruistic behaviors have been the focus of
models and experiments because they are the hardest ones
to account for, not because they are empirically the most im-
portant. Careful experimental attempts to expose covert self-
interestedmotives have found support for an “empathy altru-
ism” hypothesis (Batson 2011). In experimental treatments
designed to induce research participants to empathize with
someone who is going to suffer a harm, many people will vol-
unteer to help the victim at a cost to themselves. Batson’s
program of experiments was designed to show that various
egoistic hypotheses could not entirely explain these results.
Models suggest that the evolution of altruistic punishment
is likely to be frequency dependent (Boyd & Richerson
1992b). If punishment is sufﬁciently costly to the punished
and cheap to the punisher, a relatively few punishers sufﬁce
to encourage reluctant cooperators and would-be defectors
to cooperate. Experimental studies using economic games
support the ﬁndings of models. They ﬁnd much individual
variation both in propensities to cooperate and to punish
non-cooperators (Henrich et al. 2010a; Kurzban & Houser
2005). Only a minority of participants act altruistically. We
are inclined to think that evolution has built an element of
genuine empathy and true altruism into our social psychology
because monitoring and punishment are costly to punishers
and to punishees, but many people obey norms mainly
because deviance is punished.
Historical and ethnographic data suggest that variation in
the effectiveness of controlling self-seeking behavior is
related to all three forms of group selection. For
example, Turchin and Nefedov (2009) studied dynastic
cycles in agrarian societies. Elite groups do provide services
in such societies, but they have a tendency to grow and
become increasingly corrupt over time. Corrupt elites
tend to be replaced by competitors who provide better gov-
ernance. Successful empires, such as those of ancient Rome
and Han China, had more effective institutions for produc-
ing public goods and incorporating new populations into
their expanding polities than their competitors. The increas-
ing acceptance of the rule of law in Early Modern Europe is
fundamental to that region’s explosive demographic and eco-
nomic growth (North et al. 2009). In the modern world,
large numbers of migrants move from countries with low
norms of civic cooperation and poor rule of law to countries
with more civic cooperation and better rule of law (Boyd &
Richerson 2009). Thus, we have ample evidence that inter-
nal regulatory systems control deviance and solve dilemmas
of cooperation to varying degrees of effectiveness. Much of
the last ﬁve millennia of human history can be read as a slow,
halting increase in the effectiveness of such institutions (e.g.,
Fukuyama 2011).
6.3. Religion and ritual
Religions furnish group-boundary–deﬁning symbols, moral
justiﬁcations for institutions of social control, and rituals
that celebrate and facilitate an organization’s solidarity. Reli-
gions contain effective mechanisms for reducing internal
variation through sacred principles and norm-enforcing
rules of reward, punishment, and exclusion, which bind par-
ticipants into moral communities (Atran 2010; Graham &
Haidt 2010; Rappaport 1999). Numerous studies have
found evidence for group-functional properties of religions
(Atran 2002; Atran & Norenzayan 2005; Boyer 2001).
The success of a number of key cultural innovations that
generate well-documented associations between in-group
prosociality and religious/ritual participation appear to be
clear examples of group functionality (Henrich et al.
2010a; Norenzayan & Shariff 2008). Belief in moralizing
high gods is associated with cooperative altruism (Johnson
2005; Shariff et al. 2009) and willingness to punish non-co-
operators (McKay et al. 2011). Ethnographic, historical,
and experimental evidence suggest that synchronized
dance and rhythmic ritual facilitate coordination and
bonding of groups, and relieve low-level in-group conﬂict
(Kirschner & Tomasello 2010; McNeill 1995; Rappaport
1999). Theoretical arguments (Iannaccone 1992), support-
ed by quantitative observations (Sosis & Bressler 2003;
Sosis & Rufﬂe 2003), suggest that costly signals of group
membership, such as hard-to-perform rituals and other sac-
riﬁces, help groups weed out free-riders and foster in-
group altruism. A common characteristic of religions is
sacred rules (Durkheim 1912; Rappaport 1999). They
supply a stable and enforceable moral code, held as inviola-
ble by religious adherents (Atran 2010). These often man-
ifest as prosocial rules, including norms of fairness and
norms of group defense, and also as symbolic systems
that demarcate in-group membership. At the same time,
of course, religions (and other ideologies), when used to
create in-group solidarity, sometimes create fear and
hatred of out-groups (West 1941). CGS is not utopian!
Non-religious institutions also carry out rituals as part of
their group culture, and they have similar effects. McNeill
(1995) gives evidence that the ritual of close-order drill
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reshaped warfare by facilitating in-group cooperation and
camaraderie, leading to the higher success of groups that
perform these seemingly functionally meaningless rituals.
7. Conclusion
The evidence we have outlined in this article makes the
case that culture varies between human groups ranging in
size from organizations within societies to ethnolinguistic
tribes and nations, and even multi-ethnic empires. These
groups are often symbolically marked, have more or less
formal criteria for membership, and possess distinctive
social institutions. This variation is transmitted to new gen-
erations by the human capacity to acquire norms and social
institutions via imitation and teaching. Institutions include
mechanisms of selective punishment and reward that
reduce small-scale variation in behavior. Human organiza-
tions compete, often in highly organized ways, and the
success and failure of groups in such competitions is
often determined by institutional and other cultural differ-
ences. As Darwin (1874) argued in The Descent of Man,
many human groups meet the basic criteria necessary for
selection to operate: heritable variation and competition,
the outcome of which is based on that heritable variation.
Ethnographic evidence of the prerequisites for and opera-
tion of CGS in the simplest societies suggests that CGS has
operated in our lineage for a few tens of millennia, if not
longer. If so, the cooperative imperatives produced by ru-
dimentary culturally transmitted institutions may well
have shaped our innate social psychology. This is reﬂected
by the observation that young children learn norms and act
on them, but chimpanzee societies have, at best, rudimen-
tary norms. Individual-level human decisions regarding the
invention of new cultural variants, the spread of variants by
diffusion, and the choices of group afﬁliation are likely to be
strongly colored by moral intuitions like sympathy and
patriotism. The current direct evidence for culture-led
gene-culture coevolution is only strong for genes that do
not directly affect behavior, but evidence regarding behav-
ioral traits is likely to improve greatly in the next decade.
We submit that the evidence sketched here is more than
sufﬁcient to justify taking the CGS hypothesis seriously as a
basic explanation for our species’ highly unusual ability to
create large societies with widespread cooperation
between non-relatives. We do not see how any of the alter-
natives to CGS can easily account for the institutionalized
cooperation that characterizes human societies. We cer-
tainly do not claim that a large body of studies has met
the gold standard of accurately estimating the strength of
any of the three CGS processes we have discussed. Nor
have we estimated the strength of culture-based social se-
lection on human genes. These projects are in their
infancy. We have pointed to excellent pioneering studies
showing that a proper quantitative investigation of cultural
evolution and gene-culture coevolution is possible (e.g.,
Bouckaert et al. 2012; Hout et al. 2001; Itan et al. 2009).
We need an empirical game theory that estimates costs
and beneﬁts generated by people playing various strategies
in institutional games. Do individuals bear costs or neglect
to take beneﬁts that accrue to them as individuals in order
to beneﬁt their social groups? How large are such beneﬁts
and costs? Are organizations with many individuals who are
willing to bear costs or forego beneﬁts really more likely to
win contests with other groups, or attract imitators and im-
migrants? How does rewarding individuals with prestige or
symbolically with medals and prizes affect their genetic
ﬁtness or cultural success? The bad news is that the
games people play are very complex, and many of those
most relevant to human evolution took place many genera-
tions ago. The good news is that evolutionary biologists
have struggled fairly successfully with similar complexities
in organic evolution (Endler 1986).
Appendix
Table 1. Description of data with corresponding FST values plotted in Figure 1.
Data description Groups (sample size) Group type
(1=religious,
2=political,
3=ethnic,
4=nations/
provinces)
FST Reference
Survey (Nov13–Nov24 2006).
Public opinion amidst rising
violence in Afghanistan.
Opinions on the US, Osama
Bin Laden, intervention by
NATO,…
Pashtun (872), Tajik
(718), Uzbek
(225), Turkmen
(50), Hazara (189)
3 0.065 WPO-PIPA-“Afghan Approval of the Karzai
Government and Western Forces,Though
Still Strong, Is Declining” http://drum.lib.
umd.edu/handle/1903/10120
Environmental attitudes in
California
somewhat politically
liberal (473),
somewhat
conservative (562)
2 0.098 Public Policy Institute of California, “PPIC
Statewide Survey: Californians and the
Environment”
(continues)
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Table 1 (Continued)
Data description Groups (sample size) Group type
(1=religious,
2=political,
3=ethnic,
4=nations/
provinces)
FST Reference
Environmental attitudes in
California
very politically liberal
(257), very
politically
conservative (338)
2 0.277 Public Policy Institute of California, “PPIC
Statewide Survey: Californians and the
Environment”
State-level opinion on the
allocation of resources by
State and local governments
Caucasian or White
and Non-Hispanic
(1375), Hispanic or
Latino (638)
3 0.041 Public Policy Institute of California, “PPIC
Statewide Survey: Californians and Their
Government”
State-level opinion on the
allocation of funds by State
and local governments
Born in the US
(1829), Not Born
in the US (662)
3 0.027 Public Policy Institute of California, “PPIC
Statewide Survey: Californians and Their
Government”
Attitudes toward taxation,
unions, immigrants, voting,
special elections, education
Afﬁliate a lot with the
Tea Party (92),
Does not afﬁliate
at all with the Tea
Party (426)
2 0.421 Field (California) Poll March 2011. San
Francisco, CA: Field Research, Poll 08-05.
2008 Survey. The role of clergy
in the political system.
(1) Statement A – Religion
must be respected, but clergy
should not dictate the political
system. (2) Statement B –
Clergy must play a greater role
in our political system.
Saudi Arabia (760),
Lebanon (600)
4 0.612 Shibley Telhami/Sadat Chair, University of
Maryland – Professor Shibley Telhami,
Principal Investigator.
http://sadat.umd.edu/surveys/index.htm
2008 Survey. The right of women
to work outside the home.
Saudi Arabia (760),
Lebanon (600)
4 0.591 Shibley Telhami/Sadat Chair, University of
Maryland – Professor Shibley Telhami,
Principal Investigator.
http://sadat.umd.edu/surveys/index.htm
2008 Survey. The role of clergy
in the political system. (1)
Statement A – Religion must
be respected, but clergy
should not dictate the political
system. (2) Statement B –
Clergy must play a greater role
in our political system.
Muslims (748),
Christians (92)
1 0.063 Shibley Telhami/Sadat Chair, University of
Maryland – Professor Shibley Telhami,
Principal Investigator.
http://sadat.umd.edu/surveys/index.htm
2008 Survey. The right of women
to work outside the home.
Muslims (748),
Christians (92)
1 0.105 Shibley Telhami/Sadat Chair, University of
Maryland – Professor Shibley Telhami,
Principal Investigator.
http://sadat.umd.edu/surveys/index.htm
Likely scenario for peace or war
with Israel
Muslims (748),
Christians (92)
1 0.009 Shibley Telhami/Sadat Chair, University of
Maryland – Professor Shibley Telhami,
Principal Investigator.
http://sadat.umd.edu/surveys/index.htm
June 2005 survey. Attitudes on
international trade policies and
the role of government among
workers whose jobs were lost
because of overseas trade or
changing industry demand
Republican (287),
Democrat (306)
2 0.061 The PIPA/Knowledge Networks poll, The
American Public on International Issues.
(continues)
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Table 1 (Continued)
Data description Groups (sample size) Group type
(1=religious,
2=political,
3=ethnic,
4=nations/
provinces)
FST Reference
July 2004. Attitudes on the use of
detention and torture for the
war on terrorism
Republican (126),
Democrat (165)
2 0.152 The PIPA/Knowledge Networks poll, The
American Public on International Issues:
Americans on Detention, Torture, and the
War on Terrorism
September 2007. Attitudes on
the further adoption of Sharia
law: As compared to current
Pakistan law, do you think that
Shari’a should play a larger
role, a smaller role, or about
the same role in Pakistan law
as it plays today?
Pakistanis from the
provinces of
Punjab (358), Sind
(269), NWFP (79)
and Blouchistan
(34)
4 0.041 WorldPublicOpinion.org, Pakistani Public
Opinion on Democracy, Islamic Militancy,
and Relations with the US; Sept. 12–28,
2007
June 1982. Attitude toward
whether abortion should “be
left as it is, made easier to get,
or more difﬁcult to get.”
Church of England
(653), Catholic
(189)
1 0.060 Walker, N. and Marsh, C., Public Attitudes
towards Sentenced Offenders and
Abortion, 1982 [computer ﬁle]. Colchester,
Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1983.
SN: 1898.
June 1982. Attitude toward
whether abortion should “be
left as it is, made easier to get,
or more difﬁcult to get.”
Catholic (189),
Atheist/Agnostic
(69)
1 0.146 Walker, N. and Marsh, C., Public Attitudes
towards Sentenced Offenders and
Abortion, 1982 [computer ﬁle]. Colchester,
Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1983.
SN: 1898.
(1982). Whether the respondent
agrees to homosexual couples
living together
Church of England
(644), Catholic
(188)
1 0.018 Walker, N. and Marsh, C., Public Attitudes
towards Sentenced Offenders and
Abortion, 1982 [computer ﬁle]. Colchester,
Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1983.
SN: 1898.
(1982). Whether the respondent
agrees to homosexual couples
living together
Catholic (188),
Atheist/Agnostic
(70)
1 0.040 Walker, N. and Marsh, C., Public Attitudes
towards Sentenced Offenders and
Abortion, 1982 [computer ﬁle]. Colchester,
Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1983.
SN: 1898.
2009. The respondent’s opinion
regarding same-sex marriage
in California
No preference/
Atheist (99),
Catholic (149)
1 0.021 Field Research Corporation, 601 California
Street, Suite 900 022509, San Francisco,
CA 94108. Final Late February 2009 Field
Poll –Questionnaire
2009. The respondent’s opinion
regarding same-sex marriage
in California
No preference/
Atheist (99),
Protestant (190)
1 0.131 Field Research Corporation, 601 California
Street, Suite 900 022509, San Francisco,
CA 94108. Final Late February 2009 Field
Poll –Questionnaire
2009. The respondent’s opinion
regarding same-sex marriage
in California
No preference/
Atheist (99),
Jewish (81) Other
Christian
1 0.179 Field Research Corporation, 601 California
Street, Suite 900 022509, San Francisco,
CA 94108. Final Late February 2009 Field
Poll –Questionnaire
2009. The respondent’s opinion
regarding same-sex marriage
in California
Hispanic (111), non-
Hispanic (547)
3 0.021 Field Research Corporation, 601 California
Street, Suite 900 022509, San Francisco,
CA 94108. Final Late February 2009 Field
Poll –Questionnaire
2006. Opinions on conditions for
peace with Israel (if at all)
Shia (145), Christian
(210)
1 0.337 Shibley Telhami/Sadat Chair, University of
Maryland – Professor Shibley Telhami,
Principal Investigator.
http://sadat.umd.edu/surveys/index.htm
(continues)
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Abstract: We examine the cultural group selection (CGS) hypothesis in
light of our ﬁeldwork in Northern Ghana and Oaxaca, highly multi-
ethnic regions. Our evidence fails to corroborate two central predictions
of the hypothesis: that the cultural group is the unit of evolution, and
that cultural homogenization is to be expected as the outcome of a
selective process.
While we agree with Richerson et al. that prosocial emotions play
a central role in fostering group cohesion (Acedo-Carmona &
Gomila 2013; 2014b), we disagree with them in their lack of
enough attention to the internal complexity within social groups.
Such internal structure, though, casts doubt on the role that
group competition is required to play according to the cultural
group selection (CGS) hypothesis, as well as on the role culture
is assigned. Two arguments are developed to articulate this
point, supported by ﬁeldwork evidence from Northern Ghana
and Oaxaca (México). These are regions characterized by the co-
existence of multi-ethnic, multicultural groups and are therefore
well-suited to put the predictions of CGS hypothesis to the test,
which fail to get corroborated.
Argument 1. The CGS hypothesis contends that the cultural
group is the relevant unit of selection for the evolution of coopera-
tion. It follows from this that members of a group should cooperate
equallywith anymember of thegroup, beyondkin. Instead,whatwe
found inourﬁeldwork is that individualswithin a grouppreferential-
ly cooperate with the members of their respective “trust circles,”
and that these trust circles are small groups related to a past
history of reciprocation and afﬁliation (Acedo-Carmona & Gomila
2015). The cultural group is amuch bigger unit, whose degree of in-
ternal cohesion derives from the topology of connections among
these small groups (Acedo-Carmona & Gomila 2014b).
This suggests that cultural groups are not the basic unit of selec-
tion of human societies – rather, small groups are, for the follow-
ing reasons:
a. Even in contexts where no common culture exists, individ-
uals develop social ties (Zhou et al. 2005) that make cooperation
possible, such as trust relationships.
b. The social brain is ready to develop close relationships
(Roberts et al. 2009). So, it is reasonable to think that psycholog-
ical dispositions to create and maintain bonds in their immediate
Table 1 (Continued)
Data description Groups (sample size) Group type
(1=religious,
2=political,
3=ethnic,
4=nations/
provinces)
FST Reference
2006. Opinions on conditions for
peace with Israel (if at all)
Shia (145), Druze
(27)
1 0.568 Shibley Telhami/Sadat Chair, University of
Maryland – Professor Shibley Telhami,
Principal Investigator.
http://sadat.umd.edu/surveys/index.htm
2006. Opinions on conditions for
peace with Israel (if at all)
Shia (145), Sunni
(143)
1 0.111 Shibley Telhami/Sadat Chair, University of
Maryland – Professor Shibley Telhami,
Principal Investigator.
http://sadat.umd.edu/surveys/index.htm
2009. Opinions on good State
governance in California
Conservative (314),
Liberal (204)
2 0.168 Field Research Corporation, 601 California
Street, Suite 900 100209, San Francisco,
CA 94108. Final Late September/Early
October 2009 Field Poll
2003. Georgia Poll. Do you favor
or oppose government
involvement in health care?
Democrat (128),
Republican (128)
2 0.016 Fall Georgia Poll, 2003, Survey Research
Center, The University of Georgia, Athens,
GA 30602 – James J. Bason, Director
2003. Georgia Poll. Do you favor
or oppose the U.S.
government spending $15
billion dollars on the AIDs
epidemic in Africa?
Democrat (128),
Republican (128)
2 0.008 Fall Georgia Poll, 2003, Survey Research
Center, The University of Georgia, Athens,
GA 30602 – James J. Bason, Director
2003. Georgia Poll. I worry that
pesticides on the foods I buy
will seriously harm me or my
family. Agree/Disagree
Democrat (140),
Republican (149)
2 0.048 Fall Georgia Poll, 2003, Survey Research
Center, The University of Georgia, Athens,
GA 30602 – James J. Bason, Director
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environment were selected (Henzi et al. 2007; Stiller & Dunbar
2007), before competition among cultural groups can even start.
c. Evidence from Northern Ghana also suggests that small
groups are more resistant and ﬂexible at a time to face to hard
challenges (Acedo-Carmona & Gomila 2014a).
d. Even in contemporary societies, small groups continue
playing a central role of structuring cooperation within the
society (sociologists call this phenomenon “social capital”;
Putnam 1993).
Selective processes at the cultural group level, therefore,
cannot be basic, but dependent upon their respective internal
structure of several groups, including kin-based groups and afﬁli-
ation groups, with different degrees of internal cohesion and in-
terconnection. For example, sometimes cultural groups merge
into bigger ones, and sometimes groups split: Competition
among groups may have little to do with these processes, but
rather with internal processes at the small-group level.
Argument 2. The CGS hypothesis predicts regional cultural
homogenization in the long run: If there is competition among
co-local cultural groups, the successful one is deemed to prevail
according to CGS, either by exclusion of the other, or by absorp-
tion/assimilation (by imitation of the most successful one, for in-
stance). However, this is not what happened, either in Northern
Ghana or in Oaxaca – on the contrary, both regions are inhabited
by a plurality of cultural groups, which coexist and also cooperate,
while keeping their distinctive ethnic identities (Acedo-Carmona
& Gomila, 2015). In both cases, there are different origins, a set-
tlement period, and a long history of interaction among the groups
within the same region, while linguistic and cultural diversity con-
tinues, despite the fact that some ethnic groups do better than
others in terms of status and welfare.
This suggests that the role of culture may have more to do with
reinforcing group cohesion than promoting group competition. A
shared culture may facilitate cooperation by inducing a positive
expectation from individuals whose identities and values are
shared (Tanis & Postmes 2005). But in a non-instrumental way,
it is not something one can choose. Culture migrations do not
take place strategically because individuals by nature do not
change their group identity (Bhugra & Becker 2005). The affec-
tive sense of familiarity and belonging provided by cultural iden-
tity is too strong to allow an easy detachment toward another
more advantageous culture. On the other hand, slow cultural
changes take place even in successful cultural groups.
The CGS hypothesis emphasizes the well-known in-group/out-
group bias (Chen & Xin Li 2009). However, the in-group bias that
contributes to foster internal cohesion does not need to involve
aversion to other groups (Mäs & Dijkstra 2014). This aversion
emerges only in cases of competition for resources (Foley &
Gamble 2009). From this point of view, cultural differentiation
appears as the by-product of an adaptive process to a speciﬁc en-
vironment by a society (Alvard 2003), rather than a way to
compete with other social groups in the ﬁrst place, while
keeping track of the basic forms of social cohesion (such as
trust). This approach also may account for the diversity of existing
cultures, even in the same territory: The prediction is that each
society will take advantage of some of the opportunities of the en-
vironment, such as peasants versus shepherds or merchants versus
state ofﬁcials, as it happens in Northern Ghana (Acedo-Carmona
& Gomila 2014a). Competition derived from population explosion
is a too recent phenomenon to have played an evolutionary role.
In summary, in our view, the cement of society is to be found in
the basic human disposition to trust each other, which gives rise to
small groups. Societies are constituted by these groups, and their
interrelationships are different. Culture certainly molds these in-
terrelationships and organization, according to tradition and envi-
ronmental conditions. But its role in fostering cooperation does
not seem to be primarily in providing a competitive advantage,
as claimed by CGS.
Cultural evolution need not imply group
selection
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Abstract: Richerson et al. make a compelling case for cultural evolution.
In focusing on cultural group selection, however, they neglect important
individual-level accounts of cultural evolution. While scientiﬁc discourse
typically links cultural evolution to group selection and genetic evolution
to individual selection, this association is due to historical accident only.
We thus call for more consideration of individual-level cultural evolution.
The target article provides compelling evidence that culture is a
real phenomenon that varies across groups and evolves over
time. The authors go on to argue that cultural evolution, with se-
lection occurring at the level of the group, is necessary for explain-
ing human cooperation. In doing so, however, they overlook the
importance of individual-level cultural evolution.
Cultural evolution need not be focused on group-level selec-
tion. As long as variation exists in ideas (or strategies, in a game-
theoretic context), and ideas or strategies that are more successful
are more likely to be adopted by others, then cultural evolution is
occurring. From a mathematical perspective, such a process is for-
mally equivalent to (individual-level) genetic evolution, and it can
explain both interpersonal cooperation and the emergence of in-
stitutions that govern human behavior.
With respect to human cooperation, consider the theoretical per-
spective offered by the social heuristics hypothesis (SHH), which
combines cultural evolution with dual-process models of cognition.
The SHH posits that individuals internalize strategies that are typi-
cally advantageous in daily life (Rand et al. 2014b) and carry these
automatic and intuitive responses with them into atypical social sit-
uations (such as laboratory experiments). Therefore, imitation and
learning, as shaped by one’s physical and cultural environment,
determine an individual’s internalized norms and preferences.
Such a process can lead to substantial variation in norms across
groups (as different groups inhabit different environments) and
support the evolutionof cooperation inone-shot anonymous settings
(via spillovers from the cooperation that is typically advantageous
due to reciprocity, reputation, and punishment).
Empirical support for the SHH comes from evidence that exper-
imentally inducing greater intuitive thinking promotes cooperation in
one-shot anonymous economic games relative to inducing delibera-
tion: Applying time constraints (Cone&Rand 2014; Rand et al. 2012;
Rand & Kraft-Todd 2014; Rand et al. 2014a; 2014b), conceptually
priming intuition (Lotz 2014; Rand et al. 2012), inducing cognitive
load (Cornelissen et al. 2011; Roch et al. 2000; Schulz et al. 2014),
or increasing the immediacy of payments (Dreber et al. 2014;
Kovarik 2009) can increase participants’ willingness to pay costs to
provide beneﬁts to strangers. Furthermore, cultural factors, such as
trust of daily-life interaction partners, alter participants’ intuitive re-
sponses as predicted by such a theory: Intuition only promotes coop-
eration among those who come from a culture of cooperation and
trust,where cooperation is thus advantageous (Capraro&Cococcioni
2015; Rand & Kraft-Todd 2014). Direct evidence of the spillover
effects that are at the heart of the SHHcomes from laboratory exper-
iments where participants are randomly assigned to interact under
rules that make cooperation or defection advantageous: Participants
experiencing a social environment that favors defection are dramati-
cally less prosocial in subsequent one-shot anonymous interactions,
but only if they rely on intuitive, heuristic processing (Peysakhovich
& Rand 2015).
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This theory accommodates the innate learning structures used in
norm acquisition (Hamlin et al. 2011), while also explaining cross-cul-
tural differences in norms and preferences (Ellingsen et al. 2012;
Gächter et al. 2010; Henrich et al. 2001; 2010b; Herrmann et al.
2008). Importantly, the SHH accomplishes this without an appeal to
group selection or intergroup conﬂict. An individual beneﬁts from in-
ternalizing successful strategies, and in typical settings where mecha-
nisms for the evolution of cooperation are operating, what is good
for the individual winds up also being beneﬁcial for the group. Thus,
improving the group’s welfare occurs as a side effect of selection max-
imizing individual payoffs, rather than as the cause of that selection.
What about institutions? By enforcing norms of cooperation, insti-
tutions play a critical role in stabilizing payoff structures that simulta-
neously optimize social and individual welfare. Can the emergence of
such institutions be explained by individual-level forces? Indeed, it
can. Consider the institution of democratic voting. Under a median
voting rule, for instance, individuals engaged in a group cooperation
endeavor each vote for a contribution amount, and then all partici-
pants are forced to contribute the amount speciﬁed by the median
voter (Bernard et al. 2013; Deacon & Shapiro 1975; Hauser et al.
2014; Walker et al. 2000). Under such an institution, even self-inter-
ested people would vote for contribution to a public good, because in-
dividuals earn higher payoffs in a group where everyone contributes.
Since the institution forces all participants to behave in the same way,
the free-rider problem is eliminated, and individual and collective in-
terests are aligned. Furthermore, similar logicwould cause individual-
level forces to favor joining or founding such an institution, rather than
preferring a scenario where free-riding was possible (and thus coop-
eration was doomed). Indeed, experiments show that people “vote
with their feet” and learn to choose institutions with sanctions over
a sanction-free alternative (Gürerk et al. 2006;Rockenbach&Milinski
2006). These studies capture the essential components of institution-
alized cooperation: When institutions can homogenize individual
behavior through norm enforcement, social welfare and individual
welfare are maximized by the same strategy.
Thus, cultural evolution and learning neednot be linked to group-
level selection, and genetic evolution to individual-level selection, as
is done in the target article (and inmuch of the literature on cultural
evolutionmore broadly). Both of these dimensions of the debate re-
garding human evolution can vary independently (Rand & Nowak
2013). A helpful analogy comes from American politics, where
social and ﬁscal conservatism, two independent dimensions of polit-
ical attitudes, tend to strongly co-vary because of the United States’
two-party system. However, these two variables do not need to co-
vary: An individual can be socially liberal and ﬁscally conservative
(e.g., libertarian) or socially conservative and ﬁscally liberal. Similar-
ly, scholars can advocate for the importance of cultural evolution
without invoking group selection, an intellectual space which is
often left unoccupied. It is largely due to historical accident that cul-
tural evolution and group selection have come to be linked (themost
successful proponents of the importance of culture are also advo-
cates of group selection). Continuing to develop individual-level ac-
counts of cultural evolution is essential for deepening our
understanding of human evolution and prosociality.
The burden of proof for a cultural group
selection account
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Abstract: Richerson et al. establish cultural group selection as a plausible
force in human social evolution. However, they do not demonstrate its
causal precedence for any trait, let alone its “essentialness.” To do so,
they must show that a particular group trait was caused by cultural
transmission, and directly caused differences in group ﬁtness.
Richerson et al. have done a tremendous job of establishing the
plausibility of cultural group selection (CGS) as a process of
social evolution. However, they have not shown that it is “essen-
tial” to human cooperation, or even that it has operated on any
single trait. Instead, they show that ﬁtness can be partitioned so
as to satisfy the conditions for CGS. This is an altogether differ-
ent – and much weaker – claim.
The total ﬁtness of a population can be carved up in multiple
ways and attributed to any number of traits, so long as ﬁtness and
trait values covary. This is one of the more pleasing results
derived from the Price equation (e.g., Price 1972; see also Hamil-
ton 1975; Marshall 2011; Queller 1992), and it should bury the
notion that individual- and multi-level selection accounts are pre-
dictively different. An allele that is favored in inclusive ﬁtness or
neighbor-modulatedmodels will also be favored in group selection
models (and vice versa), because the frequency of that allele is pos-
itively correlated with ﬁtness whether we conceive of it as affecting
individuals or groups. If CGS favors the same ﬁtness effects as se-
lection on genes (not a given, of course), then the ﬁndings in the
target article should not be news. The average ﬁtness of individuals
is necessarily correlated with the ﬁtness of their groups.
But just because we could view selection as taking place at the
group level does not mean we should. Although individual-level
and multi-level ﬁtness partitions are predictively equivalent, they
are not causally so (Birch & Okasha 2015; Okasha 2015; see also
Okasha & Paternotte 2012). Sometimes, group traits directly
cause group ﬁtness, but at other times the relationship between
the two is merely correlational. Using the wrong ﬁtness partition
will lead one to infer causality where none exists and, consequently,
mischaracterize the adaptation. If there is individual-level variation
that directly causes variation in individual ﬁtness (Fig. 1A), then an
individual-level partition is best. Of course, individual variation in
traits will also directly affect trait variation at the group level; this
is what Williams (1966) meant in saying that “a herd of ﬂeet
deer” will simultaneously appear as a “ﬂeet herd.” In this instance,
the target of selection is the ﬂeetness of individuals, rather than that
of the groups they make up. Conversely, trait variance at the group
Figure 1 (Barclay & Krupp). Causality in individual and group
selection. Arrows show the direction of direct causal effects. (A)
An individual-level partition is justiﬁed when the individual trait
directly affects individual ﬁtness and there is no direct
relationship between the group trait and group ﬁtness. This
results in an individual adaptation. (B) A group-level partition is
justiﬁed when only the group trait directly affects group ﬁtness
and there is no direct relationship between the individual trait
and individual ﬁtness. This results in a group adaptation.
Adapted from Okasha (2015).
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level that directly causes variance in group ﬁtness (Fig. 1B) is best
handled by a group- or multi-level partition.
Consider warfare as an illustration. In typical battles where
some live and die on each side, individual ﬁtnesses cause group
ﬁtness through simple summation. In ﬁghts where the loser is an-
nihilated (e.g., the losing battleship is sunk), however, individual
ﬁtness is directly caused by group ﬁtness – individuals succeed
or fail because their group succeeds or fails. A multi-level parti-
tion, such as CGS, is only warranted in the latter sort of case.
The burden of proof for a CGS account, then, is considerably
heavier than what the target article presents. First, CGS needs
to be tested on a case-by-case basis; it cannot be accepted whole-
sale because it cannot be distinguished from alternative ﬁtness
partitions in this way. A hypothesis for a particular group trait
must be set up against alternative hypotheses. Second, the evi-
dence must demonstrate the direct causality of the link between
the group trait and group ﬁtness (Fig. 1B), beyond mere correla-
tion. Third, the evidence must show that the group trait has
evolved and is maintained speciﬁcally by cultural transmission.
While Richerson et al. do not ignore these issues, their “sketch
of the evidence” falls short of making their case compelling.
Many alleged examples of group selection likely reﬂect individ-
ual-level adaptations. The requirements for group, as opposed to
individual, adaptation are rather imposing: It is rare for individual
human fates to be so intertwined with their group’s fate that group
success directly causes (rather than merely correlates with) indi-
vidual success, such as all group members succeeding or failing to-
gether as a unit because of their group’s composition. Generally,
we can expect group traits to directly cause group adaptation
only when partners are clonal or when there is extreme repression
of competition (Gardner & Grafen 2009; Okasha & Paternotte
2012), neither of which describes the human condition well.
The examples given by Richerson et al. do not come close to
meeting this criterion. Conﬂicts that lead to the success or
failure of entire groups would, but such circumstances are rare.
Moreover, many cases of ostensible cultural transmission are ex-
plainable as strategic, individual responses to existing socio-ecolog-
ical circumstances. Violent defense of one’s honor – a key aspect of
the “Culture of Honor” – in the Southern United States is often
given as a shining example of cultural transmission (e.g., Nisbett
& Cohen 1996; Richerson & Boyd 2005). However, current varia-
tion in income inequality fully accounts for any cultural difference
in homicide rates between the northern and southern states (Daly
& Wilson 2010). Similarly, behavioral differences between collec-
tivist and individualist cultures are supposedlymaintained by inter-
nalized social norms and beliefs (e.g., Markus & Kitayama 1991),
yet these differences can disappear when the expectations of the
different cultural groups are matched (Yamagishi et al. 2008).
Richerson et al. wave away alternative explanations by toppling a
straw-man of “evoked culture” that they readily admit no one holds
and by relegating as “narrow” the interpretation of experimental
research. They also ignore the fact that CGS explains genetically
detrimental helping by invoking the “mistakes” of an adaptive
learning mechanism (Barclay & Van Vugt 2015). More generally,
the study of cooperation has long been hindered by confusion
between proximate and ultimate causation (Barclay 2012; West
et al. 2011), and we can now add to the list a persistent confusion
over the utility of the group selection concept itself. We look
forward to future work on CGS that convincingly demonstrates
both the causal relationship between group traits and group
ﬁtness and the transmission of these traits by cultural means.
The cooperative breeding perspective helps
in pinning down when uniquely human
evolutionary processes are necessary
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Abstract: The cultural group selection (CGS) approach provides a
compelling explanation for recent changes in human societies, but has
trouble explaining why our ancestors, rather than any other great ape,
evolved into a hyper-cooperative niche. The cooperative breeding
hypothesis can plug this gap and thus complement CGS, because recent
comparative evidence suggests that it promoted proactive prosociality,
social transmission, and communication in Pleistocene hominins.
Richerson et al. address two key changes in human evolution, the
ﬁrst being how cooperation could evolve in the small-scale Pleisto-
cene societies of prehistoric times, and the second being how these
small-scale societies successfully evolved into much larger and
more complex societies during the Holocene. The authors’ case
for a role of cultural group selection (CGS) in the second transition
is strong. However, we will argue that the adoption of cooperative
breeding sufﬁces to explain the origin of human hyper-cooperation
in early forager societies, as it resulted in increased prosociality and
social transmission and favored the emergence of language.
Richerson et al. mention cooperative breeding as a possible
trigger of the process involving CGS, but argue that this alterna-
tive hypothesis is difﬁcult to test independently. However,
recent comparative work exploring the psychological and cogni-
tive consequences of cooperative breeding in nonhuman primates
now increasingly allows us to identify general patterns that reliably
emerge whenever a primate species adopts cooperative breeding.
It is thus most parsimonious to assume that such psychological and
Figure 1 (Burkart & van Schaik). The relationship between allomaternal care and (A) proactive prosociality and (B) social tolerance.
Humans ﬁt the general primate trend and do not represent an outlier.
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cognitive consequences also arose when our hominin ancestors,
but none of the other great apes, started to engage in cooperative
breeding (Hrdy 2009; Kramer 2010). Together, these conse-
quences are likely to have paved the way for the emergence of
CGS processes (van Schaik & Burkart 2010).
Proactive prosociality. The ﬁrst and perhaps most important
consequence of cooperative breeding is that it leads to higher
levels of proactive prosociality at the group level. To test this,
we used the group service paradigm, in which an individual can
provide food to other group members without receiving any
food itself, and applied it to 24 groups of 15 species of nonhuman
primates (Burkart et al. 2014). The results (Fig. 1A) show that the
extent of allomaternal care directed at immatures is the best pre-
dictor of experimentally assessed proactive prosociality within a
group, far better in fact than any other factor proposed so far, in-
cluding brain size, social tolerance, cooperative hunting, or the
presence of strong social bonds. Most importantly, humans per-
fectly ﬁt the nonhuman primate regression, suggesting that we
do not need a special explanation for our proactive prosociality.
Social transmission.Cooperatively breeding primates, the calli-
trichid monkeys, consistently show enhanced performance in
social learning tasks (Burkart & van Schaik 2010; Snowdon
2001) compared to their independently breeding sister taxa,
most likely due to their high social tolerance (Coussi-Korbel &
Fragaszy 1995), which, like proactive prosociality, demonstrably
increases with increasing levels of allomaternal care across pri-
mates (Fig. 1B). Indeed, callitrichid monkeys not only show
high levels of social learning, but also the best evidence for teach-
ing among nonhuman primates comes from callitrichids (Dell’-
Mour et al. 2009; Humle & Snowdon 2008; Rapaport 2011),
and not from the intelligent, yet independently breeding great
apes (Boesch 1991; Humle et al. 2009; Lonsdorf 2006). Among
non-primates, teaching is similarly over-represented in coopera-
tively breeding species (Byrne & Rapaport 2011; Kline 2015).
Communication and language. Callitrichids also show remark-
ably complex vocal communication (Rukstalis et al. 2003; Zuber-
bühler 2012), with large vocal repertoires and unusual levels of
vocal learning, both as immatures (including babbling) and as
adults, as well as vocal control (Roy et al. 2011; Snowdon 2013).
Intriguingly, and reﬂecting their prosocial attitude, cooperatively
breeding monkeys regularly use food-offering calls (Vitale et al.
2003) and cooperative vocal communication (Takahashi et al.
2013), in that they take turns in extended sequences of call ex-
changes that are based on conversation rules strikingly similar to
those used by humans (Stivers et al. 2009). Notably, apes altogeth-
er lack communicative turn taking. Information donation (in the
form of functionally referential food calls, teaching, or vocal coop-
eration; Takahashi et al. 2013) is thus over-represented in cooper-
atively breeding primates compared to independently breeding
ones. It is the basis for language, which explains why apes, who
possess most basic cognitive requirements for language but
largely lack this prosocial motivation (Tomasello 2007), never
evolved language.
These broad evolutionary trends can explain why human psy-
chology became different from that of the other great apes:
Alone among great apes, our ancestors started to rear their off-
spring cooperatively. Extensive allomaternal care is a better expla-
nation than the other source of human cooperation, male bonding
and the resulting cooperative hunting and indirect reciprocity in
food sharing, because in other male-bonded or cooperatively
hunting species, we do not see similar prosocial tendencies,
unless they also are cooperative breeders (Burkart et al. 2009;
Burkart & van Schaik 2010).
In sum, comparative evidence supports the idea that coopera-
tive breeding installed in our ancestors the psychological predis-
positions that functioned as the pre-adaptive substrate upon
which CGS could eventually be built: the design for group func-
tion (language – see target article, sect. 6.1) and mechanisms
maintaining intergroup variation (social learning – sect. 2; proso-
ciality – sect. 6.3). This argument enhances the plausibility of
CGS in the Holocene transition. First, without this foundation,
CGS has a circularity problem. High-ﬁdelity, low-cost signaling
had to evolve ﬁrst in order to allow gene-culture coevolutionary
processes to install a more prosocial psychology, which in turn
would have paved the way for high-ﬁdelity, low-cost signaling
and eventually language. Second, the adoption of cooperative
breeding offers a plausible explanation for why our ancestors,
but none of the other great apes, took this extraordinary trajecto-
ry. Thus, regardless of whether CGS is needed to explain the Ho-
locene transition to large-scale societies, cooperative breeding is
necessary to explain its operation in the ﬁrst place.
Mother–infant cultural group selection
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Abstract: Richerson et al. argue that “cultural group selection plays an
essential role in explaining human cooperation.”We believe that cooperation
came ﬁrst, making culture and thus cultural group selection possible.
Cooperation and culture began – and begins – in mother–infant interaction.
Richerson et al. “do not see how any of the alternatives to CGS can
easily account for the institutionalized cooperation that character-
izes human societies” (target article, sect. 7, para. 2). While they
make a solid case for the role of cultural group selection (CGS)
in human evolution and history, we think it is the evolution of
human cooperation that made the tribal social instincts and
CGS possible in the ﬁrst place, and that this occurred much
earlier than the authors think. To explain, we refer to Weingarten
and Chisholm’s (2009) use of Bowlby’s (1946) insight that “the
psychological problem of ensuring persistent co-operative behav-
iour” (p. 62) in groups was solved by the evolution of the capacity
of infants to develop, ﬁrst, an attachment to (a powerful emotional
valuation of) mothers and others, then, as they mature, to groups
of others, group leaders, and group “policy” (i.e., belief/value
system; Bowlby made speciﬁc reference to the cohesion, cooper-
ation, and altruism of combat units in WWII).
From the perspective of attachment theory – and infants –
everyone’s ﬁrst group, tribe, society, institution, ethnolinguistic
unit, and culture is the mother–infant group. (By mother we
mean “mother and/or others who act like mothers.”) Everyone’s
ﬁrst experience of cooperation is in the resolution (or not) of
parent–offspring conﬂict (Chisholm 2003). Because selection op-
erates only on phenotypes, and phenotypes must develop before
they are exposed to selection, we are skeptical of models of the
evolution of cooperation that attribute ﬁtness beneﬁts to adults
only. How did our adult ancestors learn to cooperate? What mo-
tivated them to cooperate?
Richerson et al. have little use for what they call “trigger hypoth-
eses” for the evolution of cooperation because they are difﬁcult to
test and “even themost innatist theories [of language, for example]
imagine a culture-led gene-culture coevolutionary process.” We
have little use for them because they are all about the behavior
of adults – but do imagine a mother–infant culture-led
Commentary/Richerson et al.: Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 39 (2016) 23
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X15000059
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 11 Feb 2017 at 15:42:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
coevolutionary process that set the stage for CGS. Like Richerson
et al., we do not think that kin selection and reciprocity are sufﬁ-
cient to explain large-scale cooperation, but again, think they can
explain where our cooperative motivations came from and how
theywere exposed to selection – becausemany of the “mechanisms
that maintain intergroup variation” are already part of the attach-
ment process. To wit, infants are capable of accurate, rapid,
social learning; infants conform their behavior to their mothers’
behavior; the infant–mother group is a moral community, based
on trust (security) and norms of interaction, and infants and
mothers punish each other for “deviant” behavior with resistance,
displays of anger, withdrawal, and so forth; infants learn dispro-
portionately from their “prestigious,” all-powerful, all-resourc-
es-controlling mothers; and infants engage in “dances and
similar motor rituals” with their mothers (Beebe & Lachmann
2014; Trevarthen 2007; Tronick 2007). Moreover, oxytocin and
subcortical brain systems subserve both infant and adult attach-
ment behavior (Lane et al. 2013; Nelson & Panksepp 1998;
Schore 2013; Strathearn 2011) and trust in experimental games
played by adults (Baumgartner et al. 2008; Kosfeld et al. 2005).
The basic mammalian social emotions (Panksepp 2011) provide
the utility function – emotional costs and beneﬁts – guiding
human choice, by infants in the attachment process and adults
in cooperation with each other.
Because there is no point in thinking unless one already has some-
thing of value to think about, the basic mammalian, “bottom-up,”
subcortical emotions have also been implicated in the development
of “top-down,” neocortical thinking (Damasio 1994; 1999), of which
theory mind is an early example. Theory of mind – and related con-
structs like intersubjectivity (Trevarthen 2011) and “time travel”
(Suddendorf 2013) – enables infants to learn through (not just
from) mothers by inferring (thinking about) their mothers’ beliefs,
desires, and intentions/actions in order to “choose” their own next
action on the basis of their innate value system, the basicmammalian
social emotions. Theory of mind is the beginning of culture – shared
or “we” understanding/intentionality (Tomasello et al. 2005). It also
varies as a function of attachment security (Fonagy & Target 1997;
Fonagy et al. 2007; Meins et al. 2002). As Hobson (2004, p. 94)
put it, “symbolizing, language and thought are possible only
because of the nature of the emotional connection between one
person and another, and because of each person’s involvement
with a shared world.” The cultural origin of human cognition is in
the co-construction of meaning by mother and infant. We therefore
partly disagree with Richerson et al.’s statement that “Perhaps the
earliest cultural norms merely solidiﬁed the bonds of kinship and
reciprocity that were evolving through participation in systems of co-
operative breeding” (sect. 2.2, para. 2). (Again, how did kin and co-
operative breeders learn to cooperate? What made them want to?)
We think the earliest cultural norms evolved throughmother–infant
cooperation.
This brings us to “docility,” one of Richerson et al.’s “trigger hy-
potheses”: “Docile individuals more inclined to conform to norms
would ﬁnd it easier to enter larger, more norm-bound groups”
(sect. 2.2, para. 3). If “docile” means less fearful and aggressive,
we entirely agree, for two reasons. First, secure attachment is asso-
ciated with less fear and aggression (Cassidy 2008; Fearon et al.
2010). Second, the Russian farm fox studies (Belyaev et al. 1985;
Trut 1999) show that artiﬁcial selection for “tameness” (reduced
fear/aggression) succeeded, not because “genes for” tameness
were selected, but because of the delayed development of fearful/
aggressive behavior in tame strains compared to non-selected,
wild strains. As a correlated by-product, the “docile” strains also
showed increased social-cognitive skills (Hare et al. 2005). Wein-
garten and Chisholm (2009) proposed that the evolution of
delayeddevelopment in humansmight havehad the sameeffect, po-
tentially explaining how human adults came to be (relatively) docile.
In conclusion, we believe that the tribal social instincts and
CGS were important very early in human evolution as our
infant ancestors evolved the enhanced social-cognitive skills
(theory of mind) that enabled them to “bargain and negotiate”
their way through parent–offspring conﬂict. The outcome, every-
one’s ﬁrst culture –mother–infant culture – repeated in every
mother–infant group for hundreds of thousands of years, resulted
in culture-led, gene-culture coevolution, and CGS. We are thus
inclined to agree with Ayala (2010): Complex cumulative culture
may well be an exaptation.
Intergroup competition may not be needed for
shaping group cooperation and cultural group
selection
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Abstract: Because intergroup interactions often are mixed-motive rather
than strictly zero-sum, groups often negotiate settlements that enable
both cultures to thrive. Moreover, group prosperity rests on in-group
love (rather than out-group hate) that emerges also absent intergroup
competition or comparison. It follows that cultural group selection
(CGS) reﬂects group effectiveness in organizing in-group trust and
cooperation, rather than winning (in)direct intergroup competitions.
Richerson et al. have identiﬁed ﬁve conditions for cultural group
selection (CGS) to be considered as a viable possibility to explain
cultural variation across groups and societies. One such condi-
tion is intergroup competition: “while modern nations and the
subgroups … differ in many ways from ancestral tribes, they
rest on the innate foundations that evolved from competition
between ethnolinguistic units” (sect. 2, para. 2), and “the
success and failure of groups in such competitions is often deter-
mined by institutional and other cultural differences” (sect. 7,
para. 1). The authors reason that intergroup competition for
scarce resources such as cattle and territory, market share, or re-
ligious supporters motivates within-group cooperation, and
creates cultural practices and culture-speciﬁc institutions. Inter-
group competition allows some tribes, ﬁrms, or religions to
survive and prosper, while others are marginalized. Ultimately,
cultural norms and institutions are thought to provide selection
pressures for genetic adaptations for social behavior, including
parochial altruism.
Here we question the importance of intergroup competition in
CGS and culture-led genetic evolution of adaptations for pro-
social behavior. First, we take issue with the tendency in
evolutionary theory in general, and in CGS in particular, to con-
ceptualize intergroup competition as a one-dimensional and
zero-sum game. Similar to inter-individual interactions (Deutsch
1973; Schelling 1960), intergroup competition can vary in the
degree of corresponding versus non-corresponding interests
(Bornstein 2003). In fact, CGS relies on variable-sum Prisoner’s
Dilemma game and Ultimatum Bargaining games when testing
(parts of) CGS theory (Bowles & Gintis 2011; Hagen & Hammer-
stein 2006; Henrich 2004). Furthermore, intergroup competition
often is multi-dimensional so that losses on one issue can be, and
often are, offset by gains on another issue (Aaldering & De Dreu
2012; De Dreu & Carnevale 2003). Accordingly, there are many
alternative solutions to intergroup competition than “winner-
takes-all,” including leaving the scene (withdrawal from the battle-
ﬁeld, entering a different market), or negotiating a settlement (De
Dreu 2010; Pruitt & Rubin 1986). Indeed, tribes and small-scale
societies not only raid but also trade (Horan et al. 2005), ﬁrms
merge much more often through negotiated deals than through
hostile take-overs (Martynova & Renneboog 2008), and disputes
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between countries may involve some hostilities and barbed-wired
fences, but rarely lead to warfare (Jones et al. 1996). Thus, inter-
group interactions often involve some corresponding interests and
can and are settled peacefully through negotiated deals that allow
both sides, and their respective cultures, to survive and prosper.
As such, it is difﬁcult to see whether and how intergroup competi-
tion is, or has been, a powerful selective pressure on the evolution
of group culture, and hence, culture-led genetic evolution.
Second, Richerson et al. suggest that this intergroup competi-
tion and CGS could explain cultural and genetic adaptations for
parochial cooperation. While it is unclear exactly what types of ad-
aptations can be hypothesized to exist via culture-led gene-culture
coevolution, research on the proximate mechanisms underlying
group cooperation does not seem to contain the footprint of inter-
group competition as a strong selection pressure shaping group
cooperation. Social psychology has discovered that parochial altru-
ism can be motivated by both in-group love and out-group hate
(Brewer 1999; Greenwald & Pettigrew 2014). In-group love
refers to the tendency to sacriﬁce immediate self-interest to
beneﬁt the in-group and its members; out-group hate refers to
the tendency to sacriﬁce immediate self-interest to harm, dero-
gate, and aggress competing out-groups and their members
(Allport 1954; Brewer 1999; De Dreu et al. 2014). In-group
love and out-group hate are conceptually and empirically dis-
tinct – in intergroup competition, humans may be motivated by
in-group love, by out-group hate, or by some combination of
both (De Dreu et al. 2014). Absent intergroup competition, or
even the presence of other groups, humans may still be motivated
by in-group love but, obviously, not by out-group hate. Intergroup
competition is but one of the many drivers of in-group love.
Moreover, a meta-analysis of studies using cooperation games
in psychology, economics, and sociology revealed robust inter-
group discrimination in cooperation being due to in-group love
rather than out-group hate (Balliet et al. 2014). Rivaling out-
groups were treated the same way as unfamiliar strangers, sug-
gesting that for cooperation it matters whether someone
belongs to one’s own group or not. Indeed, intergroup competi-
tion strengthens in-group love rather than out-group hate
(Halevy et al. 2008; 2012), both among adults (De Dreu et al.
2014; Halevy et al. 2008) and young children (Buttelmann &
Böhm 2014). In fact, oxytocin, an evolutionary ancient neuropep-
tide pivotal in social bonding, modulates in-group love rather
than out-group hate (De Dreu et al. 2010; 2011; Shalvi & De
Dreu 2014). Thus, in-group love can emerge both in the pres-
ence and absence of intergroup competition, and intergroup
competition motivates in-group love more than out-group hate.
Accordingly, there is substantial room for negotiated settlements
and peaceful coexistence of (culturally) different groups and so-
cieties, especially when between group interactions are multi-di-
mensional and variable-sum.
Third and ﬁnally, intergroup competition may not be necessary
to explain the (genetic) evolution of psychological adaptations sup-
porting (parochial) cooperation. For example, group membership
can be a cue that another person is part of an individual’s social
network and people may cooperate with in-group members to in-
crease their reputation to gain indirect beneﬁts from others and
avoid being excluded from the group. Intergroup competition,
or even intergroup comparisons, are not needed to bring about
these processes (see Balliet et al. 2014; Yamagishi et al. 1999). Ac-
cordingly, a more parsimonious and empirically more valid per-
spective may be that cultural group selection is the outcome of
individuals and their groups seeking to survive and prosper, and
who, therefore, create norms and cultural practices that sustain
and promote biologically prepared tendencies for in-group love.
Some groups properly adapt to a changing environment (the en-
trance of competing out-groups included), and others are less
able to adapt to changes in the environment (crop failures and
earthquakes included). Whether exogenous pressures are social
or non-social in nature, groups that organize and sustain in-
group love survive, prosper, and spread, and with them their
culture. In short, in-group love, not intergroup competition, is
driving cultural group selection.
Human evolutionary history and contemporary
evolutionary theory provide insight when
assessing cultural group selection
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Abstract: Richerson et al. provide a much needed roadmap for assessing
cultural group selection (CGS) theory and for applying it to understanding
variation between contemporary human groups. However, the current
proposal lacks connection to relevant evidence from the human
evolutionary record and requires a better integration with contemporary
evolutionary theory. The article also misapplies the Fst statistic.
We agree that cultural group selection (CGS) has been under-the-
orized and applaud the attempt to develop a more formalized
framework. However, there are two areas where the current
effort falls short. The ﬁrst is the lack of engagement with research
on the development of complex cooperation and shared intention-
ality in our evolutionary history. The second area is twofold and in-
volves the lack of explicit connection to many processes in the
Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES; e.g., Laland et al. 2014;
2015), most of which can assist in developing robust CGS argu-
ments. Richerson et al. also measure and describe cultural variation
and culture groups, the key elements in CGS, using radically differ-
ent, and often non-compatible, scales and deﬁnitions, relying on a
weak analogy use of the Fst statistic. These ﬂaws undermine the
strength of the argument, but are not lethal and can be corrected.
Richerson et al. seek support for their assertions with data from
contemporary psychology, ecology, economics, and cultural anthro-
pology, but do so without providing engagement with the evidence
for when or how human cooperation began, data that exist in the
archaeological and fossil record. The drive toward complex cooper-
ation and the incipient patterns of CGS are signiﬁcantly older than
suggested in the target article. There is evidence of complexity in
cooperative behaviors deep in Hominoid (ape) history and
complex cooperation between non-kin individuals is part of an
adaptive complex that predates the appearance of the genus
Homo (Herrmann et al. 2007; MacKinnon & Fuentes 2011;
Malone et al. 2012). In order to most effectively contextualize the
emergence and role of CGS in the genus Homo, we must
examine the Pleistocene evolutionary and archaeological record,
which provides material evidence that can support these claims.
The patterns and processes invoked in explaining CGS require
that we have a working knowledge of the material, behavior, and
ecological features of the expansive human niche across the Pleisto-
cene. Recent work (Andersson et al. 2014; Fuentes 2015; Grove &
Coward 2008; Sterelny & Hiscock 2014; Stout 2012; Whiten &
Erdal 2012) demonstrates that symbol-making and socio-cognitive
niche construction played a key role in our lineage’s success in
the terminal Pleistocene and is directly relevant to understanding
the evolutionary landscape of interactions within and between
human groups. This lack of engagement (there are only a few par-
agraphs with scant citations) represents a missed opportunity to
demonstrate the evolutionary history and processes central in de-
veloping the capacity for, and effects of, CGS across the evolution
of the genus Homo. Combining the material record, niche
Commentary/Richerson et al.: Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 39 (2016) 25
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X15000059
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 11 Feb 2017 at 15:42:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
construction theory, and paleoanthropological data sets creates a
key venue to test the theories presented in the article.
For example, there is archaeological evidence for symbol con-
struction, formation, and use that predates the appearance of
Homo sapiens (circa 200,000 years ago). Initial results from our
broad-scale assessment of these data indicate support for Richer-
son et al.’s assertion that CGS was active “as far back as symbolic
marking is evident.” While they suggest symbol-making may go
back to 164 k.y.a., there are earlier signs such as the engraved
bones from Bilzingsleben (Mania & Mania 1988) which may
date to 350 k.y.a. Ochre use older than 200 k.y.a has been uncov-
ered at sites in Zambia (Clark & Brown 2001), Sudan (Peer et al.
2004), and the Netherlands (Roebroeks et al. 2012), suggesting
complex behavior and possible CGS at earlier dates. We suggest
that key aspects of CGS emerged previous to identiﬁable
symbol-making and then coevolved, via niche construction and se-
lection (alongside drift and gene ﬂow), with that capacity to
develop a baseline for the radical leaps in complexity in the last
20,000 years that Richerson et al. focus on.
While we are supportive of the CGS concept, there is a lack of
explicit connectivity to the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis
(EES). Despite introducing three forms of cultural group selec-
tion, Richerson and colleagues retain a reliance on selection-
based processes as the key architect of function. This misses the
opportunity to engage with niche construction, evo-devo, pheno-
typic plasticity, and other processes in the EES under which “Or-
ganisms are constructed in development, not simply
‘programmed’ to develop by genes. Living things do not evolve
to ﬁt into pre-existing environments, but co-construct and co-
evolve with their environments, in the process changing the struc-
ture of ecosystems” (Laland et al. 2014, p. 162). The processes in
the EES, in addition to selection models, and multiple patterns of
evolutionarily relevant inheritance (genetic, epigenetic, behavio-
ral, and symbolic; e.g., Jablonka & Lamb 2005) are central to
the development of a more robust CGS approach. The current
article does invoke non-genetic inheritance and implicitly uses a
form of niche construction but does so without serious connection
to the theoretical toolkit available. CGS will be more robust if it
were explicitly connected to the EES.
We would be remiss if we did not note that cultural FST does not
function in the same way as a genetic FST does. FST measures the
variation that exists when a metapopulation lives in discrete
groups. However, the assumption that responses to one or two
questions on a survey are analogous to “one or two loci for a
genetic FST” is not correct. Variance used to calculate FST in
genetic or morphological contexts are based on physically deﬁnable
measurements, but the answers by Saudi and Lebanese citizens to
one of two questions about the role of clergy in the political
system are not truly quantitative measures. They are inﬂuenced by
multiple contextual and contingent (and linguistic) cultural variables
and cannot be treated as independent material measures analogous
to the number of alleles at a locus or inter-parietal breadth on a
cranium. It is not clear that a cultural FST measures what a genetic
one does or that such a measure is actually useful for assessing CGS.
CGS is relevant and should be incorporated into our under-
standing of human evolution, but approaches and analyses need
to be rooted in a contemporary evolutionary theory and the ar-
chaeological record, be untangled from certain assumptions
about selection and ﬁtness, and seek models and assessments ap-
propriate for cultural processes.
Societal threat as amoderator of cultural group
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Abstract: As scholars have rushed to either prove or refute cultural group
selection (CGS), the debate lacks sufﬁcient consideration of CGS’s
potential moderators. We argue that pressures for CGS are particularly
strong when groups face ecological and human-made threat. Field,
experimental, computational, and genetic evidence are presented to
substantiate this claim.
The debate on cultural group selection (CGS) would be more fruit-
ful if it considered the role of human ecology as a critical moderator
of CGS. In particular, we argue that ecological and historical threats
to human societies strengthen CGS pressures. As we summarize
below, there is substantial evidence from ﬁeld, experimental, com-
putational, and genetic studies suggesting that exposure to threat
increases the strength of social norms and punishment of deviance,
which are conditions that Richerson et al. identify as important
mechanisms that maintain intergroup variation. Hence, ecological
and historical threats can critically moderate the strength of CGS
pressures and may provide insight into precisely where, when,
and to what extent CGS occurs.
Field research across 33 nations ﬁrst documented the connec-
tion between ecological and historical threat and the degree of
norm strength in groups (Gelfand et al. 2011). Ecological and
human-made threats were theorized to increase the need for
clear rules and coordination for the purpose of survival –whether
it is to reduce chaos in nations that have high population density,
to effectively deal with resource scarcity, to coordinate in the
face of natural disasters, to defend against territorial threats, and/
or to contain the spread of infectious disease. Societies facing
these ecological and human challenges therefore develop strong
norms and sanctions for deviance (i.e., are tight) to enhance coor-
dination and deal effectively with such threats. By contrast, socie-
ties with less threat have a lower need for coordination, and hence
are loose, that is, haveweaker norms andmuch higher tolerance for
deviant behavior. Using archival and survey data, we tested this hy-
pothesis across a wide range of variables and found that societies
facing ecological and historical threats do indeed develop stronger
norms and punishment of deviance (Gelfand et al. 2011).
Further research conﬁrmed this relationship at the state level in
the United States. Harrington and Gelfand (2014) found that
tighter states (e.g., those which have strong norms and punish-
ment of deviance) have a greater degree of natural disasters and
environmental vulnerabilities, fewer resources (indicated by
greater rates of food insecurity), a greater incidence of disease
and health vulnerabilities, and perceive a greater degree of exter-
nal threat, reﬂected in the desire for more national defense spend-
ing and greater rates of military recruitment, as compared to loose
states. (i.e., those which have weaker norms and less punishment
of deviance). Individuals in tighter states also had higher levels of
conscientiousness – a personality dimension that reﬂects greater
impulse control, cautiousness, desire for orderliness, and confor-
mity to norms – and lower openness – a personality dimension
that reﬂects non-traditional values and beliefs, interest and curios-
ity toward new ideas, and tolerance for other cultures (John et al.
2008). Tighter states also had signiﬁcantly lower residential mobil-
ity and supported more isolationist policies (such as buying Amer-
ican products exclusively and supporting government restriction
of imported products) compared to loose states.
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Beyond these correlational results, evolutionary game theoret-
ical (EGT) models show that groups that face a high degree of
threat require stronger norms and greater punishment of deviance
in order to survive (Roos et al. 2015). Following existing EGT
models (Hilbe & Traulsen 2012; Roos et al. 2014), we examined
the evolution of strategies for cooperation as well as strategies
for a subsequent punishment phase in cooperation and coordina-
tion games. We found that exposing populations to higher degrees
of threat – implemented through lower base-rate payoffs – led to
an increase in the survival of agents that adhered to the coopera-
tion or coordination norm and those that punished norm-deviating
behaviors. Under low threat, the evolutionary pressures resulted
in a more diverse mix of all possible strategies. Besides showing
that strong norms and punishment of deviance emerges under
chronic levels of high threat, these models also found that tempo-
rary increases in threat cause norm strength to increase until the
threat subsides. Given that conformity and punishment are impor-
tant pressures for CGS (per Richerson et al.), it follows that in-
creases in ecological and historical threat contribute to the
conditions for CGS to occur.
Our electroencephalography work has also found neurobiolog-
ical differences in the detection of deviant behaviors among tight
and loose groups (Mu et al. 2015). Chinese samples, which report-
ed higher degrees of territorial threats, had stronger neurological
responses (e.g., greater N400) in the frontal region when viewing
social norms violations (e.g., Bob is in the library, he is shouting as
compared to Bob is in the library he is studying) in comparison
with U.S. samples. Moreover, stronger N400 responses mediated
cultural differences in a number of attitudes and behaviors, in-
cluding higher self-control and ethnocentrism, but lower creativ-
ity, among Chinese as compared to U.S. groups. More generally,
pronounced neural reactions to norm violations should enable
groups to enforce social norms and punish deviant behavior,
which, according Richerson et al., should further enhance intra-
group cohesion and intergroup variation.
Relatedly, using genetic data, Mrazek et al. (2013) argue that
higher frequencies of short (S) allele in the 5-HTTLPR polymor-
phism of the serotonin transporter gene (SLC6A4) persist in
regions of the world prone to ecological threat because heightened
threat sensitivity may be adaptive in such regions. Because the
S allele has been associated with more aversive reactions to moral
violations in groups, they suggest that threat-driven genetic variance
in the S allele may underlie differences in moral attitudes across
cultures. Their path model linking ecological threat, genetic vari-
ability of the S allele, the strength of social norms, and reactions
to moral violations provides plausible evidence for this argument.
In sum, as scholars have rushed to either prove or refute cultur-
al group selection, few have explored it as a phenomenon that is
modiﬁed by the ecological and historical contexts in which
human groups are embedded. Considering the role of societal
threat in theories of CGS could help resolve the debate of
where, to what extent, and how CGS occurs.
A framework for modeling human evolution
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Abstract: Culture-led gene-culture coevolution is a framework within
which substantive explanations of human evolution must be located. It is
not itself an explanation. Explanations depend on such concrete
historical evolutionary factors such as the control of ﬁre, collective child-
rearing, lethal weapon technology, altruistic cooperation and punishment,
and the mastery of complex collaboration protocols leading to an effective
division of social labor.
The target article nicely elaborates the strong relationship
between cultural group selection and gene-culture coevolution.
Richerson et al. correctly observe that gene-culture coevolution
signiﬁcantly strengthens genetic group selection models.
However, there really are no purely genetic group selection
models in the literature. All such models employ the phenotypic
gambit (Grafen 1984), in which complex transmission processes
are treated as though they were the product of a single allele of
the genome. Such models represent equally any transmission
process, cultural, genetic, or interaction between the two, that
depend only on vertical transmission from parents to offspring
(Gintis 2014).
The target article’s contention that cultural group selection is “a
basic explanation for our species’ highly unusual ability to create
large societies with widespread cooperation between non-rela-
tives” (sect. 7, para. 2) is incorrect. Cultural group selection is
not an explanation of anything. Rather, it is a framework within
which such an explanation can fruitfully be developed. The
main features of human cooperation, which include collective
child-rearing without a reproductive division of labor (Hrdy
2000; Wilson 2012), hunting large game with lethal weapons
(Wrangham & Carmody 2010), altruistic cooperation and punish-
ment (Bowles & Gintis 2011), as well as collaborative skills de-
pending on a theory of mind (Tomasello 2008), follow from the
particular evolutionary history of our species.
Curiously, the authors suggest that there is evidence for
culture-led gene-culture coevolution only “for a few simple
genetic traits” (sect. 2.2, para. 6). In fact, there is overwhelming
evidence for this process as central to the constitution of Homo
sapiens, a few pieces of which I will cite here.
Human Self-domestication: Darwin noticed that selective
breeding of mammals for tameness entailed a pattern of similar
side-effects of domestication to human society in distinct
species. Darwin even suggested that, “Man in many respects
may be compared with those animals which have been long do-
mesticated” (Darwin 1871, Ch. 7, p. 172). Belyaev (1979) corrob-
orated this insight, studying captive silver foxes bred for tameness.
These animals developed humanly attractive faces with short
snouts, ﬂoppy ears, patches of white fur on their heads, and
curly tails (Gibbons 2014). More recently, Cieri et al. (2014) doc-
umented domesticated syndrome changes in human evolution
since the Middle Stone Age and Upper Paleolithic, and Wilkins
et al. (2014) have proposed a general genetic model explaining
the domestication phenomenon.
This is evidence for a very straightforward culture-led group se-
lection mechanism in which an increasingly complex division of
labor and social norms that rewarded cooperation (Tomasello
2014) favored genetic changes that produced a more domesticat-
ed and prosocial human disposition.
Control of Fire and the Reorganization of the Human Upper
Torso: Prior to the control of ﬁre, hominins inhabited trees at
night as a defense against predators. Because predators have an
instinctive fear of ﬁre, the control of ﬁre permitted hominins,
who were already bipedal, to abandon climbing almost completely
(Wrangham & Carmody 2010). The lack of need for brachiation
freed the hand, arms, and shoulders of proto-humans to evolve
for other purposes (Gintis et al. 2015).
Lethal Weapons and the Physiology of Throwing:Hominins de-
veloped the use of long-range projectile weaponry, and such tech-
niques were central to human social life (Bingham 1999; Wilkins
et al. 2012). Humans are unique in possessing the neural machin-
ery for rapid manual-brachial movements that allows for precision
stone-throwing, which depends on the brain’s capacity to orches-
trate a series of rapidly changing muscle movements (Calvin 1983).
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Roach et al. (2013) showed thatHomo erectus had already evolved
this capacity for accurate overhead throwing. Humans are unique
in possessing a torso musculature optimized for the powerful and
accurate throwing of projectile weapons.
Language and the Physiology of Communication: The in-
creased social importance of communication in human society re-
warded genetic changes that facilitate speech. Regions in the
motor cortex expanded in early humans to facilitate speech pro-
duction. Concurrently, nerves and muscles to the mouth, larynx,
and tongue became more numerous to handle the complexities
of speech (Jurmain et al. 1997). Parts of the cerebral cortex,
Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas, which do not exist or are relatively
small in other primates, are large in humans and permit grammat-
ical speech and comprehension (Belin et al. 2000; Binder et al.
1997).
Modern humans have a larynx low in the throat, a position that
allows the throat to serve as a resonating chamber capable of a
great number of sounds (Relethford 2007). The ﬁrst hominids
that had skeletal structures supporting this laryngeal placement
were the Homo heidelbergensis, who lived from 800,000 to
100,000 years ago. In addition, the production of consonants re-
quires a short oral cavity, whereas our nearest primate relatives
have much too long an oral cavity for this purpose. The position
of the hyoid bone, which is a point of attachment for a tongue
muscle, developed in Homo sapiens in a manner permitting
highly precise and ﬂexible tongue movements.
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Abstract: Driven by intergroup competition, social norms, beliefs, and
practices can evolve in ways that more effectively tap into a wide variety
of evolved psychological mechanisms to foster group-beneﬁcial behavior.
The more powerful such evolved mechanisms are, the more effectively
culture can potentially harness and manipulate them to generate greater
phenotypic variation across groups, thereby fueling cultural group selection.
Many critics of the approach taken by Richerson et. al. incorrectly
believe that evolutionary mechanisms regulating reciprocity, rep-
utation, life history, and behavior toward kin necessarily represent
alternatives to cultural group selection as explanations for cooper-
ative behavior, and that evidence for these mechanisms consti-
tutes evidence against a role for cultural group selection (e.g.,
Lamba & Mace 2011; Pinker 2012). To the contrary, intergroup
competition will favor those group-beneﬁcial cultural traits – in-
cluding social norms, beliefs, and practices – that most effectively
inﬁltrate and exploit aspects of our evolved psychology
(N. Henrich & Henrich 2007; Richerson & Boyd 1999). Rituals,
religious beliefs, marriage norms, and kinship systems all tap
into how the mind works in different ways, and if these traits
vary in ways that inﬂuence the success of groups in competition,
then cultural group selection can shape human social behavior.
The following examples illustrate this point.
The kinship systems that dominate life in small-scale societies
variously harness, extend, and suppress evolved psychological
mechanisms for dealing with relatives (Mathew et al. 2013). By
building on the intuitions and motivations supplied by our
evolved kin psychology, cultural evolution can, for example,
spread social norms for treating distant cousins more like
genetic siblings, thereby fostering greater cooperation while in-
hibiting sex and marriage. Such kinship norms often exploit our
proximate kin identiﬁcation mechanisms by inﬂuencing patterns
of residence and daily routines (e.g., who eats together), and label-
ing (e.g., calling some cousins “brothers”). Incest taboos can acti-
vate a proximate mechanism for innate incest aversion by
prescribing the co-rearing of cousins in the same extended house-
hold. Moreover, third parties readily acquire such norms because
they already have compatible intuitions about how others “should”
behave toward their siblings (J. Henrich 2016).
Widespread unilineal clan organizations are particularly interest-
ing. Though clearly rooted in kin psychology, they devalue half of
one’s genealogical relatives in order to foster greater cooperation
with the other half. Among foragers in Indonesia, ﬁeld studies
show that patriclan membership predicts large-scale cooperation
in whale hunting better than genealogical kinship (Alvard 2011).
In Australian foragers, ethno-historical and linguistic reconstruc-
tions suggest that patrilineal clan organizations spread only in the
last 6,000 years, probably via various forms of intergroup competi-
tion (Evans & McConvell 1998; J. Henrich 2016).
Cultural evolution may also empower direct reciprocity
(N. Henrich & Henrich 2007). Theoretical work (Boyd & Lorder-
baum 1987) reveals that the success of reciprocating strategies
depends on the particular constellation of other strategies present
(e.g., see Zefferman [2014a] on Delton et al. [2011]). The combina-
torial explosion of possibilities in this complex multi-dimensional
space of possible strategies means that it is unlikely that a
jukebox-like psychology could effectively address this challenge.
Thus, it is not surprising that outside of humans reciprocity is
rare and limited to low cost behaviors (Clutton-Brock 2009).
Cultural evolution, however, may explain why reciprocity is so
powerful in humans (Boyd & Mathew 2015; N. Henrich &
Henrich 2007). Social norms provide shared standards of accept-
able behavior, allowing third parties to assist in identifying and
punishing defectors. Intergroup competition can favor those social
norms which maximize the effectiveness of direct reciprocity
under particular conditions, and this may help explain why the im-
portance of direct reciprocity varies so dramatically among societies
(Fiske 1992). Thus, it may be cultural evolution that turns direct
reciprocity from the ﬂimsy and relatively unimportantmeta-strategy
that we see in other animals into a powerful force for cooperation.
Reputation underpins many models of cooperation (Barclay
2013; Panchanathan & Boyd 2004). However, such models are in-
complete because they leave unspeciﬁed where the required rep-
utational standards come from. Reputational standards are
culturally transmitted (Salali et al. 2015) and vary dramatically
among societies (Bell et al. 2009), even among societies facing
similar ecological circumstances (Edgerton 1971; McElreath
2004). Across societies, reputations are inﬂuenced not only by co-
operative actions like contributing to village feasts or leading the
charge against the village in the next valley, but also practices
like female inﬁbulation, funerary cannibalism, ritual participation,
and food taboos. Thus, any explanation that “reputation explains
cooperation” needs a theory for why reputational standards vary
so dramatically among societies, and why group-beneﬁcial behav-
iors often generate good reputations. Driven by intergroup compe-
tition, cultural evolution may favor some elements of reputational
content (e.g., for bravery in warfare) over other elements.
Finally, environmental cues may evoke evolved psychological
responses that inﬂuence human sociality. For example, some
argue that cues received early in life evoke either a “fast” or
“slow” life history strategy (McCullough et al. 2013), with cues
of safety, security, and stability favoring “slow” life histories,
and greater cooperativeness. Building on this, some argue,
often in opposition to cultural evolutionary accounts, that such
life history switches account for between-group variation in
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prosociality and the growth of moralizing religions (Baumard
et al. 2015).
However, what’s missed is that such evoked responses are pre-
cisely the kind of psychological switches that cultural group selec-
tion could harness. If slow life history strategies favor greater
cooperation, then cultural group selection will favor sets of
norms that stabilize families, provide social safety nets, reduce
disease threats, or do whatever most effectively throws the
switch in ways that foster success in intergroup competition.
The existence of such switches can actually increase the variation
among groups in phenotypes, fueling the engine of cultural group
selection. The spread of normative monogamous marriage pro-
vides an example of an institution that harnesses various evolved
mechanisms to increase paternal investment, household related-
ness, and infant/child survival while reducing male–male compe-
tition (Henrich et al. 2012b). This culturally evolved package is
precisely the kind of institution that could throw the slow life
history “switch” and magnify the power of cultural group
selection.
Overall, the existing evidence for the importance of kinship,
reciprocity, reputation, and evoked responses for human cooper-
ation and sociality contributes to a prima facie case for cultural
group selection by providing psychological mechanisms that can
be exploited by relatively weak social norms to generate big differ-
ences in phenotypes between groups, thereby powering up cultur-
al group selection. We urge researchers to consider a more
integrative approach, one that synthesizes genetic and cultural
evolution.
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Abstract: Pet-keeping is highly variable across cultures in both frequency
and form. Cultural group selection offers a plausible explanation for the
development and spread of this uniquely human phenomenon in that
pet-keeping involves an inheritance system, socially transmitted norms
and preferences, substantial between-group variation, and (albeit
indirectly) intergroup competition.
In the target article, Richerson et al. argue that cultural group se-
lection (CGS) was essential for the evolution of the high level of
cooperation seen in our species, as well as the development of in-
stitutions such as religions and businesses. Here I make the case
that CGS also provides a coherent explanation for the evolution
of a uniquely human form of social relationships – pet-keeping.
Pet-keeping poses an evolutionary problem. There is no evidence
that pets increase the reproductive potential of their owners, and
the putative health and psychological beneﬁts of living with
animals are not as well-established as commonly believed
(Herzog 2011). Maintaining a companion animal can be costly,
and devoting affection and resources on members of another
species that have no apparent function cannot be explained by
kin selection or reciprocity.
Several lines of evidence suggest that CGS may have played a
role in the emergence and spread of pet-keeping. First, pet-
keeping occurs in humans only. While nonhumans occasionally
form attachments to members of a different species, these
unusual relationships always seem to involve some human inter-
vention such as occurs in zoos, wildlife parks, and households
(Herzog 2014). In completely natural environments, “animal
odd couples” analogous to pet-keeping are extremely rare and
probably non-existent. Nonhuman species do possess prosocial
motivational systems such as parental care and empathy that are
prerequisites for the formation of interspeciﬁc attachments
(e.g., Preston & De Waal 2002). But the fact that long-term affec-
tionate relationships between non-conspeciﬁcs have not been ob-
served in the wild, even in nonhuman apes, suggests that pet-
keeping requires the degree of rapid social learning found only
in our species.
Second, unlike language, music, and prohibitions against sex
with ﬁrst-degree relatives, pet-keeping is not a human universal.
Indeed, the frequency and form of pet-keeping vary widely
among cultures. Indigenous peoples of Amazonia, for example,
commonly make pets of captured wild animals such as monkeys
and birds. This practice, however, is rare among tribal peoples
of New Guinea (Diamond 1993). In some cultures, pet-keeping
is unknown, and some languages have no word that corresponds
to “pet.” Cross-cultural studies reveal that practices common in
modern Western societies, such as letting animals live in our
homes, allowing them to sleep in our beds, and considering
them full-ﬂedged family members are cultural anomalies (Gray
& Young 2010). Further, social norms governing relationships
with pets can shift dramatically over time. In Medieval Europe,
cats were routinely subjected to torture and mass slaughter, as
they were linked with witchcraft. Their image only began to
change in the mid-17th century, with the complete transformation
of the cat from pariah to household pet occurring by the end of the
18th century (Bradshaw 2013).
Third, preferences for pets are transmitted vertically from
parent to child and horizontally across cultural landscapes. A
recent study found that mothers who had pets in their childhood,
tended to raise their offspring with pets (Westgarth et al. 2010).
Sudden shifts in the popularity of types of pets occur across cultur-
al groups via social transmission. In the United States, examples
include transient enthusiasms for baby turtles, caged songbirds,
ferrets, mice, and pot-bellied pigs. Using 60 million American
Kennel Club dog registrations between 1926 and 2005 as data,
my colleagues and I have shown that shifts in choices for canine
companions are inﬂuenced by the mechanisms Richerson et al.
propose as sources of intergroup variation. These include rapid
social learning, conformity, and the inﬂuence of prestigious
models. We have found that dog breed preferences are inﬂuenced
by the decisions of others (Herzog et al. 2004); are unrelated to
breed-characteristic qualities such as desirable behavioral traits
and frequency of genetic diseases (Ghirlanda et al. 2013); and
result in fads in which the more quickly a breed becomes
popular, the faster its appeal subsequently declines (Acerbi
et al. 2012; Herzog 2006). In addition, long-lasting changes in
the popularity of types of dogs are sometimes instigated by
media exposure (ﬁlms with canine movie stars) (Ghirlanda et al.
2014). In short, pet-keeping follows the laws of fashion.
Fourth, while it is unlikely that cultural differences in pet-
keeping are the direct result of intergroup competition, competi-
tive forces do shape aspects of human–animal interactions that are
precursors to affection. The use of hunting dogs varies widely
among indigenous peoples of the Neotropics. Dogs substantially
increase the success of Mayangna hunters in Nicaragua, and
while the Mayangna are not attached to adult dogs, they do
name their dogs and play with puppies (Koster 2009). The acqui-
sition of horses by Apache and Comanche Indians in the 17th
century profoundly changed the nature of tribal warfare on the
Great Plains of the United States (Hämäläinen 2003).
Finally, pet-keeping practices are affected by some of the insti-
tutions that Richerson et al. believe arose via CGS, for example,
religion and businesses. On the multi-ethnic island of Sri Lanka,
79% of Buddhist households include a dog, compared to
Muslim households, of which only 4% do (Knobel 2009). In the
United States, over the last two decades, the proportion of
homes with companion animals has increased only slightly while
the amount of money Americans spend on their pets has risen
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ﬁvefold. It is likely that efforts by industry trade groups such as the
Pet Products Manufacturers Association and the American Veter-
inary Medical Association to promote the beneﬁts of pet owner-
ship have contributed to the recent cultural trend sometimes
referred to as the “humanization of pets.”
In sum, pet-keeping shows the marks of a cultural group–select-
ed institution. It involves an inheritance system, socially transmit-
ted norms, a high degree of between-group variation, and (albeit
indirect) intergroup competition. Certainly, pet-keeping has evo-
lutionary and neurobiological roots (see, e.g., Archer 1997;
Stoeckel et al. 2014). But the large individual and cultural differ-
ences observed in attachment to animals suggest that learning and
culture play a larger role than biology when it comes to bringing
them into our lives. CGS offers an elegant explanation for an im-
portant cultural phenomenon that has, until recently, been ne-
glected by social and behavioral scientists.
Frozen cultural plasticity
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Abstract:We discuss cultural group selection under the view of the frozen
plasticity theory and the different explanatory power and predictions of
this framework. We present evidence that cultural adaptations and their
inﬂuence on the degree of cooperation may be more complex than
presented by Richerson et al., and conclude with the gene-environment-
culture relationship and its impacts on cultural group selection.
Richerson et al. present compelling evidence for cultural group
selection acting as a major constituent of human cooperation;
however, we argue that it would be more beneﬁcial to view cultur-
al evolution in light of more complex evolutionary models, such as
the punctuated equilibrium theory or the frozen plasticity theory
(Flegr 2010): frequency-dependent selection of cultural norms
and, mostly, punctuated equilibrium pattern of cultural evolution
(in contrast to the simple gradualist approach in Richerson et al.’s
target article).
The frozen plasticity framework takes into account the relations
between the cultural norms, which are seldom unrelated to each
other (a cultural trait can be a positive norm in one context, but a
harmful one in another context). The result could be that the
more institutions a culture develops, the more “frozen” it
becomes as the traits interact, and it becomes increasingly difﬁcult
for any new (better) variant to become established, especially if
the culture is isolated.
An example of our point consists in thriving Neolithic agricul-
tural societies, which formed large and successful autocratic cul-
tures, but in which high power inequality and rent-seeking
emerged. These factors eventually became barriers to their
further development and prevented efﬁcient cooperation, as the
magnitude of relationships between various institutions grew so
large that any change would require too large a restructuralization
of the status quo (Olsson & Paik 2013). Major institutional
changes are likely only after the occurrence of large-scale events
or disasters – natural as well as socioeconomic. (An example of
this is that, in the aftermath of World War II, Japan ended state
Shintoism and hundreds of religious groups sprang up in a very
quick succession; Iannaccone 1998.) But there is no place for
such developments in Richerson et al.’s framework; in their
view, societies implement cooperative norms and irreversibly
move toward prosperity.
We would like to stress that adjustment toward better-perform-
ing norms (“cultural plasticity”) is more intricate than Richerson
et al. suggest. We show this in the following sections.
The unbearable lightness of good institutions.Culture adoption
elasticity is highly dependent on the geographical, historical, and
intragroup factors and on development of competing cultures,
but the direction of inﬂuence is not straightforward (Acemoglu
et al. 2005). For example, Europeans were more likely to introduce
extractive colonial regimes in relatively richer societies or regions
where they could not settle. These regions struggle with poverty
now. On the contrary, in relatively poor regions Europeans
settled in large numbers and implemented institutions that encour-
age prosperity today (Acemoglu et al. 2001; 2002). Richerson et al.
would view the story in terms of pure natural selection, but their
general theory does not distinguish among factors such as culture
and institutions versus human capital (Chanda et al. 2014;
Glaeser et al. 2004) versus genetic diversity (Ashraf & Galor
2013; Cook 2014), which co-inﬂuence intergroup competition.
Moreover, similar types of culture originating from one ances-
tral culture may choose similar environments to colonize, thereby
creating a logically consistent phylogenetic tree while not exclud-
ing the evoked culture hypothesis. The character of natural envi-
ronment may have inﬂuenced the relative ability of different
cultures to expand and prevail over others; thus institutional var-
iation could be only a derivative force in intergroup competition
(Spolaore & Wacziarg 2013).
(Mal)adaptivity of institutions and norms in cooperation.
Richerson et al. neglect to stress that some norms can be beneﬁcial
on a certain level and harmful on another bymoving a culture to the
non-cooperative equilibrium. Theymention the beneﬁts of institu-
tionalized norms like honor and bravery to intergroup warfare;
however, these can act harmfully at the intragroup level. The
culture of honor within high castes in India is related to a low
degree of coordination (Brooks et al. 2014).
Norms that had become “frozen”may have a detrimental effect
in many modern societies, expressed, for instance, in the higher
prevalence of antisocial punishment (Kubeˇna et al. 2014) in coun-
tries whose strong emphasis on traditions may have been beneﬁ-
cial previously (Gintis 2008; Herrmann et al. 2008). While some
norms could have played an essential role in forming human coop-
eration, many likely ceased fulﬁlling this role due to the decreased
adaptivity of the trait-network. Important examples of these phe-
nomena could be religious norms (Norenzayan et al. 2016).
Selection forces acting on meta-norms. Richerson et al. estab-
lish the government as an intelligent designer. Their examples
include patent law and antimonopoly law. However, these traits
are more in accord with our argument that social norms become
“frozen” in time. They persist largely due to powerful special in-
terest groups, even if they become harmful for the society.
Patent law in its current form impedes rather than promotes inno-
vation (Boldrin & Levine 2008), and antimonopoly law is often a
tool of adjustment of government politics (Armentano 1986) or
a product of lobby groups’ pressure.
The meta-norms (i.e., norms promoting punishment of defectors
and punishment-shirkers alike) are subject to selection as well. Prie-
tula and Conway (2009) note that an established or internalized
meta-norm could easily become a “trap” and stop being beneﬁcial.
Gene-culture coevolution. Genetic diversity has greater effects
on comparative development than Richerson et al. admit. Genetic
make-up can inﬂuence aspects of cultural evolution, which alongwith
resource accessibility may in turn give advantage to bearers of certain
genetic markers in a gene-culture coevolutionary process, for
example, in the interaction of scents and genetic make-up
(Havlíček & Roberts 2013). Loci related to olfaction, immunity,
and metabolism (connected to subsistence strategies) are among
those most positively selected in recent human history (Akey 2009).
Conclusion.We fully support cultural selection as the principal
explanation for the degree of cooperation among humans (see a
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contemporary example in our Fig. 1: North and South Koreans
shared the same history and cultural, linguistic, and geographic
roots, but institutional differences dramatically diverged the de-
velopment of their countries). Nevertheless, we suggest a rigorous
analysis of the political and population structure of societies
throughout their history to assess whether “cultural bottlenecks”
and founder effects inﬂuence the plasticity of cultural traits and
can explain human cooperation in greater detail.
The sketch is blank: No evidence for an
explanatory role for cultural group selection
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Abstract: As evidence that cultural group selection has occurred,
Richerson et al. simply retrodict that humans use language, punish each
other, and have religion. This is a meager empirical haul after 30 years.
This contrasts sharply with the adaptationist approach to human
behavior – evolutionary psychology –which has produced scores of novel,
speciﬁc, and empirically conﬁrmed predictions.
The adaptationist approach of George Williams (1966) revolution-
ized evolutionary biology. It replaced a loose willingness to assume
that every trait of an organism had an evolved function with,
instead, a rigorous focus on characterizing adaptations – traits of
organisms shaped by natural selection to solve an adaptive
problem. Not all traits are adaptations: some are merely incidental
by-products of adaptations and need no special adaptive explana-
tion. Blood contains adaptations for the transport of oxygen and
carbon dioxide; its transport properties were crafted by natural se-
lection. Its red color when oxygenated is a by-product of its chem-
istry and needs no adaptive explanation. In Williams’ words,
“adaptation is a special and onerous concept that should be used
only where it is really necessary” (p. 4). Researchers must carefully
test whether a trait is in fact an adaptation and not recognize ad-
aptation in “purely fortuitous effects” or invoke natural selection
“to resolve problems that do not exist” (p. 4). The adaptationist
program has been enormously productive: By the 1990s, after
30 years of work, the fruit of this approach already ﬁlled textbooks
(e.g., Alcock 1998; Krebs & Davies 1993), and it is now the back-
ground assumption of virtually all research in animal behavior
(Alcock 2001).
Williams had a further insight: Selection is most efﬁcient at the
lowest, most faithfully replicating levels in the hierarchy of life.
Genes reproduce more faithfully than individuals, who reproduce
more faithfully than groups. Thus, adaptions generally arise in
the service of transmitting the genes that build them, not in the
service of perpetuating the groups where individuals carrying
those genes reside. But, as Williams noted, a herd of ﬂeet deer
is also a ﬂeet herd. So, how was ﬂeetness built? Parsimony says
that, because genic selection is more powerful, unless herd ﬂeet-
ness shows special design that could not be preserved simply by
the differential reproduction of speedier deer, group selection is
not doing any explanatory work. Group selection should only be
invoked with clear evidence of group-level adaptation, not
merely group-level phenomena, an error repeatedly made by the
target article.
Theories of cultural group selection, gene-culture coevolution,
and dual inheritance are now at least 30 years old (e.g., Boyd &
Richerson 1985). Thus, we think it is fair to question their empir-
ical yield. Have these theories made detailed, unique, and novel
predictions conﬁrmed with evidence showing speciﬁcally group-
functional adaptation? Or has group-functional adaptation been
applied when not necessary to solve problems that do not exist?
Our reading of the target article’s section 6 suggests the latter.
The best evidence offered for cultural group selection is the ret-
rodiction that humans have language, sometimes punish each
other, and have religion. There are no novel predictions made
by cultural selection theory. (Simply re-describing known facts
with the terminology of cultural group selection is not a novel pre-
diction.) More critically, no evidence is offered that these traits
arise from cultural group selection; we argue that apparent
group-level effects are by-products arising from individual-level
beneﬁts when this alternative is taken seriously.
The evoked culture and cognitive niche (a.k.a. improvisational
intelligence) hypotheses that Richerson et al. discard are two in-
stances of this alternative. Evoked culture hypotheses propose
facultative cognitive mechanisms that modulate behavior based
on available information (Tooby & Cosmides 1992). These
Figure 1 (Houdek & Novakova). Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in North and South Korea, 1950–98. Reprinted with
permission from Acemoglu et al. (2005).
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mechanisms evolve when, ancestrally, different behaviors are
best in different physical and social ecologies. This was surely
the case for punishment, as the utility of using coercive power
to get one’s way would have ancestrally varied between people
(e.g., aggression pays more for the strong; Sell et al. 2009) and
between ecologies (e.g., aggression pays more when there are
gains it can recruit; Krasnow et al. 2012). Cognitive niche hy-
potheses propose mechanisms that extract information from
the environment and make appropriate inferences (Tooby &
DeVore 1987).
Importantly, these theories are not the straw-men reported in
the target article. Why should a mechanism for exploiting the cog-
nitive niche rely on solitary innovation when a clearly superior
design would also target information in the minds of others?
Why should a mechanism for evoked culture be unable to
operate outside the parameter range under which it evolved?
Our mechanisms of diet choice gravitate to big macs and cheese-
cake despite none existing during our evolutionary history.
Although police forces and the rule of law did not exist in Paleo-
lithic society, our evolved psychology of personal aggression can
be exploited by these institutions to evoke cultures that never
existed before. To the extent that our evolved social psychology
is richly articulated, features of this evoked culture can act as
further inputs to other facultative mechanisms and evoke
further novel cultural features (Tooby & Cosmides 1992).
A ﬁnal note: We are surprised that a paper discussing the tax-
onomy of group selection and cultural coevolutionary models can
so repeatedly mistake simple cultural change for cultural group
selection. There is no dispute that cultures change over time.
This is, in fact, the predicted result when creatures exploiting
the cognitive niche leave enduring traces in their societies that
evoke new cultures down the line (Pinker 2012). But as Williams
argued, adaptation is an onerous concept. It is no less onerous for
culturally group selected adaptations. The burden has not been
met here.
In our view, the jury is still out on the explanatory and predic-
tive power of cultural group selection theory. Luckily, it is not the
only approach on offer. About 30 years ago another theoretical ap-
proach emerged as the conﬂuence of adaptationism and cognitive
science: evolutionary psychology (e.g., Daly & Wilson 1988;
Tooby & Cosmides 1989). Although Richerson and colleagues
criticize evolutionary psychological approaches, it is evolutionary
psychology that has inspired scores of novel, speciﬁc, and empir-
ically conﬁrmed predictions. The many empirical successes of
evolutionary psychology have ﬁlled textbooks, handbooks, and
hundreds of journal articles (e.g., Buss 2005; 2014; Buss &
Reeve 2003). Although cultural group selection theory may yet
yield insights, at the moment it is evolutionary psychology that
provides a generative, testable, and productive framework for un-
derstanding the human mind and the cultures it creates.
The empirical evidence that does not support
cultural group selection models for the
evolution of human cooperation
doi:10.1017/S0140525X15000175, e44
Shakti Lamba
Centre for Ecology and Conservation, College for Life and Environmental
Sciences, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, Penryn, Cornwall TR10 9FE,
United Kingdom.
s.lamba@exeter.ac.uk
http://biosciences.exeter.ac.uk/staff/index.php?web_id=Shakti_Lamba
Abstract: I outline key empirical evidence from my research and that of
other scholars, testing the role of cultural group selection (CGS) in the
evolution of human cooperation, which Richerson et al. failed to
mention and which fails to support the CGS hypothesis.
Much of my research has focused on seriously testing the cultural
group selection (CGS) hypothesis for the evolution of large-scale co-
operation in humans as presented by Richerson et al. CGS is an
elegant idea that captured my imagination, among those of many
others. But a scientist must always remain open to the possibility
that even the most elegant of ideas can fail to explain the real world.
As Thomas Huxley said, “the great tragedy of Science [is] the
slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact” (Huxley 1894, p. 244).
I agree with Richerson et al. that the issue is not whether coopera-
tionbasedon reciprocity and inclusiveﬁtness exists, but ratherwhether
these explanations can account for large-scale cooperation inhumans. I
also agree that group selection on cultural variation is theoretically pos-
sible, but that the extent of variation, heritability, and competition will
determine whether it is an empirically important force or not. Richer-
son et al. ask, “Are the norms that underpin institutions among the cul-
tural traits so transmitted? Do we observe sufﬁcient variation at the
level of groups of considerable size for group selection to be a plausible
process?” (target article,Abstract). They state that “If the answer to one
of these questions is ‘no,’ then wemust look to other hypotheses” (Ab-
stract). My research, as well as that of others, suggests that the answer
to both these questions may be “no.”
A series of empirical ﬁeld studies I conducted in rural India
demonstrate that: (1) individuals do not exhibit a strong tendency
to culturally transmit cooperative behaviour (Lamba 2014); (2)
behavioural variation observed across human groups is at least
in part driven by demographic and ecological processes rather
than cultural processes (Lamba & Mace 2011; 2012; 2013); and
(3) individuals are more selﬁsh in larger populations and less
likely to copy increasingly cooperative behaviour (Lamba 2014;
Lamba & Mace 2011). Thus, I have tested the ﬁrst two of the
three axioms on which CGS is based, that is, cultural heritability,
variation, and competition.
1. People do not tend to copy cooperative behaviour. A central
assumption of CGS models is that individuals copy the behaviour
of others and acquire cooperative strategies via social learning. I
tested this assumption across 14 populations of the same
society, the Pahari Korwa of India (Lamba 2014). A series of
public goods games, played with real money and for high stakes,
across these populations found little evidence that people used
either pay-off biased learning or conformity to copy others’ coop-
erative behaviour. The tendency to copy others’ behaviour was
highly variable and individuals were less likely to copy more coop-
erative strategies, that is, behaviour that bore higher costs by
depositing more money into a group pot. To my knowledge, this
is the only quantitative study conducted in real-world populations
that tests whether individuals socially transmit cooperative behav-
iour, and it suggests that they do not. Hence, the only current
quantitative empirical evidence testing whether cooperative be-
haviour is culturally transmitted does not support this idea.
2. Behavioural variation across human groups is at least partly
driven by demographic and ecological processes.Richerson et al.
state that “it is an empirical matter whether cultural evolutionary
processes can maintain substantial between-group variation” (sect.
2.1, para. 3). They cite studies suggesting that behavioural variation
across human groups is driven by corresponding variation in cultural
norms of cooperation (Henrich et al. 2004; 2006; Herrmann et al.
2008). The studies (Henrich et al. 2004; 2006; 2010a; Herrmann
et al. 2008) administered economic games in up to 16 societies
and found that game behaviour varied across them. However,
they sampled only one or a fewpopulations per society and therefore
did not include population (or village) replicates from each society.
Thus, they cannot distinguish whether cultural norms or any of the
many other variables that vary between the study populations (e.g.,
population demographics, habitat variation, climate) cause the ob-
served behavioural differences. Building on their work, we adminis-
tered public goods games, a naturalistic measure of cooperative
behaviour involving the sharing of salt (Lamba & Mace 2011), and
ultimatum games (Lamba & Mace 2013) in up to 21 populations
of the same society, the Pahari Korwa of India. For all three mea-
sures, we found signiﬁcant and substantial behavioural variation
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across these multiple populations of the same ethno-linguistic
group, and we found that some of this variation was explained
by demographic factors such as population size, age, and sex.
Hence, individuals from different villages did not share a
common cultural norm of cooperation despite their common
ethnicity, and their behaviour varied in response to the demo-
graphic and ecological features of their environment. Our
results are bolstered by similar ﬁndings in other societies
(Falk & Zehnder 2013; Gurven 2004; Gurven et al. 2008;
Nettle et al. 2011; Tognetti et al. 2012). Since demographic
characteristics of populations are likely to change during indi-
viduals’ lifetimes, we may also expect their behaviour to
change in response. And if individuals’ cooperativeness is
likely to change across their lifetimes, then we should not
expect culturally heritable variation in the behaviour of
human groups across generations.
3. Individuals are more selﬁsh in larger populations and less
likely to copy increasingly costly cooperative behaviour. We
found that individuals took more salt for themselves and left less
for others in larger villages (Lamba & Mace 2011). Individuals
were also less likely to copy more cooperative behaviour (Lamba
2014). While CGS models invoke cultural transmission to explain
the evolution of large-scale cooperation, empirical data suggest
that cultural transmission is less likely as behaviour gets more coop-
erative and cooperation is less likely in large populations.
In conclusion, if individuals do not copy cooperative behaviour,
the behavioural variation between groups is unstable due to the
demographic changes that groups experience over time, and
behaviour is more selﬁsh in larger populations, then we must
question the existence of stably transmitted cultural norms of co-
operation. There is published empirical evidence which Richerson
et al. fail to mention, suggesting that the answer to more than one
of their questions may be “no.” Therefore, by their own admission,
we must also look to hypotheses other than CGS.
The role of cultural group selection in
explaining human cooperation is a hard case
to prove
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Abstract: We believe cultural group selection is an elegant theoretical
framework to study the evolution of complex human behaviours,
including large-scale cooperation. However, the empirical evidence on
key theoretical issues – such as levels of within- and between-group
variation and effects of intergroup competition – is so far patchy, with no
clear case where all the relevant assumptions and predictions of cultural
group selection are met, to the exclusion of other explanations.
We believe cultural group selection (CGS) is an elegant theoreti-
cal framework for studying the evolution of complex human be-
haviour. The target article sets out to present evidence that
culturally evolutionary processes have resulted in the selection
of large-scale cooperation as a group-level adaptation. However,
the empirical evidence presented does, in our opinion, still fail
to conclusively demonstrate that CGS explains human coopera-
tion better than the competing hypotheses.
Variation in cooperative behaviour – frequently measured
through economic games – across different cultures (Henrich
et al. 2005; 2006; 2010a) is put forward as evidence that coopera-
tion is a stable, persistent, and group-level trait on which selection
at the level of the group could act. However, as we and others
have argued elsewhere, high levels of variation in cooperative be-
haviour are also found within ethnic groups (Lamba &Mace 2011;
2012; Nettle et al. 2011), suggesting that variation attributed to
different cultural norms could in fact reﬂect individual adaptations
to different environments. The FST data presented in the article
supports the idea that countries differ in some beliefs and
values, so at least one of the assumptions of CGS is met.
However the beliefs and values examined are not associated
with actual cooperative behaviours; for example, demonstrating
that there is signiﬁcant country-level variation in attitudes
toward abortion has arguably little relevance to the argument at
stake. And has there been enough time for countries to be
subject to selection on the basis of this trait?
Cultural difference is one of the foundational assumptions of an-
thropology, so we should expect to ﬁnd it. We agree that
institutions are likely to be of particular interest in this ﬁeld and
the most promising candidates for cultural traits may be those
classic subjects of anthropological investigation such as kinship
norms, political systems, and religion, which are generally group-
level traits, almost by deﬁnition. Religion often has the character-
istics of a trait designed for group promotion and cohesion (e.g.,
costly rituals, apostasy punishment, and clear between-group
demarcation) making it a strong candidate for spread through in-
tergroup competition. Political systems have to be properties of
the group rather than the individual, so group selection should
be in operation in these cases (Currie & Mace 2009; Currie et al
2010). Normative marriage and dispersal strategies may only be ef-
fective if the rest of your local population shares your understand-
ing of the rules; strong frequency-dependent selection could
maintain variation between groups, so such traits would also be
promising cases to seek evidence for CGS. While language is a
classic frequency-dependent group trait, the exact design of partic-
ular languages is not generally considered to confer any particular
beneﬁt over any other, therefore it is unlikely that CGS is operating
on languages.
A key aspect of CGS is the idea that traits that provide an ad-
vantage to groups, even if at a cost to the individual, are selected
for in a situation of intergroup competition. Our attempts at
testing this hypothesis for the evolution of parochial altruism –
the combination of in-group altruism and out-group hostility
due to intergroup competition and conﬂict – using naturalistic
ﬁeld experiments in Northern Ireland, found little evidence to
support this idea. Individual and neighbourhood exposure to
conﬂict explained a reduction in out-group cooperation, but cru-
cially had either no effect or also reduced cooperation toward the
in-group. In addition, no signiﬁcant differences in cooperation
were found between the two cultural groups when taking into
account individual socio-economic characteristics, which in turn
best predicted the variation in cooperative behaviour (Silva &
Mace 2014; 2015).
Richerson et al.’s article aims to present the evidence in favour
of CGS, hence its adversarial approach rather than the more sci-
entiﬁc approach of falsiﬁcation. However there is still a large em-
pirical project to be done in order to identify the domains in which
CGS may be an important evolutionary force. Context is likely to
be fundamental, as it is in any evolutionary scenario. Different
traits will have different patterns of transmission and different
selective forces acting upon them, and beneﬁts may be operation-
alized at the level of the individual or of the society, or both. We
are at a stage of investigation of this topic where we ﬁnd one spe-
ciﬁc assumption may be met in one case and another assumption
may be met for a different trait or in a different kind of a group;
but a consistent story showing the wide applicability of CGS to the
evolution of large-scale cooperative behaviour is still lacking, other
than at an anecdotal level.
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The disunity of cultural group selection
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Abstract: I argue that demographic selection, migration, and cultural
diffusion, three mechanisms of institutional change, have little in
common. Two of these lack the key features associated with group
selection: they do not present us with group-level selection pressures
counteracting individual-level ones, need not produce behavioral
altruism, and do not require competition between groups whose
members cooperate preferentially with one another. Cultural norms
vary, change, and inﬂuence cooperation; but that is not group selection.
I agree with Richerson et al.’s stimulating article on its most im-
portant point: Human coalitions and institutions have a long cul-
tural history. Their evolution may be driven by three different
mechanisms (sect. 2.1.): the differential growth of biological
groups; migrations from one group to another; and imitation of
norms and other institutional arrangements. The authors’
version of cultural group selection (CGS) makes use of all three
mechanisms, presenting them as three complementary facets of
a uniﬁed theory. I will argue that they have little in common
(see Fig. 1).
In the ﬁrst form of CGS distinguished in the target article,
groups are deﬁned by three overlapping properties: (i) by
descent (you are a group member if you are descended from
group members); (ii) by preferential cooperation (group
members tend to help one another rather than non-members);
and (iii) by cultural links (they make use of the same institutional
innovations). In this scenario, you cannot vote with your feet by
going to a new group and becoming part of it; neither would
you help someone who does not share your values, or ﬁght
someone who does. When the last two criteria are relaxed, two
new types of CGS result. Type 2 CGS is migration, when individ-
uals vote with their feet to join the societies that offer them the
best deal (Boyd & Richerson 2009). Here, groups are deﬁned
by culture and preferential cooperation alone. I am a member
of the group of people whose norms I share and whose
members I choose to cooperate with – even if I was not born
there. Finally, in the third form of CGS (selective imitation) pref-
erential cooperation must also be dropped, as is obvious from
Richerson et al.’s logic and examples. Group members are
deﬁned by their common adoption of some institutional innova-
tion – that is all: for example, when American ﬁrms copy the insti-
tutions of German research and development, they do so strictly
for their own beneﬁt, not as a way to ally themselves with
German industry.
One can use CGS to predict, or explain, two very different
things: (1) the evolution of altruistic behavior, and (2) equilibrium
selection (André & Morin 2011; Boyd & Richerson 1990). Behav-
ioral altruism is an uncompensated sacriﬁce from the individual to
the group, with ﬁtness consequences. Equilibrium selection is a
process that favors the most stable forms of cooperation, including
non-altruistic, mutually beneﬁcial cooperation. Migration and im-
itation are more likely to work toward equilibrium selection: We
can expect people to join the societies, or adopt the institutions,
that give them a better deal. Type 1 CGS is more conducive to
true altruism, because it short-cuts adaptive individual decisions.
Much of the appeal of CGS is due to Type 1 CGS, and to the
promise of ﬁnding a scientiﬁc rationale for altruism, as a way of
backing attacks against standard rational choice theory (Fehr &
Fischbacher 2003; Sober & Wilson 1999). Yet, much of its plausi-
bility derives from models of the second type, where mutually
proﬁtable forms of cooperation spread and no genuine altruism
results. The authors’ last two types of CGS, thus, do not seem
capable of delivering what CGS is widely thought to explain,
namely, altruism (André & Morin 2011; Morin 2014). Tellingly,
the authors refrain from making any speciﬁc prediction regarding
behavioral altruism (sect. 6.2.).
Both Type 2 and Type 3 CGS (migration and imitation) are
“driven by human choices” (sect. 2, para. 1), as opposed to the rel-
atively autonomous demographic dynamics that prevail in Type 1
CGS (birth-rates, wars, etc.). Types 2 and 3 of CGS must, at least
occasionally, create group-level selection pressures that are fully
aligned with individual-level selection pressures, and thus
undistinguishable from them (unless we assume that human
Figure 1 (Morin). Three processes that, for Richerson et al., qualify as “cultural group selection,” and my interpretation of the
assumptions and consequences behind each.
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decision-making is so maladaptive as to decreases individual
ﬁtness systematically). People will vote with their feet: they will
join the societies that promise them the best deal. They are
likely to adopt institutional innovations that serve everyone’s inter-
ests. Indeed, most of the examples cited by Richerson et al.
concern mutually beneﬁcial forms of cooperation. One can still
use groups as units of accounting, but the causality resides entirely
in individual choices. Contrary to what is stated in section 4.1,
CGS is not, then, characterized by group-level selection pressures
counteracting individual-level pressures, pushing individuals to
sacriﬁce their own ﬁtness for the group.
The disunity of CGS is deepened by the authors’ inclusion of
Type 3 CGS. Cultural diffusion need involve no demographic
change, and no change in the composition of coalitions. The
manner of cooperation is all that changes. When we use money,
majority voting, or the academic practice of research seminars,
we are not ipso facto allying ourselves with most of the people
who use those practices. A state that decides to allow the legal
use of class actions is not forming a coalition with the other
states that allow it, or against those that do not. Here, we have
sheer equilibrium selection with no differential growth, and no
competition between coalitions. Group selection without all this
is Hamlet without the prince.
What is wrong with heterogeneous theories? Science needs
lumpers as well as splitters; but to test three very different hypoth-
eses as if they were one, is to test only their weakest common
denominator. Here, we are left with the uncontroversial view
that coalitions or institutions vary and evolve. Richerson et al.’s
more substantive suggestion is that useful institutions can only
spread through some form of group selection – but to make this
point, they dilute the concept of CGS to such an extent that it
loses coherence and explanatory heft.
Social selection is a powerful explanation for
prosociality
doi:10.1017/S0140525X15000308, e47
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Abstract: Cultural group selection helps explain human cooperation, but
social selection offers a complementary, more powerful explanation. Just
as sexual selection shapes extreme traits that increase matings, social
selection shapes extreme traits that make individuals preferred social
partners. Self-interested partner choices create strong and possibly
runaway selection for prosocial traits, without requiring group selection,
kin selection, or reciprocity.
Cultural group selection (CGS) does indeed, as the target article
argues, play an important role in explaining human cooperation.
However, social selection offers a powerful explanation of extreme
human prosociality that contradicts Richerson et al.’s second thesis
that only CGS “can easily account for the institutionalized coopera-
tion that characterizes human societies” (sect. 7, para. 2).
The authors document transmissible substantial variations
between cultural groups that account for the growth and persis-
tence of some human groups at the expense of other groups. Ex-
amples from religious groups conﬁrm the theory. The Shakers had
6,000 members in the mid-19th century but the norm of celibacy
shrank the group by outmigration and lack of reproduction, so
only one small community remains. In contrast, the Catholic
Church’s prohibition of birth control fosters group growth.
CGS not only occurs, but also it can act on between-group var-
iations in cooperativeness to help explain human prosociality.
Groups with norms enforcing cooperation tend to expand and
displace other groups, although, as the target article notes, com-
plexities arise because of the costs of cooperating, the costs of
punishing defectors, and movement of individuals and norms
between groups. Nonetheless, CGS offers a plausible explanation
for cooperation within groups, and tendencies for conﬂict
between groups. Once established, cultural norms for in-group
cooperation create forces of natural selection that give advantages
to individuals with tendencies to learn and conform to those
norms, as well as to their groups, in a recursive cycle that gives
rise to capacities for complex culture.
CGS is not, however, the only plausible explanation for extreme
human prosociality, and it does little to explain how the process
gets going. Social selection can explain extreme human prosocial
traits that CGS cannot. This is not Herbert Simon’s social selec-
tion or that of Joan Roughgarden; it is the idea, ﬁrst explored in
depth in a pair of papers by Mary Jane West-Eberhard, that
describe how self-interested social choices create strong selection
forces that may account for extreme prosociality and other traits
that are otherwise difﬁcult to explain (West-Eberhard 1979;
1983; cf. Nesse 2009). She deﬁnes social selection in relation to
its exemplar and subtype, sexual selection:
Sexual selection refers to the subset of social competition in which the
resource at stake is mates. And social selection is differential reproduc-
tive success (ultimately, differential gene replication) due to differential
success in social competition, whatever the resource at stake. (West-
Eberhard 1979, p. 158)
Peahen preferences for peacocks with ﬂamboyant tails give a
ﬁtness advantage to males with extreme traits, and to females
who prefer males with extreme traits. Positive feedback
between selection for the trait and the preference increases the
prevalence of alleles that increase mating success until the
ﬁtness costs to health and survival outweigh their mating beneﬁts.
West-Eberhard’s core insight was that social selection occurs
for competition over resources other than matings. A recent
review noted, “It would have made as much sense for Darwin
(and everybody since) to distinguish between selection by
choice versus competition rather than on sexual versus non-
sexual selection” (Lyon & Montgomerie 2012, p. 5). Social selec-
tion for competition opens up a whole world of important expla-
nations, but partner choice is more important for explaining
cooperation. Despite formal models (Frank 2006; Tanaka 1996;
Wolf et al. 1999) and detailed descriptions with examples from
many species (Flinn & Alexander 2007; Lyon & Montgomerie
2012; Tobias et al. 2012), social selection has been neglected as
an explanation for human prosociality.
As many have noted, most social exchanges are mutualisms or
are readily explained by kin selection or reciprocity. However,
some extreme human prosocial traits still need explanation.
CGS has a hard time explaining the pervasiveness and intensity
of guilt, motivations for reparations, extreme sensitivity to what
others think, concern for other’s welfare, pity, commitment,
empathy, philanthropy, and pride in generosity. Such traits are,
however, expected outcomes from social selection that gives ad-
vantages to those preferred as relationship partners or group
members.
People prefer partners and group members who have plentiful
resources that they generously and reliably share (albeit selective-
ly) with their partners. Thus, to be preferred as a partner requires
striving to get resources and a reputation for sharing them. The
ﬁtness beneﬁts are not as direct as increased matings, but they
are more pervasive. Day by day, reputations and relationships
grow and fade as the result of actions small and large. The most
desirable relationship partners pair with each other, and this selec-
tive association gives them a selective advantage. As West and col-
leagues note in a critique of trait group selection models, “An
alternative is to state as simply as possible what they are –
models of nonrandom assortment of altruistic genes” (West
et al. 2007, p. 11).
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The beneﬁts experienced by prosocial individuals, and the ben-
eﬁts of preferring such individuals as partners or group members,
shape social traits as extreme and costly as a peacock’s tail. This
requires no kin selection, reciprocity, group selection, or CGS, al-
though all of those phenomena are also involved in selecting for
prosocial traits.
Social selection has been modeled in economic terms as partner
choice that shapes advertisements for generosity (Noë et al. 2001)
that can become more honest and costly than intended. However,
effort invested in carefully assessing partners and making oneself a
preferred partner is only the start. Models describing whether to
stay or walk away from an existing relationship illustrate how
walking away can be inexpensive or even beneﬁcial for the punish-
er but devastating to the person punished, efﬁciently enforcing
social norms (Aktipis 2004). Shunning and solitary conﬁnement
are cruel for good evolutionary reasons.
Careful selection of partners and group members offers little
advantage in a species unless differentiated relationships offer a
net advantage, some more than others. After a tipping point was
reached, however, investments in careful partner choice and
traits that make one a preferred partner could coevolve in a pos-
sibly runaway process that may have been crucial in making
culture possible (Nesse 2010). Social selection may explain how
self-interested social choices could have created selection forces
by which humans domesticated themselves.
Is cultural group selection enough?
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Abstract: Richerson et al. propose cultural group selection (CGS) as the
basis for understanding the evolution of cultural systems. Their proposal
does not take into account the nature of cultural idea systems as being
constituted at an organizational, rather than an individual level. The
sealing partners of the Netsilik Inuit exemplify the problem with their
account.
Though recognizing that cultural group selection (CGS) “is not a
complete theory of the evolution of cultural variation” (sect. 2.1,
para. 5), Richerson et al. consider CGS to be a major player and
list four of its prerequisites. All of these are accepted by most an-
thropologists and sociologists because cultural systems, including
norms and institutions, are extended across generations through
enculturation, and culture has long been considered to constitute
an “extrasomatic adaptation” (White 1959, p. 9), with functional
differences the basis for the outcome of competition between
groups (see, e.g., Evans-Pritchard’s [1940] account of the conﬂict
between the Nuer and the Dinka).
Similarly, the authors’ “necessary but not sufﬁcient test of the
CGS hypothesis,” namely, that “social systems of human societies
follow a phylogenetic pattern” (sect. 3.2, para. 1) is easily passed
by cultural and social systems. For example, the historical
pattern for the appearance and spread of kinship terminologies
as part of the colonization of the Paciﬁc Oceanic Islands, ﬁrst by
Melanesians and then by Polynesians, can be presented as a phy-
logeny organized around structural differences in the terminolo-
gies (Read 2013; see Fig. 1 here). However, these differences
do not emerge from changes at the behavioral level assumed by
their model of cultural evolution, but are organizational
changes. Kinship terminologies, with their algebraic-like structure
(Leaf & Read 2012; Read 1984; 2012; Read et al. 2014) are sym-
bolic, computational systems with an underlying, generative logic
and no more emergent from behavior than is arithmetic (contra
Smaldino 2014) – hence, their evolutionary change is at the
global level of organization and not the population level of individ-
ual traits (see Lane et al. 2009).
CGS shares with biological group selection the same problem of
porous boundaries. If homogenization of between-group traits
occurs on a time scale shorter than that needed for the conse-
quences of between-group competition to materialize, then
group competition will be obviated. Biological group competition
“solves” the porous boundary problem through coupling selection
for traits that maintain non-porous boundaries with biological
group competition. In extreme form, this leads to the formation
of biological species. The functional equivalent for CGS would
be a group-level, cultural system with boundaries resistant to
the introduction of competing cultural traits.
Consider the cultural adaptation of the Netsilik Inuit of Hudson
Bay to Arctic conditions (Balikci 1970). Their adaptation included
a culturally prescribed system of sealing partners central to pro-
curing and sharing seal meat in the winter months. The system
of sealing partners was but one of several functionally integrated
cultural idea systems (see Leaf & Read 2012) that regulated,
among other things, female infanticide, post-marital residence,
and preferential cousin marriage. Jointly, these idea systems
framed the behavioral patterns and modes of social organization
Figure 1 (Read). Phylogeny for Polynesian societies based on
the reconstructed sequence of changes in the structural patterns
for the sibling kin terms from a sample of the Polynesian
kinship terminologies. The speciﬁc patterns, based on attributes
associated with the sibling kin terms, are discussed in Read
(2013). The left-to-right positions of the branch points in the
phylogeny correspond to the relative time-sequence of the
colonization of the islands corresponding to the societies listed
on the right side of the ﬁgure (see Figure 7 in Read [2013] for
a map showing the colonization sequence). (Reproduced from
Read 2013, Figure 9, with permission of the publisher.)
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necessary for the survival of the Netsilik Inuit under Arctic condi-
tions (Balikci 1970; Read 2005).
The Netsilik adaptation centered on three resources: (1)
salmon, (2) caribou, and (3) seals. Seals were obtained in the
winter months when a seal surfaced in one of the breathing
holes it had to keep open in the pack ice in order to breathe.
Because there was no way to know which breathing hole a seal
would use, the Netsilik increased substantially their odds of ob-
taining a seal by stationing about 20 hunters at different breathing
holes. Each hunter had 12 sealing partners in the camp, with each
partner corresponding to a part of the seal, plus one part of the
seal for the hunter and one for his children. When a seal was
killed, the hunter’s wife distributed the parts of the seal to the
wives of the partners in accordance with the part of the seal rep-
resented by a partner. The partners were determined at birth by
the boy’s mother from among distant (cultural) kin –with kin
being those recognized by reference through one of their kin
terms, such as in the English expression, “he is my uncle.”
The system of sealing partners expresses the cultural meaning
of being a seal hunter and makes the actions of others, as
hunters, predictable, hence forming the basis for cooperation
among the sealing partners. In this sense their cultural idea
system was a social contract to which the Netsilik adhered. The
social contract speciﬁed that a seal, through the act of the
hunter, became collectively owned by the hunter and his partners,
and only they had rights to the seal. Collective ownership was
enacted by distribution of the seal meat, based on another cultural
idea system that deﬁned a man as the procurer of resources and
his wife as manager of the resources he procured (Read 2005).
Accordingly, the seal was butchered by the hunter’s wife and
distributed to the wives of the sealing partners. The system of
sealing partners was, in effect, the antithesis of sharing through
the individual traits of altruism and cooperation since individual
beneﬁts arose through collective ownership and rules of sharing
expressed through the social contract. From an evolutionary per-
spective, “it is possible to have a stable social contract for food
sharing” even if “the food is implicitly owned by every individual
who goes hunting” (Taylor 2014, p. 71).
In their social contract, the Netsilik did not trust a hunter to be
altruistic or to voluntarily cooperate, and they instead created an or-
ganizational system that depended on neither of these. Cheating, in
the sense of opting out of acting in accordance with being a sealing
partner, was not a viable option in a context in which individual
hunters would likely not survive without averaging hunting risks
over a pool of hunters. Consequently, the conceptual boundary
for the organization of sealing partners was impervious, given the
technologies available to them, to any competing, individual strat-
egy. Cultural idea systems like this operate and evolve at an organi-
zational, rather than an individual, level with the consequence that
“human sociocultural organizations … [have] representations,
rules, relationships, management processes and function associated
with these organizations, which are different from, and have vastly
more transformative and generative capability than, those at the in-
dividual level” (Lane et al. 2009, p. 35).
Cultural differentiation does not entail group-
level structure: The case for geographically
explicit analysis
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Abstract: Richerson et al. argue that relatively large cultural FST values
provide evidence for group structure and therefore scope for group
selection. However, recent research on spatial patterns of cultural
variation demonstrates that, as in the genetic case, apparent group
structure can be a consequence of geographic clines, not group barriers.
Such a pattern limits the scope for cultural group selection.
Richerson et al. present a wide-ranging synthesis of evidence for
cultural group selection. An innovative feature of their argument
is that they draw attention to the importance of quantifying the ap-
portionment of cultural variation within and between groups.
They calculate FST values for 29 aspects of culture between neigh-
bouring groups and argue that relatively large cultural FST values
provide scope for cultural group selection. In addition, they cite
Bell et al.’s (2009) ﬁnding that average cultural FST values (as
indexed by responses to the World Values Survey) are greater
for neighbouring groups than average genetic FST values as evi-
dence that there is greater potential for cultural group selection
than genetic group selection. While we agree that this framework
for quantifying cultural variation holds considerable potential, we
challenge Richerson et al.’s interpretation of the existing empirical
data.
The FST statistic belongs to a broad family of “ﬁxation indices” –
statistics developed by population geneticists to study genetic dif-
ferentiation between populations (Holsinger & Weir 2009).
Several studies have demonstrated that human genetic variation
is predominantly clinal, with differentiation between populations
being strongly predicted by geographic distance across a variety
of biological markers (Handley et al. 2007). Discontinuities do
exist (typically associated with geographic obstacles), but many ap-
parent genetic barriers have proven to be artefacts of heteroge-
neous spatial sampling (Handley et al. 2007). A clinal pattern of
variation is consistent with an “isolation by distance” (IBD)
model (Wright 1943), in which individuals tend to migrate
limited distances relative to the total geographic range of the
species. Under IBD, a gradual blending of one population into
the next is predicted, rather than group barriers. Nevertheless,
two sampling locations can produce signiﬁcant FST values simply
due to their geographic separation.
None of the 29 cultural FST estimates reported by Richerson
et al. or the cultural FST estimates reported by Bell et al. (2009)
have been analysed within a spatially explicit framework. This
renders these estimates difﬁcult to interpret, since, as in the
genetic case, apparent population structure could be an arte-
fact of discontinuous spatial sampling, rather than cultural
barriers.
Recently, we published a study that quantiﬁed the extent to
which geography and group afﬁliation independently predict cul-
tural differentiation between ethnolinguistic groups (Ross et al.
2013). We used geographic coordinates and coded narrative ele-
ments of 700 versions of a folktale from 31 European groups, ana-
lysing both individual folktales and group-level differentiation using
ΦST, a ﬁxation index that is closely related to FST (Holsinger &Weir
2009). We found signiﬁcant differentiation between groups with an
average ΦST of 0.091, indicating that, on average, 9.1% of the var-
iation between individual folktales was between groups, which is
considerably higher than the genetic differentiation found
between comparable European populations (Lao et al. 2008;
Novembre et al. 2008). However, incorporating geography into
the analysis revealed that at the level of individual folktales, geo-
graphic distance explains considerably more variation between folk-
tales than group boundaries (6.6% of variance vs. 3.7%). Such a
pattern of predominantly clinal variation is consistent with IBD-
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like cultural diffusion processes. This means that geographically
close individuals/tales from neighbouring groups tend to be more
similar than is suggested by the relatively large average cultural
ΦST, thereby limiting the scope for cultural group selection.
Two recent studies speak to the generality of our ﬁndings and the
FST estimates from Richerson et al. First, Brown et al. (2014) exam-
ined group-level folk song differentiation among nine indigenous
ethnolinguistic groups in Taiwan. They found signiﬁcant cultural
differentiation between groups. Intriguingly, however, cultural
ΦST was found to be an order of magnitude smaller than genetic
ΦST for the same groups, contra Bell et al.’s (2009) hypothesis
that human groups generally show a higher degree of cultural dif-
ferentiation than genetic differentiation. This result is particularly
pertinent to discussions about human evolution, because the folk
song data are drawn from small-scale indigenous societies whose
lifestyles and group structure better approximate those of our an-
cestors than the large-scale multiethnic nation states studied by
Bell et al. (2009). Second, Shennan et al. (2015) examined individ-
ual level variation and group-level differentiation in two material
culture complexes – pottery and personal ornaments – from 361
sites of 22 putative Neolithic cultural groups in Europe. At the
level of individual artefacts, cultural afﬁliation was an independent
predictor of pottery variation, while geography was not; but both
cultural afﬁliation and geography were independent predictors of
ornament variation. At the group level, they found signiﬁcant cul-
tural differentiation, with geography predicting differentiation in
ornaments but not pottery.
This result suggests that the relative inﬂuence of cultural barri-
ers and geographic effects can vary across different cultural
markers in comparable populations, just as is the case for different
genetic markers (i.e., autosomal DNA, mitochondrial DNA, and
Y-chromosome; Jobling 2012). Caution is therefore warranted in
making generalizations about the relationships between groups
on the basis of analysis of a limited range of cultural traits.
While we support the rigorous analysis of empirical data to quan-
tify cultural variation, the evidence we present here suggests that
cultural differentiation between groups varies considerably across
cultural domains and spatial scales and is often best explained in
terms of geographic clines – a pattern that suggests IBD-like cultur-
al processes and limited scope for cultural group selection between
neighbours. We note that, in the absence of stable individual level
trait differences between neighbouring groups, the most important
forms of variation for cultural group selection may be group-level
traits (Smaldino 2014), such as the presence or absence of particu-
lar religious or political institutions, rather than the values, stories,
songs, or material possessions of individuals. Further work that ex-
amines individual variation and group-level differentiation using a
geographically explicit framework across the full spectrum of
aspects of human culture is needed.
When is the spread of a cultural trait due to
cultural group selection? The case of religious
syncretism
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Abstract: The reproduction of cultural systems in cases where cultural
group selection may occur is typically incomplete, with only certain
cultural traits being adopted by less successful cultural groups. Why a
particular trait and not another is transmitted might not be explained by
cultural group selection. We explore this issue through the case of
religious syncretism.
Richerson et al. give compelling evidence that the conditions for
Darwinian evolution are sometimes met in the case of cultural
groups. By presenting evidence for cultural group variation, inher-
itance, and selection, the authors succeed in rendering the cultur-
al group selection (CGS) hypothesis more plausible, and we agree
that CGS may partly explain cooperation and other cultural traits.
We remain unconvinced, however, that the evidence demon-
strates that CGS is a particularly strong force in cultural evolution
because selection mechanisms – conquest, imitation, and migra-
tion – frequently do not involve selection between cultural
groups, but instead work at the level of individual cultural traits.
Consider a case where the conditions favorable to CGS are met:
Distinct cultural groups compete, and a group achieves greater
success due to cultural variation. According to CGS, we should
expect the cultural traits underpinning that group’s success to
spread. Presumably, such transmission occurs either by complete
assimilation to the successful group or by selective adoption of
traits, with preference for traits speciﬁcally contributing to com-
petitive success.
Total transmission is rarely thecase.Evenwhen it isclear that selec-
tive conquest, migration, or imitation has occurred, these selective
forces rarely involve the total replacement of all the features of the
less successful group with all the features of the more successful
group. Instead, cultural groups in competitive situations adopt only
some features of competing groups, or more frequently, new
hybrid cultural traits emerge through the fusionof features frommul-
tiplegroups. In anyparticular case, therearevariouspotential reasons
forwhyone trait, and not another,was adopted after a process of con-
quest, imitation, ormigration.WhileCGSmaybea factor,wecanalso
appeal to other factorsnot accounted forbyCGS, including thedirect
appeal of that trait or pure chance. To be convinced that CGS is a
strong force in cultural evolution, we need evidence that cultural bor-
rowing incasesofconquest, imitation,andmigration ispredominantly
driven by contribution to group-level differential success, and not by
other potential explanations.
We speculate that CGS is not among the strongest forces
driving which cultural traits spread in such cases. To see why,
let us examine a paradigmatic case. The authors (Richerson
et al.) consider the spread of religion as a ﬂagship case of CGS,
noting that features of Christianity contributed to the success of
Christian groups, so those cultural features spread both through
successful conquest and through comparative success in situations
of resource scarcity. A closer inspection, however, calls this story
into question. The spread of a religion does not entail the spread
of all its cultural features. On the contrary, it has long been recog-
nized that the spread of religion in the face of differential success
of cultural groups involves syncretism, deﬁned as “a type of accep-
tance characterized by the conscious adaptation of an alien form
or idea in terms of some indigenous counterpart” instead of the
replacement of the indigenous trait by the foreign one (Madsen
1967, p. 369). Consider the spread of Roman Catholicism to
what is now Mexico. Invading European cultural groups out-com-
peted the pre-Columbian cultural groups of Mexico, and part of
the conquest involved the adoption of Catholicism by native
groups. The adoption, however, was syncretic – the surface trap-
pings of Catholicism became part of local culture, but indigenous
groups were selective about which Catholic practices they
adopted, and also selectively retained native practices by giving
them a nominally Catholic guise. Well-known examples include
the retention of indigenous holidays such as Día de Muertos,
the continuance of traditional practices such as curanderismo,
and the thinly-veiled re-presentation of indigenous deities as
Catholic saints such as La Virgen de Guadalupe.
How does syncretism of this sort tell against CGS? Syncretism
demonstrates that the spread of a religion due to the dominance of
a cultural group does not entail the successful reproduction of any
Commentary/Richerson et al.: Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation
38 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 39 (2016)
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X15000059
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 11 Feb 2017 at 15:42:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
particular aspect of the cultural systems associated with that
group. Although, for instance, Mayan communities adopted the
practice of saint worship from the conquering Spanish, Mayan
saint worship tends to “evince a more profound parochialism
than did saint worship in 16th-century Spain. Cosmologically,
Maya saints have become decidedly local personages relatively in-
dependent of the remote … God” (Watanabe 1990, p. 137). This
is telling. The conquest of New Spain was facilitated by the paro-
chialism of indigenous cultural groups; the fractious independent
city states of Mexico could not compete with a nation-state built
around a common identity. Nevertheless, this cooperative
feature of Spanish Catholic culture was resisted by many of the
conquered peoples, even while cultural traits irrelevant to differ-
ential success (e.g., the names of deities) were adopted. In short,
the veneer of Catholicism spread, but for CGS, it is not the veneer
that matters, but rather the values and practices which contribut-
ed to differential group success. Which values and practices were
adopted, however, seems to have little to do with whether they
contributed to success, but instead with how those practices indi-
vidually appealed to the conquered peoples.
Other cases of the spread of religion by conquest, imitation, and
migration exhibit the same pattern, as do, we would argue, cases
of cultural transmission in other domains. To a large degree then,
which cultural traits spread in cases of differential competitive
success is explained by factors other than the role those traits
played in that success. To determine the relative strength of
CGS in relation to other cultural evolutionary forces, we need
not only to establish that conditions favorable to CGS are met,
but also to examine particular instances of cultural transmission.
This would involve systematically sampling traits from the more
successful cultural system, then determining for each individual
sample whether it spread and, if so, the extent to which CGS con-
tributed. By establishing a theoretical background against which
we can perform this sort of investigation into the contributions
of CGS to the evolution of human cultural traits, Richerson
et al. open the doors to research that may help us better under-
stand many of the most notable features of culture.
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Abstract: The cultural group selection hypothesis is supported by
considerations of short-term and long-term behavioral patterns of group
members, and the short-term and long-term consequences of that
behavior. The key to understanding cooperation lies in understanding
that the effect of an extended behavioral pattern does not equal – and
might even be opposite to – the added effects of its parts.
Richerson et al. argue that widespread cooperation between
human non-relatives and Darwin’s observation that individuals
“sacriﬁce themselves for the common good” (Darwin 1874, pp.
178–79; see epigram at start of target article) are best explained
by a mechanism of cultural group selection (CGS). In the follow-
ing, I elaborate on how ontogenetic mechanisms may also have
contributed to our organization in groups and how both coopera-
tion and the sub-phenomenon of “self-sacriﬁce” may be under-
stood as parts of temporally extended behavioral patterns
exhibited either by a group or by individuals.
Behavior of groups, as well as of individuals, takes time. Since
time is limited, possible activities compete. Natural selection
chooses those activities that correlate either with Phylogenetically
Important Events (PIE) that ultimately enhance ﬁtness or ontoge-
netic proxies of these PIEs (Baum 2012). Temporally extended
activities have parts that consist of smaller-scale behavioral pat-
terns. Thus, natural selection acts on behavioral patterns of
varying complexity. Those patterns might be extended in time,
as well as in social space; that is, they can be exhibited by an indi-
vidual or by a group. More local behavioral patterns have other
consequences than more extended patterns embracing those
local patterns. To estimate an activity’s effect on an individual’s
or a group’s ﬁtness, we need to weigh the long-term effects of
the sum of local acts against the long-term effect of the behavioral
pattern as a whole. The key to understanding cooperation or self-
sacriﬁce lies in the realization that the effect of the pattern as a
whole does not equal the added effects of its parts, let alone
does a particular part affect ﬁtness in the same direction as the
whole pattern. Focusing on the consequences of parts (i.e.,
single local acts) can lead us up the garden path when explaining
cooperation.
The following two examples illustrate how the effect of an indi-
vidual’s local act can differ from the effect of an individual’s or a
group’s extended behavioral pattern: An individual’s local act,
such as an alcoholic’s acceptance of a drink at a party, is promptly
followed by relaxed and friendly social interactions, that is, proxies
of ﬁtness-enhancing PIEs. We call the acceptance of the drink
“impulsive.” The alcoholic’s refusal of the drink is promptly fol-
lowed by proxies for ﬁtness-decreasing PIEs such as social disap-
proval or simply the absence of relaxed social interactions. If an
alcoholic refuses a drink, we say that he or she is showing “self-
control.” Despite the short-term consequences, an extended
pattern of self-controlled behavior leads to enhanced ﬁtness.
Even if every single refusal of a drink is punished by proxies for
ﬁtness-decreasing PIEs, the extended pattern of abstinence
from alcohol will correlate with being healthier, having more
well-functioning relationships, and a better economy – self-con-
trolled behavior (as an extended pattern) enhances ﬁtness, as-
sessed in the long run (Baum 2015; Rachlin 2004).
A parallel mechanism selects the behavior of a group. Each par-
ticular engagement in a cooperative activity, such as recycling,
might be locally costly for the individual. If, however, enough
group members cooperate, those activities lead to ﬁtness-enhanc-
ing PIEs or their proxies. The effect of the more extended behav-
ioral pattern is in the interest of the individual as well as of the
group. Of course, those individuals who in fact recycled are not
necessarily those whose ﬁtness actually beneﬁts. In most instanc-
es, however, the whole group beneﬁts, which means that those
who contributed at their own immediate cost often do indeed
beneﬁt in the long run. An individual’s acts that lead – if they
are not punished – to PIEs advantageous for his or her own
ﬁtness but disadvantageous for the ﬁtness of other group
members, are labeled “selﬁsh,” whereas acts that are in the
short run costly for the individual but beneﬁcial for the group – in-
cluding the individual – are called “cooperative.” How many in-
stances of “self-sacriﬁce” are advantageous for the individual’s
ﬁtness can be understood when analyzing them as parts of rates
of cooperative behavior, which correlate with rates of consequenc-
es, such as reciprocity.
Even if altruistic behavior is not central to their argument,
Richerson et al. “are inclined to think that evolution has built an
element of […] true altruism into our social psychology” (sect.
6.2, para. 2). If “true altruism” is deﬁned by the absence of
ﬁtness-enhancing consequences on the actor’s behavior, here,
Richerson et al.’s account is not reconcilable with the view of al-
truistic behavior as a temporally extended behavioral pattern
that may be learned over an individual’s lifetime (Rachlin 2002).
An individual act of cooperation, as well as of altruism, each of
which might even be followed by ﬁtness-decreasing PIEs in the
short run, can nevertheless be ﬁtness-beneﬁcial when repeated
over time. Just as biological selection has acted on groups of
organs constituting organisms, extended behavioral patterns
(i.e., groups of acts) can be selected together.
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How do the abstract patterns of behavior resist being broken up
by selﬁsh behavior?
Richerson et al. posit that group-variable culturally transmitted
social norms with group-level functionality are evidence of CGS.
Teaching and following norms and rules are practices that func-
tion to overcome selﬁsh and impulsive behavior. We have rules
such as “brush your teeth twice a day” to ensure that our offspring
act in a self-controlled manner and to maximize their ﬁtness in the
long run, and we have rules such as “help others” to ensure the
coherence of the group.
In different environmental situations, natural selection occur-
ring within groups and between groups may have different relative
strengths. Even if cooperation, deﬁned as “working together
toward a shared aim” (Wehmeier and Hornby 2000), was selected
because it commonly enhanced the individual’s long-term ﬁtness,
it neither follows that cooperation enhances all cooperators’
ﬁtness, nor that all acts that we classify as parts of cooperative
behavior do so. A truly self-sacriﬁcing act can come about
because it is generally advantageous to cooperate, and making de-
cisions on a case-by-case basis is costly. Just as a single drink in a
pattern of abstinence does not signiﬁcantly change the correlation
between that pattern and PIEs (e.g., good health), a single ﬁtness-
reducing act of an individual will not signiﬁcantly change the cor-
relation of cooperative behavior and its ﬁtness-enhancing effect
resulting from the group’s collaboration.
Richerson et al. offer a coherent framework which is supported,
complemented, and potentially slightly modiﬁed by the proposed
considerations of behavioral patterns and their consequences in
different time frames.
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Abstract: We agree that institutions and rules are crucial for explaining
human sociality, but we question the claim of there not being
“alternatives to CGS [that] can easily account for the institutionalized
cooperation that characterizes human societies” (target article, sect. 7).
Hypothesizing that self-interested individuals coercively and
collaboratively create rules, we propose that agent-based hypotheses
offer viable alternatives to cultural group selection (CGS).
Richerson et al. argue that cultural systems, such as prosocial re-
ligion and institutions that maintain social order, play a vital role in
enabling the cooperation of both small- and large-scale human so-
cieties. We agree. But we are unconvinced that cultural group se-
lection (CGS) is the only hypothesis able to account for the
existence of such phenomena. CGS leads to group-functional
culture by selecting on cultural variation (Boyd & Richerson
2010), but such selection presupposes that group-functional equi-
libria exist already, suggesting that other processes, including
within-group dynamics, contribute to the emergence of group-
functional culture. Since researchers have long recognized that in-
dividuals with the requisite power coercively and consensually
create rules, we propose a complementary “rule-making
hypothesis” for group-adaptive institutions. Understanding the
contribution of such agent-based social processes is essential for
evaluating the value and limits of CGS theory.
Focusing speciﬁcally on rules and institutions that control social
deviance (one of Richerson et al.’s three examples of group-adap-
tive culture; see sect. 6.2), we describe two manifestations of this
rule-making hypothesis. The ﬁrst emerges when asymmetries in
power or inﬂuence allow parties to create and impose rules that
satisfy their own interests. Depending on whether the interests
of these coercive authorities coincide with those of the group,
these individuals will sometimes but not always create and main-
tain rules with group-level beneﬁts. An alternative form of this hy-
pothesis develops when power is more evenly distributed. In these
cases, coordinated groups of individuals can consensually create,
modify, and enforce rules that control defection.
Individuals can have key roles in producing group-functional
rules if they have sufﬁcient power or inﬂuence to institute cultural
changes and enforce new rules. Schapera (1970) observed that
Tswana tribal chiefs drove cultural change by introducing innova-
tions ranging from single rules, such as the banning of beer, to in-
frastructural changes, like the establishment of a police system.
The chiefs’ objectives in creating rules included quelling social dis-
turbance, reducing poverty, and collectivizing otherwise divergent
interests – goals with explicit group-level beneﬁts. Functional
rules can also stem from leaders dealing with novel forms of con-
ﬂict. Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941), in their ethnography of the
Cheyenne legal system, described how tensions arose after one
man borrowed another individual’s horse without permission.
The military chiefs eased the friction between the parties and
then established a rule: “Now we shall make a new rule. There
shall be no more borrowing of horses without asking … [If] the
taker tries to keep them, we will give him a whipping” (p. 128).
Considering the role of coercive rule-makers offers an alternative
explanation not only for the origin of group-functional culture, but
also for its maintenance, because powerful rule-makers should
continue to enforce group-functional rules as long as the rules
satisfy their own perceived self-interest. Moreover, the coercive
authority dynamic accounts for the ubiquity of institutions that
asymmetrically beneﬁt the powerful, spanning etiquette norms
(e.g., Trobriand Islanders: Malinowski 1926) and food taboos
(e.g., the Etoro: Kelly 1980; the Aranda: Spencer & Gillen
1927; and the Sanumá: Taylor 1981).
Coercive rule-makers who have the power to change rules
should create group-functional culture when their own interests
coincide with those of their groups. In some cases, these overlap-
ping interests stem from coercive rule-makers preferring groups
with cooperative, compliant individuals. Elders of the Kurnai of
Australia demanded that young boys “listen to, and obey the old
men” and “live peaceably with their friends” (Howitt 1885,
p. 316), rules that improve the welfare of the elders while also cre-
ating group-level beneﬁts. Studies of punishment in animal socie-
ties show that CGS is not necessary for the coercive enforcement
of group-adaptive behavior (Singh and Boomsma 2015). Reeve
(1992) found that naked mole rat queens harass lazy subordinates,
while Flack et al. (2005; 2006) noted that dominant macaques
police conﬂicts among subordinates, stabilizing their own high
status while reducing within-group conﬂict.
To this point, we have illustrated the ability of powerful individ-
uals to create group-adaptive rules. However, the development of
group-functional culture does not require that novelty originate
with coercive authorities. Parties of similarly powerful individuals
can also establish and maintain rules to control each other’s behav-
ior. Systems of rules that emerged across camps during the
California Gold Rush represent a well-studied example of self-in-
terested individuals coordinating to create and enforce novel insti-
tutions of social order. Despite the absence of organized state law,
miners residing at promising digs convened and instituted major-
ity-approved rules to protect mining rights and safety (McDowell
2004). Violations of those rules spurred injured parties to seek
redress through the support of the community, who used coordi-
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nated punishment to enforce rules. Ostrom’s (1990) review of
small-scale institutions that manage common pool resources sim-
ilarly exempliﬁes how the coordination of self-interested agents
can produce group-functional culture. Fishermen in Alanya,
Turkey, for example, took 10 years to perfect an institution to
control overharvesting and conﬂict, with a built-in means of moti-
vating individuals to monitor and enforce violations of mutually
recognized rules. Last, group consent can interact with authorities
to produce group-functional culture. Among the Enga of New
Guinea, leaders presented cultural innovations to their groups,
though group consensus ultimately governed adoption. As Wiess-
ner (2002) summarized, “The innovations promoted were ones
that leaders felt could be played to their own advantage; the inno-
vations that stuck were those that worked for the individual and
the group” (p. 251).
Here we brieﬂy reviewed evidence that individuals motivated
by self-interest can create group-functional culture through coer-
cion, consensus, or both. Although our discussion is largely re-
stricted to rules controlling deviance, these arguments apply to
the development of other domains of group-functional culture
as well, such as institutions that reward otherwise costly behaviors
(Glowacki &Wrangham 2013) and prosocial religion (Norenzayan
et al. 2016). Only after recognizing complementary and alterna-
tive hypotheses for group-functional culture, as well as the criteria
for testing among them, will we be able to assess Richerson et al.’s
claim that CGS is uniquely important in generating the cultural
systems underlying human cooperation.
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Abstract: Developmental research characterizes even the youngest
learners as critical and selective, capable of preserving or culling cultural
information on the bases of informant accuracy, reasoning, or
coherence. We suggest that Richerson et al. adjust their account of
social learning in cultural group selection (CGS) by taking into
consideration the role of the selective learner in the cultural inheritance
system.
Richerson et al.’s discussion rightly characterizes social learning as
one of the key facilitators of cultural group selection (CGS). While
we agree with the idea that social learning is essential for cultural
inheritance, and serves as a source of cultural variation and selec-
tion, we believe that the authors’ discussion has underspeciﬁed
the signiﬁcant role of the rational, critical, and selective social
learner in these evolutionary processes.
We would ﬁrst like to note that behavioral imitation, which the
authors focus on, is not the only form of social learning that could
reduce intergroup cultural variation. Cultural variation between
groups is a starting point not only for the spread of group-beneﬁ-
cial behaviors but also for group-beneﬁcial beliefs, ideas,
or concepts. Contact with out-group scientiﬁc knowledge, for
example, could result in the adoption of this cultural information
by less successful groups. In such cases, learning would not be pri-
marily imitative in nature – one could not describe cross-cultural
learning about microbes, for example, as primarily imitative in
nature, and yet this has reduced between-group variation in cul-
tural beliefs about the unseen causes of disease.
That said, the selective social learner is inﬂuenced by factors
beyond those cited by Richerson et al. (those being a penchant
for conformity, the sway of prestige, afﬁnity for cultural norms, or
group membership biases). A growing body of developmental re-
search characterizes even the youngest social learners as active par-
ticipants in the learning process, whose selectivity can act to
preserve or cull testimonial information on the basis of its accuracy,
support, and coherence with other beliefs (Stephens et al. 2015).
These belief-formation processes are supported by children’s
rapid assessments of others’ competence, expertise and trustworthi-
ness. Monitoring the content and coherence of messages protects
learners against misinformation, alerting them to conﬂicts
between incoming messages and their already established knowl-
edge and beliefs (Mercier & Sperber 2011). For example, infants
detect overt labeling errors and anomalous referential actions
(Gliga & Csibra 2009). They expect humans with appropriate infor-
mation to speak truthfully, and actively correct inaccurate labelers
(Koenig & Echols 2003). In imitation research, children have
been found to give priority to the approach taken by a successful
individual over an unsuccessful group, showing that in learning
actions, successful outcomes often trump conventional means (Sco-
ﬁeld et al. 2013; Seston & Kelemen 2014; Wilks et al. 2015).
Further research suggests that the detection of inaccuracy might
lead to enhanced memory for incompetent sources and poor
memory for the information they present (Corriveau & Harris
2009; Koenig & Woodward 2010; Sabbagh & Shafman 2009).
Even more relevant to CGS, research in this ﬁeld suggests that
children make rational learning decisions on the basis of whether
or not the messages they receive from informants violate their ex-
isting understanding of the world (Sobel & Kushnir 2013). Pre-
schoolers, for example, have been known to preferentially learn
from more expert (Koenig & Harris 2005; Koenig & Jaswal
2011), more grammatically proﬁcient (Corriveau et al. 2011;
Sobel & Macris 2013), and logically consistent informants
(Doebel et al. 2011). They also ﬂexibly adjust their trust in infor-
mants’ testimony based on their understanding of what is improb-
able and impossible (Corriveau et al. 2014; Shtulman & Carey
2007; Woolley & Ghossainy 2013). Young learners’ reliance on
their own understanding of what is correct, true, or possible
should not be underestimated: Their preferences for native-ac-
cented speakers (Corriveau et al. 2013), adults (Jaswal & Neely
2006), and familiar speakers (Corriveau & Harris 2009) are re-
versed if they learn that such sources have proven inaccurate.
This is not to say that children are always critical in the face of
message conﬂicts: Preschoolers have been found to trust a decep-
tive adult who provides inaccurate information about an object’s
location (Jaswal 2010; Jaswal et al. 2010). Interestingly, this may
be because preschoolers are more sensitive to violations of com-
monly held cultural knowledge (Stephens & Koenig 2015;
Koenig & Stephens 2014).
As children develop, they incorporate their growing knowledge
and experience about speakers and the world to evaluate new in-
formation. Considerations about message coherence and plausi-
bility are taken into account along with other factors – including,
as Richerson et al. mention, informant prestige, cultural conven-
tions, conformity, normativity, group membership, and so on.
We suspect that children appraise social learning situations
based on their recognition of both cultural and epistemic
norms, with priority afforded to each based on the situation
(Hodges 2014), type of testimony or information being exchanged
(Stephens & Koenig 2015), and the values endorsed in their envi-
ronment (Reifen Tagar et al. 2014).
How exactly does this selective learner play a role in CGS?
Richerson et al. describe three forms of social learning that help
maintain or reduce group-level cultural variation: (1) accurate,
rapid social learning; (2) conformist social learning, described as
mechanisms that maintain intergroup variation of cultural norms
and behaviors; and (3) selective imitation of cultural behaviors, de-
scribed as a process by which intergroup variation is reduced.
Along these lines, we would argue that the selective learner’s
ability to critically evaluate cultural information on the basis of
its accuracy, support, and coherence contributes to CGS in two
main ways. First, as previously described, the social learner can
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reduce intergroup cultural variation by rationally evaluating out-
group cultural information and adopting that which is deemed
to be not only useful, but reliable. Second, the selective social
learner is able to ensure accurate cultural transmission not only
through imitative or conformist strategies, but also by evaluating
various forms of cultural information on the bases of accuracy,
logic, and internal coherence. Thus, when a 16-month-old cor-
rects an informant who labels a shoe as a ball, upholding culturally
speciﬁc labels, what may appear to be an early tendency toward
conformity may involve critical appraisals of messages, along
with epistemic inferences about the informant.
In sum, we suggest that Richerson and colleagues take into
further consideration the role of the rational and selective social
learner, who can critically evaluate cultural information and
adjust their own learning accordingly.
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Abstract: The properties of individual carbon atoms allow them to chain
into complex molecules of immense length. They are not limited to
structures involving only a few atoms. The design features of our
evolved neural adaptations appear similarly extensible. Individuals with
forager brains can link themselves together into unprecedentedly large
cooperative structures without the need for large group-beneﬁcial
modiﬁcations to evolved human design. Roles need only be intelligible
to our social program logic, and judged better than alternatives.
The title of the target article advances the bold claim that: “Cul-
tural group selection [CGS] plays an essential role in explaining
human cooperation.” By the end of the target article, the argu-
ment has been watered down: “evidence … [justiﬁes] taking the
CGS hypothesis seriously as [one] basic explanation” (sect. 7,
para. 2, emphasis added). That is, vaguely characterized non-
quantitative facts about humans do not prove the impossibility
of CGS inﬂuencing the distribution of cooperative behavior,
however minutely. We agree it is possible. Richerson et al. similar-
ly retreat from CGS being an essential explanation for human co-
operation, substituting the claim that it is an explanation for “our
species’ highly unusual ability to create large societies with wide-
spread cooperation” (sect. 7, para. 2, emphasis added).
Because “large societies” are a recent evolutionary novelty, it
follows that selection in ancestral small-scale societies was what
predominantly forged the (genetically) evolved mechanisms that
make cooperation in modern large-scale societies possible.
Indeed, the context in which something evolves (e.g., cooperative
mechanisms in foragers living in small-scale societies) does not
predict its capacity to scale (e.g., cooperation in mass societies).
Vision that evolved to see things closer than 3 miles can see for
light-years; language capacities that evolved to allow our ancestors
to speak to hundreds now allow us to speak to millions.
CGS proponents ﬁnd the existence of cooperation in mass socie-
ties a self-evident evolutionary puzzle because the numbers involved
evoke the impression that selection is not at equilibrium (which it
need not be). In contrast, we think researchers need to carefully
characterize the computational architectures of our evolved array
of neural adaptations for exchange, delayed implicit reciprocity,
risk-pooling, alliances, coalitions, coordination (such as theory of
mind), bargaining, aggression, mateship, parenting, kin selection,
partner choice, reputation, externality-management, social learning,
and so on, together with their interactions. Only then can you know
whether any puzzling residue of “group-beneﬁcial behavior” in
modern societies remains, requiring further explanation.
The dazzlingly extended forms of modern cooperation we see
today (Adam Smith’s division of labor supporting globe-spanning
trade) appear differentially built out of adaptations for small-scale
sociality that modularly scale, such as exchange – rather than the
marginal benevolence of Smith’s butcher, brewer, and baker. Evi-
dence indicates that political attitudes towardwelfare and redistribu-
tion reﬂect a specialized forager psychology of sharing for variance
reduction (Petersen et al. 2012) and resource-conﬂict (Petersen
et al. 2013). Societies that attempted to harness general benevolence
to organize institutions and production – the USSR, East Germany,
China, Cambodia, North Korea, Cuba –were spectacular coopera-
tive failures. That they functioned at all depended on other scalable
small-scale specializations – aggressive threats (conditional punish-
ment), hierarchy, dominance, coalitions, and so forth.
Even ancestral foragers had institutions (enduring coordination
with different roles). We do not understand why individually se-
lected psychological adaptations for cooperation, coordination,
coalitions, theory of mind, metarepresentations (i.e., x is a rule),
intelligent instrumental reasoning (that allows locally contingent
tailoring of actions to goals), social learning, a social psychology
that understands and deploys incentives, hierarchies (and so on)
are considered inadequate to explain institutions, then or now.
It is puzzling why the authors believe that modern institutions
cannot be far better explained without recourse to CGS, by the
combined operation of these neural adaptations in dense, persist-
ing social networks of intelligent, cultural agents (Boyer &
Petersen 2011). When the interlinked cognitive niche adaptations
(Tooby & DeVore 1987; see also, Pinker 2010) such as intelli-
gence, language, and culture are added, it is difﬁcult to see any
obvious cooperative anomalies.
Gene-culture coevolution proponents claim to see overwhelm-
ing evidence of group-beneﬁcial, individually costly behaviors in
large societies that cannot be explained by (their computationally
impoverished models of) reciprocity. For example, many results
are interpreted as showing prosocial, other-regarding preferences
purportedly inconsistent with individual selection, including a
taste for fairness, excess generosity, and a failure to uniformly
act with short-run selﬁshness. These preferences, together with
a taste for altruistically punishing fairness norm-violators, are be-
lieved to work together to make people sacriﬁce their individual
interests for the beneﬁt of the group –which then helps groups
in intergroup competition. However, the supporting experimental
ﬁndings typically involve constrained choices that conﬂate hypoth-
eses, rather than test them cleanly. When these defects are
removed from experimental designs, supporting results collapse.
For example, when subjects have the added choice of taking
from others as well as giving, they no longer give in dictator
games (List 2007). Young children, purportedly averse to unfair
divisions, will choose to pay a cost to reduce the welfare of
others when given the chance (Sheskin et al. 2014). In previous
experimental designs testing for third-party punishment of
unfair dividers, the only choices available were to punish or not.
When this demand-characteristic is removed by adding the
option of rewarding unfairness, average “altruistic” punishment
approaches zero (Pedersen et al. 2013). Where partners can
defect on both the subject and third parties, subjects punish
those who defect on them personally (Krasnow et al. 2012). More-
over, they only punish those they subsequently choose to interact
with, not those who could only harm others. This indicates that
punishment is a tool of negotiation, and not primarily designed
to altruistically uphold group norms.
Finally, the models typically used to represent individually se-
lected strategies of social interaction (“reciprocity”) are strikingly
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impoverished (e.g., Cooperate, Defect), are largely free of social
ecology and computation, and rest on many implausible assump-
tions. They need to be replaced with an adaptationist game theory.
For example, to determine whether to cooperate, agents need to
know whether an interaction is one-shot or repeated. When this
aspect of real-world cooperation is added to simulations of reci-
procity, then “excess” generosity reliably coevolves with reciproc-
ity, eliminating observed generosity as an evolutionary puzzle
(Delton et al. 2011). The rapid cultural dynamics of moral
norms (think French Revolution) seem far better explained by ri-
valrous agents opportunistically seeking allies to jockey for self-ad-
vantageous norms (Tooby & Cosmides 2010), than by the slow
accumulation of group-beneﬁting norms through some groups
doing better than others. In 1789, institutions that developed
over a thousand years were swept away in a thousand days.
Thus, we may ﬁnd that the code and open parameters of
evolved programs underlie the combinatorial rules and building
blocks of institutional cooperation.
Cultural group selection is plausible, but the
predictions of its hypotheses should be tested
with real-world data
doi:10.1017/S0140525X15000278, e55
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Abstract: The evidence compiled in the target article demonstrates that
the assumptions of cultural group selection (CGS) theory are often met,
and it is therefore a useful framework for generating plausible
hypotheses. However, more can be said about how we can test the
predictions of CGS hypotheses against competing explanations using
historical, archaeological, and anthropological data.
Scientiﬁc theories such as cultural group selection (CGS) must be
assessed in two ways. First, the basic underlying assumptions on
which an idea rests should be shown to be coherent and realistic.
Second, the theory should generate hypotheses with testable pre-
dictions about phenomena in the real world that we should
observe if the theory is correct. In the target article, Richerson
et al. do an excellent job of demonstrating that, indeed, the as-
sumptions of CGS theory are often met, and it is therefore a
useful framework for generating plausible hypotheses. In particu-
lar, the properties of cultural inheritance, processes such as con-
formity and frequency dependence, and the ubiquity and
importance of institutions enable the maintenance of variation
between groups upon which selection can act even in the face
of physical migration between groups (a large hurdle facing
genetic group selection models). The importance of this should
not be underestimated, given the somewhat controversial and
divisive history of this subject.
However, we feel there is more that can be said about how we
can test the predictions of CGS hypotheses as explanations of
human cooperation, speciﬁcally with respect to testing them
against competing explanations. CGS is an overarching framework
that can generate more speciﬁc hypotheses that can be tested
against alternatives. Let’s consider the following: over the last
10,000 years, the scale of human cooperation has increased by
several orders of magnitude: from small-scale groups of some
hundreds of foragers to large modern states with populations of
hundreds of millions. Social scientists have advanced a multitude
of theories explaining this “major evolutionary transition” (sensu
Maynard Smith & Szathmáry 1995). Such theories tend to come
in several ﬂavors (Carballo et al. 2014). “Functionalist” (or “volun-
taristic”) explanations emphasize beneﬁts of cooperation to all:
buffering environmental risk, managing competition and efﬁcient
allocation of resources, producing public goods such as an irriga-
tion system, and capturing returns to scale in, for example, eco-
nomic production (Johnson & Earle 2000). In contrast,
“conﬂict” explanations focus on the dark side of large-scale social-
ity: class struggle and exploitation, warfare and conquest (e.g.,
Carneiro 1970). CGS theory can combine these functionalist
and conﬂict elements, but in a highly speciﬁc way: Cooperation
within societies evolves as a result of conﬂict and competition
between societies.
It is possible (indeed likely) that the best explanatory model will
combine more than one mechanism, with different factors,
perhaps, interacting in nonlinear, synergistic ways. Evaluation of
such complex quantitative explanations is not a problem for
modern methods of analysis, especially when combined with a
program of building mathematical models that explicitly incorpo-
rate such interactions. In our own research we have made a
number of steps in this direction. In a recent paper (Turchin
et al. 2013) we examined whether increased competition
between groups due to the development of horse-based forms
of warfare (i.e., involving chariots, cavalry, etc.) was an important
force in the historical emergence of very large-scale human soci-
eties (“empires”). Following the logic of CGS (or multi-level selec-
tion more generally), we constructed an agent-based computer
simulation in which “cooperative” cultural traits were only select-
ed for due to the beneﬁcial effects they had in competition
between groups (without between-group competition, there was
a heavy bias against developing such traits). We were able to
test the predictions of this model against historical data about
the spatial distribution of empires over a 3,000-year period. En-
couragingly, the predictions of the model showed a good match
to the real data. Furthermore, turning off some of the important
parameters in the models produced a large drop-off in the match
between simulations and data. This indicates that our hypothesis is
at least a plausible explanation for the evolution of socio-political
complexity. This model is admittedly a gross simpliﬁcation of the
actual historical process, and these results are still somewhat pre-
liminary; however, this work does demonstrate the ability to quan-
titatively test the predictions of hypotheses informed by CGS,
using the empirical record of past human societies.
The next step is to test this hypothesis more explicitly against
other alternative explanations, including those not motivated by
CGS. An important point here is that different theories make
very different predictions as to where, when, and under what cir-
cumstances we should see the rise of large-scale societies in
the archaeological and historical record, and such things as the
order in which different aspects of societies emerge. So far the
progress in testing such theories has been slow. Yet the huge
corpus of historical and archaeological information provides us
with a remarkable empirical resource for testing theories and re-
jecting empirically inadequate explanations. The key is transform-
ing the wealth of information into a systematic form that facilitates
the kinds of analyses we described above. Currently, we are col-
laborating with colleagues from across multiple disciplines and
around the world to develop a databank of coded and quantitative
historical and archaeological information about past societies
(Seshat: Global History Databank: http://seshatdatabank.info/),
with which hypotheses about cultural evolution and human
history can be tested, including those informed by CGS theory
(Turchin et al. 2015). For example, in one project we are assessing
the idea that competition between groups led to increased egali-
tarianism in human groups, particularly beginning with develop-
ments of several “axial-age” religions (Bellah 2011). Importantly,
this idea will be rigorously tested against other competing explana-
tions, for example, the idea that religion is the “opiate of the
masses,” by which elites keep the majority of the population
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subservient. Rather than the common approach of the social sci-
ences or humanities where the world is interpreted according to
a particular theoretical perspective, we follow the approach in
which it is ultimately the data that decide which hypothesis pro-
vides the best explanation.
In summary, we contend that CGS has been shown to be a very
productive generator of testable hypotheses. This theoretical
framework is capable of producing novel, even unexpected pre-
dictions that can be then contrasted with predictions made by al-
ternative theories using historical and archaeological data.
Whether hypotheses derived from CGS theory are “true” or
not, this framework has already demonstrated its value as a pro-
ductive research program in the sense of the philosopher of
science Imre Lakatos (1978).
Multi-level selection, social signaling, and the
evolution of human suffering gestures: The
example of pain behaviors
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Abstract: Pain suffering has been naturally selected to be experienced and
expressed within a wider social system. The communication of pain
improves group coordination and decision-making about engaging in
resource dependent and potentially risky endeavors. Recent ﬁndings
warrant the development of a cohesive framework for understanding the
reciprocal nature of pain expression and individual and group-level
outcomes that can generate novel predictions on the heuristical
expression of human suffering in naturalistic and clinical settings.
Richerson et al. present an interesting take on the contemporary
movement to understand the complexity of human behavior via
multi-level selection forces. Their arguments in favor of multi-
level selection by way of cultural group ﬁtness, though speculative,
highlight the potential application in evaluating the social struc-
ture as a potent mediator in the selection of characteristics of
human psychology. It may in fact be the case that a multitude
of basic biological systems have been inﬂuenced by both individ-
ual- and group-level selection forces due to the reciprocal nature
on individual and group ﬁtness outcomes. One domain of mental
and physical health functioning that likely evolved within the con-
straints of embedded social communication is the experience and
demonstration of visceral suffering in its various forms (e.g.,
anxiety, sadness) including pain. In this commentary, we
propose to extend Richerson et al.’s thesis by showing how
human pain perception could have been inﬂuenced by multi-
level selection, a thesis that, if true, has broad implications for
the future directions of evolutionary psychology and the clinical
health sciences.
There is no doubt that the behavioral expression of physical dis-
comfort has both intra- and interpersonal functions that directly
impact the individual’s ﬁtness. Some intrapersonal functions of
pain perception include the ability to detect and discriminate en-
vironmental threats, to serve as a warning system, to promote self-
awareness (e.g., to attend to and protect an injured body-part),
and to facilitate operant learning (e.g., to avoid dangerous
stimuli; Eccleston & Crombez 1999). Relative to other species,
these intrapersonal functions alone do not explain why humans
express so many and such varied non-vital suffering behaviors, in-
cluding those associated with chronic, psychosomatic, and
emotion-induced pain conditions. One likely explanation for the
adaptive beneﬁts of pain expression lies in the social-signaling
properties of pain behaviors (Vigil & Strenth 2014).
The social-signaling perspective maintains that pain behaviors
are a pinnacle demonstration of vulnerability, which humans use
and direct toward selective social partners to gain logistical and
emotional social support in times of need (Vigil 2009). Expressive
pain behaviors also allow sufferers to assess the altruistic reliability
of the targets of their expression (e.g., friends, domestic partners
or health care providers). In other words, persons who respond to
a solicitation evoked by a pain expression are perceived as poten-
tially more reliable social partners. To date, this social-signaling
perspective of pain perception has been used (with relative
success) for predicting individual differences that inﬂuence the ex-
pression of pain in various social contexts, such as audience char-
acteristics (Vigil & Alcock 2014; Vigil & Coulombe 2011; Vigil
et al. 2014b) and the simulated presence of another person
(e.g., the sound of a stranger’s voice; see Vigil et al. 2014d).
Still, there is no reason to assume that the social-signaling func-
tions of pain are limited to individual-level ﬁtness incentives alone.
Thus, additional selection forces acting at the group level may
have played a secondary or coevolutionary role in the selection
of pain’s perception and expression. As Richerson et al. and
others have noted (Geary 2010; Geary et al. 2003), humans
evolved in an environment of coalitional competition whereby
social cooperation was used to form alliances for protecting
oneself from and competing against rival groups for control of
ecologically relevant resources (e.g., food and mates). The coordi-
nation of group activities was such a predominant feature through-
out human evolution that it may make sense to conceptualize the
group as a valid unit of selection. This is especially true if the
success of group activities depends on communication among
members. Given that the expression of pain can be understood
as an individual’s perception of threat and state of debilitation,
the aggregate effect of multiple individuals expressing pain
should ultimately inﬂuence a group’s behavior. Based on this,
the selection of individual characteristics and attributes that
bolster selective communication of pain within a group should
enable improved group coordination and decision-making. Like-
wise, groups that are better able to assess external threats (preda-
tors, neighboring groups, or parasites) and in-group capabilities
should have a greater chance of survival. From an evolutionary
perspective, this hypothesis makes intuitive sense, given that
humans are the quintessential social animal and competition
between groups is dependent on achieving effective group-level
consensus on resource expenditure and risk-taking (e.g., engaging
in new hunting tactics, migration, coalitional warfare).
Complementary to this hypothesis is the role that empathy
plays during interpersonal communication. Expressed empathy
could be understood as a key behavioral mediator subserving
the interpretation of individual-level vulnerability and threat
(i.e., pain) in coalition members. Said differently, for pain’s ex-
pression to ﬁnd an effective target, the receiver must be able to
internalize the current state (and changes in that state) of physical
and mental prowess of the signaler. This combination of pain and
empathetic signaling (e.g., behavioral mimicry) distributed among
group members enables group coordination. This hypothesis is
supported by recent ﬁndings suggesting that people express
empathy systematically with the formation of social identities cre-
ating an intragroup empathy bias – the increasing empathy
between in-group members greater than that of out-group
members (Cikara et al. 2011; 2014). The mutual expression of
pain and empathy enables in-group members to use this informa-
tion in making effective decisions. In line with this, our lab has
found that momentary pain reporting is inﬂuenced by the quantity
and quality of the individual’s peer relationships (Vigil et al. 2013),
relationships with pair-bonding partners (Vigil et al. 2014c), and
other types of co-residents (Vigil et al. 2014a). These ﬁndings
suggest that pain has been naturally selected to be expressed sys-
tematically within a broader social networking system. Further,
recent work has explicated a neurobiological relationship
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between social and physical pain. Panksepp (1998) originally pro-
posed the idea of social pain, and since then, numerous studies
have demonstrated a cognitive and behavioral overlap between
the shared aspects of physical and social pain (Eisenberger &
Cole 2012; Macdonald & Leary 2005).
On the balance, the diverse research ﬁndings from numerous
lines of inquiry suggests a need for further empirical and exper-
imental studies that would add to a developing framework for
understanding how individual behavior is reciprocally shaped
by both individual and group outcomes. Pain behaviors enjoy
a rich variability that may not be attributed to individual
factors alone, and this new framework may offer alternative
means for generating predictions of the evolved nature of
human suffering.
Clarifying the time frame and units of selection
in the cultural group selection hypothesis
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Abstract:We raise and discuss two issues for clariﬁcation. First, over what
timescale is cultural group selection proposed to have been active?
Unprecedented cooperation is inferred to have arisen in hunter-gather
life well before the recent period on which Richerson et al. focus.
Second, what is the unit of selection? Groups (of human individuals)?
Or cultural entities along the lines of “meme-complexes”?
We congratulate authors Richerson et al. on the scope and scale of
the wide-ranging literature they have brought to bear on their
thesis. This offers an impressive scholarly review of evidence
bearing on the nature of human cultural evolution. Nevertheless,
we ﬁnd it difﬁcult to judge yet how compelling is the resulting case
for cultural group selection (CGS) speciﬁcally, because of a lack of
clarity on some core issues. Here we focus on two.
The ﬁrst concerns the period of human evolution that Richerson
et al. aspire to address, which remains surprisingly ambiguous in
the target article. Much of the article focuses on recent times,
notably the Holocene. At one point they speculate that CGS may
have been important “as far back” as symbolic evolution develop-
ments, at around 160 k.y.a. But given that the authors start their
article by taking the distinctiveness of human cooperation as the re-
markable phenomenon theywish to explain, it seems to us that they
should be more seriously addressing the earlier periods of hunting
and gathering, including necessarily highly cooperative big-game
hunting, which a variety of evidence suggests was already signiﬁ-
cant between 500 k.y.a. and 1 m.y.a. at least (Whiten & Erdal
2012). This is important not only because of its relevance to the
authors’ central concerns, but also because the socio-cognitive pro-
cesses selected for over this vast timescale are likely to have left a
signiﬁcant legacy in the architecture of the human mind, including
its cooperative and cultural dispositions.
The ethnographic, archaeological, and comparative evidence
that over the years we (Erdal & Whiten 1996; Whiten &
Erdal 2012) and others have marshalled indicate that this long
hunter-gatherer era was already marked by unprecedented egal-
itarianism, generalized sharing, and coupled, enhanced levels of
cooperation – the core phenomenon the authors profess to wish
to explain – of various kinds. These have included cooperation in
each of the enterprises of hunting (including manufacturing the
weapons and traps utilized) and gathering, but also the ways in
which these activities, typically undertaken through division of
labour between separately foraging parties, are integrated over
space and time and coordinated to permit generalized sharing
of spoils at campsites, coupled with information exchange
between hunters and gatherers that enhances subsequent forag-
ing effectiveness. Among the many other forms of enhanced
cooperation are shared child care and inter-band marriage ar-
rangements. The result is that interdependence in hunter-gath-
erers displays unique levels and forms among primates, such
that through the exploitation of its socio-cognitive niche, the
band effectively acts like a uniﬁed predatory organism, able to
outcompete such “professional predators” as the large social car-
nivores of Africa. It is thus the earlier evolution of these distinc-
tive cooperative and other characteristics, in small bands
numbering about 30 individuals, that begs explanation. Given
these were surely already enmeshed in complex cumulative cul-
tures, shouldn’t the analysis of Richerson et al. be focused more
on the social dynamics and selective regimes that have operated
in tens of thousands of generations of hunting and gathering?
The unique forms and degree of interdependence among the
members of a human hunter-gatherer band –which mean
that the inclusive ﬁtness of individuals is highly contingent on
their contributions to the effectiveness of the group as a
whole – could perhaps be argued to provide an unusually suppor-
tive context for the operation of genetic group selection. However,
we are here talking instead of cultural group selection, and this
leads us to the second issue we wish to raise, which is the more
general one of what exactly are the replicating (even if with
varying ﬁdelity) entities that are proposed to be exposed to differ-
ential selection in the CGS theory? We feel this remains surpris-
ingly unclear in this article. At times the authors write as if it is
cultural “groups” of people, with some groups outcompeting or
absorbing others. But should not the unit of replication instead
be a cultural entity, more along the lines of (although not neces-
sarily isomorphic with) –what have earlier been called “memes”
or “meme-complexes” (e.g., Aunger 2000)? The latter concept
of a set of co-adapted cultural elements (Dawkins 1976, pp.
212–213) is presumably where the “group” aspect of CGS
would get purchase? And for CGS to occur, these meme-complex-
es would somehow need to spread preferentially across popula-
tions, as when cultural complexes such as religions like
Catholicism, or even national cultures in the case of large scale in-
vasions like that of the Roman Empire, spread through new pop-
ulations. Selection involving the differential reproductive success
of cultural entities (group-level selection where “group” is akin to
“meme-complex”) is a very different phenomenon to selection in-
volving differential reproductive success of groups of individuals.
The two are not mutually exclusive but it needs to be clearer
whether CGS is conceptualized as involving both types of compe-
tition or one in particular?
If the focus of the “group” term in CGS is cultural complex-
es, perhaps such phenomena have indeed characterized only the
relatively recent phases of human cultural evolution that the
authors focus on, particularly the Holocene. But is such a con-
clusion based only on the fact that we have rich, relevant evi-
dence about cultural change across this recent period? We
know all too little about the processes that characterized the
earlier and vastly longer period of our hunter-gatherer history
we alluded to earlier. Indeed, we know all too little about the
nature of cultural change from all the studies undertaken in
the recent ethnographic past. From what we do know (e.g.,
Hewlett et al. 2011; Jordan 2015), it is far from apparent that
“group” needs inserting in “cultural selection” to characterize
the processes at work.
Commentary/Richerson et al.: Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 39 (2016) 45
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X15000059
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 11 Feb 2017 at 15:42:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
Authors’ Response
Cultural group selection follows Darwin’s
classic syllogism for the operation of selection
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Abstract: The main objective of our target article was to sketch
the empirical case for the importance of selection at the level of
groups on cultural variation. Such variation is massive in
humans, but modest or absent in other species. Group selection
processes acting on this variation is a framework for developing
explanations of the unusual level of cooperation between
non-relatives found in our species. Our case for cultural group
selection (CGS) followed Darwin’s classic syllogism regarding
natural selection: If variation exists at the level of groups, if this
variation is heritable, and if it plays a role in the success or
failure of competing groups, then selection will operate at the
level of groups. We outlined the relevant domains where such
evidence can be sought and characterized the main conclusions
of work in those domains. Most commentators agree that CGS
plays some role in human evolution, although some were
considerably more skeptical. Some contributed additional
empirical cases. Some raised issues of the scope of CGS
explanations versus competing ones.
R1. Introduction
We thank our commentators for their interesting and
thoughtful reﬂections on our target article. Since
commentaries often made more than one point regarding
cultural group selection (CGS), in this Response we
discuss some of them in more than one section. Our discus-
sion is organized in the following sections, reﬂecting 13
themes:
Section R2. CGS is a framework.
Section R3. Measuring cultural variation.
Section R4. Little unites the three forms of CGS.
Section R5. Institutions are important.
Section R6. The relationship between psychological processes and
cultural evolution.
Section R7. Individual-level processes are important.
Section R8. On what units does CGS operate?
Section R9. Variations in the strength of CGS.
Section R10. Ancient preadaptations.
Section R11. Pleistocene adaptations generated by CGS.
Section R12. Relationship of CGS to the expanded evolutionary
synthesis.
Section R13. Selection of extended behavior patterns.
Section R14. The evidence is incomplete.
R2. CGS is a framework
Commentators Gintis and Mace & Silva observe that
CGS is a framework rather than an explanation. Barclay
& Krupp seem to be expressing the same idea when they
describe CGS as a plausible force while arguing that its
action needs to be demonstrated in actual cases.
We agree. We see evolutionary theory as a framework,
an accounting system, for keeping track of heritable varia-
tion through time. A CGS framework is based on the em-
pirical data strongly suggesting that heritable cultural
variation often exists between groups at scales larger than
groups linked by kinship or a history of reciprocation
(target article, sect. 4). Thus, such groups will often
respond to some form of selection and many case studies
suggest that they do (sects. 5 and 6). The CGS framework
has been used to develop explanations for concrete phe-
nomena, for example, the expansion of the Nuer at the
expense of the Dinka in the Southern Sudan in the 19th
century. Kelly (1985) developed a CGS explanation for
the Nuer expansion based on the classic ethnography of
Evans-Pritchard (1940). Kelly argued that the bride-price
system of the Nuer caused them to count descent more
deeply than the Dinka, which made it possible for them
to mobilize larger groups of ﬁghters than the Dinka.
Hence the Nuer more frequently won ﬁghts than the
Dinka and incorporated defeated Dinka into their tribes.
It is only space constraint and the patience of readers
that prevented us from offering many more, and more de-
tailed, examples. The empirical argument in our article is
that keeping accounts of group-level cultural variation,
and on the impact of cultures selecting genes, is frequently
necessary to explain events in human evolution.
Turchin & Currie also use the concept of a framework
to describe CGS. They and colleagues are building a histor-
ical database in which they expect that the CGS framework
will frequently need to be employed to explain features of
human history. Other historically minded scholars have
adopted the cultural evolutionary framework exactly
because it offers a disciplined method for investigating
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and comparing quite concrete cases (e.g., Steinmo 2010). It
is in the details of such cases that researchers can establish
(or not) that an observed cultural difference between
groups is actually affecting the outcome of their competi-
tion in a manner consistent with an explanation rooted in
CGS, as Barclay & Krupp correctly insist must be done.
R3. Measuring cultural variation
Three commentaries include remarks on the difﬁculty of
accurately measuring cultural variation: Mace & Silva,
Fuentes & Kissel, and Ross & Atkinson. All three cri-
tique our use of the FST statistic in particular (also see
related discussions in sect. R8.) This is an important
point. The most ambitious attempt to catalog the world’s
living cultures was the descriptive work of classical ethnog-
raphers. This led to the development of an important data-
base, the Human Relations Area Files (http://hraf.yale.edu/),
that has supported a great deal of quantitative comparative
work. The descriptive work on cultural evolution and
gene-culture coevolution has been conducted by historians,
archaeologists, and geneticists. This is likewise being
compiled into databases (target article, sect. 3.2).
Unfortunately, information on variation within societies
is very scanty compared to estimates of between-society
variation. The individual-level data that we used in
section 4.1 to estimate FST between various cultural units
provide a large number of responses collected from large
samples, but we cannot be certain about the extent to
which the traits represent culturally heritable variation as
opposed to variation inﬂuenced by direct environmental
effects or genetic variation. We did choose questions (see
the appendix at the end of the target article) that seem
intuitively to be cultural and related to norms and institu-
tions. It is also undoubtedly the case that competition
between the political units known as “countries” is seldom
the key level at which selection takes place. Cultural evolu-
tionists have a big task before them to get better estimates
of the heritable components of within- and between-group
variations.
Despite these limitations, we maintain that our cultural
FST estimates provide readily available evidence that
between-group variation is sufﬁcient for selection to act
at the group level (Rogers 1990). Two speciﬁc critiques
of cultural FST require further discussion, however: First,
the applicability of the traits measured to CGS, and
second, whether variation along geographic clines, not
nominal groups, affect the scope of CGS.
Mace & Silva and Fuentes & Kissel worry about
whether our cultural FST measurements assess variation
relevant to cooperation. Wenote that, (1)manyof thecultural
traits from which we derived cultural FST estimates do reﬂect
cooperative altruism, as is made clear in the appendix. For
example, we include questions about willingness to sacriﬁce
personal resources for a public good, speciﬁcally in the
domain of climate change, government involvement in
health care, and taxation by the state. Further, (2) we note
that there is no reason why we would need to limit cultural
FST calculations to beliefs or behaviors related to altruism
or cooperation. Every cultural or genetic trait can have its
own evolutionary trajectory, and this trajectory can be de-
composed using the Price equation (Price 1970) into
change due to individual-level and group-level effects.
Moreover, altruistic traits are arguably the least interesting
traits with which one could study the relative effects of in-
dividual-level and group-level selection quantitatively. By
deﬁnition, the regression of individual-level ﬁtness on indi-
vidual-level allele frequency is negative for any altruistic
trait (a result from Price 1972). The adaptive evolution of
an altruistic trait therefore must be due to group-level
selection (although not necessarily CGS). Investigation of
intergroup partitioning of variance in beliefs related to
abortion is interesting in that such beliefs relate very
directly to ﬁtness outcomes and could, in principle, be
studied quantitatively.
Further, broader cultural differences between groups, or
measurements across a range of cultural traits, may approx-
imate the relevant suite of differences resulting in a cultural
expansion due to group selection. In this view, our mea-
surements of FST are trying to estimate the theoretically im-
portant heritable variation that selection might be acting
on. Some of that variation is, of course, generated by a
complex variety of processes. For example, the military ex-
pansion of the Nuer at the expense of the Dinka (Kelly
1985) is presumably not just due to differences in political
organization. Differences in other cultural traits, such as
subsistence strategy and bride wealth, are likely also impor-
tant. Likewise, modern political groups differ on a large
range of possibly integrated issues that may cause one
group to increase and the other to dwindle. The multidi-
mensional quality of cultural expansions often requires us
to try to identify and quantify the heritable variation that se-
lection may be acting on. Similar levels of complexity are
seen with genetic variation. Genetic FST measurements
must also concede to complexity. Genetic quantitative
characters are inﬂuenced by multiple contextual and con-
tingent environmental variables within the processes of,
for example, gene regulation, phenotypic plasticity, devel-
opment, and epigenetics more generally. See our discus-
sion of the problems biologists have linking genes to
phenotypes in section R14, which is quite parallel to the
difﬁculties in linking questionnaire responses to behavior.
Ross & Atkinson raise the issues of nominal groups and
spatial variation. Our measure of cultural FST is a direct ex-
pression of the partitioning of variation in questionnaire re-
sponses across the classiﬁcation of individuals into discrete
categories or groups. We have computed cultural FST
values between ethnolinguistic, political, and religious
groups (appendix), adding to other work computing cultur-
al FST between a larger sample of nations and four small-
scale East-African societies (Bell et al. 2009, Tables S1
and S2). These categories are in some sense ad hoc, in
that we could classify these same individuals into any
number of other categories/groups and produce a different
FST value. However, the data we used were obtained from
opinion surveys which sampled units that the survey formu-
lators considered to be meaningful social units. We make
no ontological assumption that empirical group boundaries
are discrete, or that any one particular group classiﬁcation is
true. We simply illustrate that, if we assume a given classi-
ﬁcation of individuals into groups, we can calculate the
scope for group selection to act on the focal cultural trait
as a function of this classiﬁcation. It is true that many
human groups have formal criteria for membership and
are often symbolically marked by language, dialect, and
other differences. Such groups often compete (target
article, sect. 5). In section 2.1 we discussed how symbolic
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marking can create boundaries to the ﬂow of culture
between groups. These boundaries are never completely
impermeable. The project of understanding just how cul-
tural diffusion is regulated from an evolutionary point of
view is in its infancy (Jordan 2015), although a considerable
literature exists on how symbolic and formal boundaries
affect the diffusion of innovations.
Ross & Atkinson’s ﬁnding that geographic variation ex-
plains more variation in folktales than currently observed
“group boundaries,” shows that deﬁning the group struc-
ture of a human population is complicated, but we
cannot conclude from this that it is a worthless endeavor.
Clinal geographic structure is a kind of group structure,
as is nominal group identiﬁcation. A cultural FST for a
given trait could be calculated using nominal group mem-
bership (religion, political party, etc.), or using classiﬁcation
based on geographic structure to any arbitrary level of geo-
graphic resolution (nation, state, county, city, postal code,
area code, city block, etc.), or even on classiﬁcation based
on the interaction of geographic structure and nominal
group membership. The scope of group selection to
operate on the given cultural trait could be analyzed in
light of each of these classiﬁcations. Of course, to under-
stand the system under consideration requires more than
estimating the scope for selection. We have to move from
the scope for selection to the concrete norms, institutions,
and payoffs to variant behaviors to understand what is
evolving and why. Folktales may encode norms and be rel-
evant to some CGS process acting on the groups in which
they become common, or they could merely spread
because individuals ﬁnd some of them sufﬁciently enter-
taining. See also Barclay & Krupp’s comments on the
need to understand how a cultural trait affects the
success of individuals and/or groups in particular cases.
R4. Little unites the three forms of CGS
The study of cultural evolution has long been bedeviled by
the complexity of the selective processes operating on cul-
tural variation. Natural selection is important; the cultural
traits of individuals who survive and reproduce are more
likely to be passed on than those of individuals who do
not thrive. But the capacity of individuals to decide (con-
sciously or unconsciously) what cultural variants to learn
and what to pass on is also important. Individuals also inﬂu-
ence the innovation of new cultural variants. Moreover, col-
lective decision-making occurs in many societies using
institutions like tribal councils and parliaments. All of
these processes act as “forces” inﬂuencing the direction
of cultural evolution. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981)
called these latter types of forces “cultural selection,” and
Boyd and Richerson (1985) talked about “decision-
making forces” arising from individuals choosing how to
behave given the choices offered by their culture and the
opportunity to innovate. Morin is quite right that one
form of CGS we describe, the differential growth, prolifer-
ation, and extinction of cultural groups, is a form of natural
selection. The other two, differential imitation and differ-
ential migration, are selective decision-making processes,
not natural selection. The main thing all three have in
common is that they are driven by variation among
groups. We are not wedded to any particular terminology
in this matter. If people feel more comfortable seeing
these as three distinctive processes rather than ones with
enough family resemblance to merit the CGS term, we
have no objection. At any rate, we hope that the similarities
and differences are spelled out well enough in section 2.
Morin’s more substantive claims are debatable. He
argues that natural section on cultural variation is more
likely to favor altruism (traits costly at the individual
level) than selective imitation and selective migration
because the latter are based on individual decisions.
There are two problems with this argument. First, imitation
and migration decisions are typically made in the face of
considerable causal opacity. The decision maker, even if ra-
tional and self-interested, cannot understand all of the
causal connections between an institution and the beneﬁts
it confers. The imitator and especially the migrant make
their decisions on the basis of results, not causal pathways.
If a measure of altruism is essential to make an institution
work, at least some imitators or migrants may acquire the
habit of altruism by imitation or teaching. It is good to
recall that if a group selection process is favoring altruism,
it will be because, averaged over all the altruists in the
meta-population, altruistic types do better than non-altru-
ists. In currently highly successful populations, altruists
may be relatively numerous, even if not as successful as
some of the rarer non-altruists in the successful population.
Unless immigrants or imitators can compute the advantag-
es of altruism versus defection rather accurately, they are
likely to often imitate the more numerous altruists.
Second, recall the tribal social instincts hypothesis (sect.
2.2). Humans are plausibly well-adapted genetically to
living in societies in which a measure of altruism is neces-
sary to produce the beneﬁts of cooperation. In public
goods game experiments, cooperation gets established if a
sufﬁcient number of “leaders” pay costs to discourage
selﬁsh behavior, using whatever tools the experimenters
give them, such as punishment or communication (e.g.,
Baum et al. 2012). A minority of people are rationally
selﬁsh and a plurality are conditional cooperators, yet in
the laboratory with enough tools to work with, altruists
can establish near perfect cooperation. This result is
common in Western samples, but worldwide behavior is
more variable (Herrmann et al. 2008). This ﬁnding is con-
sistent with theoretical analyses which show that selection
for altruism tends to be frequency dependent (Boyd &
Richerson 1992b). For example, if the costs to altruistic
punishers for punishing a given defector are low relative
to the cost imposed on the defectors, the frequency of al-
truistic punishers at equilibrium can be small in proportion.
At least in the lab and in theory, a sufﬁcient minority of al-
truists is necessary to generate cooperation in sizeable
groups of non-relatives. There may well be a genetic
basis for this altruism driven by culture-led gene-cultural
coevolution (sect. 2.2).
Morin’s remark that acquisition of behaviors by diffusion
will not necessarily lead to demographic consequences is
technically true but misleading. Borrowers can acquire a
neutral cultural variant that is statistically but not causally
related to the success of the donor society. Normally, bor-
rowers expect, or at least hope, that the cultural trait they
have copied will have a similar positive effect on the func-
tioning of their society. Once a variant is transferred, it will
often have similar effects in the host society as it did in the
donor society. However, we should not underestimate the
problems of mismatches with other institutions, with
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other aspects of culture, and with the environment. The de-
cidedly mixed results of efforts to transfer modern Western
institutions to the former European colonies after WWII
testify to the problem (Gibson et al. 2005). We do not
see the relevance of any alliance between the donor and
borrowing society. Competing organizations often borrow
institutional and military innovations from rivals (see sect.
5.2).
R5. Institutions are important
Several commentaries underscore the importance of insti-
tutions. Institutions only operate when a substantial
number of people obey their dictates; hence they are inher-
ently group-level traits (sect. 4.3). At the same time, the
schedule of rewards offered for conformity to the institu-
tion damps down individual-level variation in behavior in
the groups that are operating the institution. The punish-
ment of non-conformists prevents them from beneﬁtting
from the rewards the institution offers. Institutions vary
from group to group. CGS may well act on other sorts of
cultural variation, but if institutions exist they are prime
candidates to evolve by such processes.
Read argues that CGS does not take into account that
cultural idea systems are constituted at an organizational
rather than an individual level. Perhaps we were not sufﬁ-
ciently clear, but, in the main, what institutions do is
create organizations. Kinship systems as idea systems are
used by many peoples to create kin-based organizations
such as clans. It is the concrete organizations that actually
compete for resources. Ideas may compete directly to be
represented in human brains, as in the cross-cultural bor-
rowing we discuss. Presumably, the attractiveness of the in-
stitutions of other societies is mostly related to potential
adopters’ estimates of how much an institution would
improve the functioning of their own society. The Netsilik
seal-hunting partnership cultural idea system is an institu-
tion in our terms, and the Netsilik use it over and over
again to create concrete partnerships. Mace & Silva un-
derscore the important point that kinship norms, political
systems, and religion are generally group-level traits.
Houdek & Novakova introduce the interesting idea of
frozen plasticity. Their idea is that as societies become
more institutionally complex, interactions between them
make it increasingly difﬁcult to change dysfunctional insti-
tutions. Eventually, large-scale events like the loss of wars
or major natural disasters lead to a punctuated restructur-
ing of social institutions during which time innovations
are made, often prosocial ones. Turchin (2006) makes a
similar point. We did not intend to imply that the CGS
framework is committed to steady and irreversible progress
toward better institutions, and if we seem to have done so,
we apologize. The stylized facts suggest a trend in the Ho-
locene toward ever more complex societies supporting an
ever larger human population, but a more detailed view
reveals this global trend to be frequently interrupted by
local crises, retrenchment, collapse, and the social extinc-
tion of whole societies. A mature theory will have to
explain both the trend line and the substantial deviations
around it. We might imagine that in crises involving socie-
ties with more or less equally complex institutions, the so-
cieties with the least frozen and least dysfunctional
institutions innovate their way out of the crisis, while
their marginally more dysfunctional competitors perish.
In this way, on the multi-millennial time scale, the capacity
of societies to manage institutional complexity has gradually
improved, whereas on the millennial time scale much more
complex historical processes dominate the dynamics (e.g.,
Davies 2011).
R6. The relationship between psychological
processes and cultural evolution
Several commentaries discuss the relationship between
psychological processes and CGS, either as alternatives or
complements. In our review of the CGS framework (sect.
2), we noted the many ways in which the population-level
processes of CGS depend upon individual-level psycholog-
ical processes. In our empirical discussion, we focused on
the early-developing cognitive structures that support the
human social learning system (sect. 3.1) and the role of
norm acquisition in making institutions possible (sect. 4.2).
Henrich & Boyd’s commentary is very close to our view
on the relationship between psychological and CGS pro-
cesses. The important point is that that norms operate at
the individual level by reinforcing, co-opting, and modify-
ing gene-based predispositions. For example, Nisbett and
Cohen (1996) compared levels of the hormones cortisol
and testosterone in Southern and Northern undergraduates
(from the U.S.) when exposed to an insult. Southern partic-
ipants disproportionately subscribed to a culture of honor
norm, which on other behavioral measures indicated that
Southerners react much more aggressively to mild insults
than Northerners. The hormone measures show how emo-
tional centers in the brain stem can be recruited by a cultur-
ally transmitted norm (Panksepp&Biven 2012).Nisbett and
Cohen review the historical data related to the evolution of
the Southern Culture of Honor and the child-rearing
practices that cause it to develop.
When considering gene-based predispositions, it must
be remembered that by the end of infancy humans have de-
veloped a sophisticated capacity for social learning (sect.
3.1). The genetic and cultural contributions to adult cogni-
tive structures will therefore co-develop from early child-
hood as well as coevolve in evolutionary time. We as yet
do not know in much mechanistic detail how cognition de-
velops or how it evolved. Features like incest avoidance, kin
recognition, and basic emotions are probably widely shared
with other species, making animal models relevant to the
discussion. Historic information extracted from the
genome, together with improvements in the conventional
paleoanthropological record, may one day tell us much
more about how human brains and cognition evolved
(Richerson et al. 2010). Cross-cultural developmental
studies, which Henrich & Boyd and their co-workers are
pioneering, will help tease apart genetic and cultural contri-
butions to development. We think we know enough to be
conﬁdent that the outline of the relationship between
genes and culture in development that Henrich & Boyd
outline is correct but our current understanding resolves
few details.
We are sympathetic to Tooby & Cosmides’ argument
that much is built on gene-based social psychological inno-
vations that evolved during the Pleistocene. We brieﬂy re-
viewed the “tribal social instincts” hypothesis in section 2.2
and discuss it in relation to the sufﬁciency of individual-
Response/Richerson et al.: Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 39 (2016) 49
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X15000059
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 11 Feb 2017 at 15:42:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
level processes in sections R7 here and 2.2 in the target
article. Tooby & Cosmides argue that individuals with
neural adaptations evolved in Pleistocene forager societies
can self-organize into large cooperative structures without
the aid of cultural evolutionary processes. They suggest
that ancestral foraging societies were small enough that in-
dividual-level social skills are sufﬁcient to explain their
social structure, and that these skills likewise sufﬁce to
explain the much larger scale and more complex societies
of today.
Tooby & Cosmides question the realism of experimen-
tal games that ﬁnd altruistic or other prosocial behavior. All
experiments involve simpliﬁcations. It is not clear that the
experimental game studies they cite in support of their ar-
gument are any more realistic. See Zefferman’s (2014a) cri-
tique of a simulation study by Delton et al. (2011) in this
regard (see also Delton & Krasnow 2014; Zefferman
2014b). The most ambitious attempts to relate experimen-
tal games to the real world are the cross-cultural studies of
Henrich et al. (2004; 2010a) (see sects. 6.2, 6.3, and 4.3 in
the target article). These studies were conducted mostly in
institutionally simple hunting and gathering, herding, and
horticultural societies by ethnographers of the people
studied. This design was adopted so as to be able to infer
from the extensive ethnographic knowledge whether or
not game behavior matched behavior in the society con-
cerned. They summarize their main ﬁndings as follows:
We draw two lessons from the experimental results: ﬁrst, there
is no society in which experimental behavior is even roughly
consistent with the canonical model of purely self-interested
actors; second, there is much more variation between groups
than has previously been reported, and this variation correlates
with differences in patterns of interaction found in everyday
life. (Henrich et al. 2004, p. 5, emphasis ours)
In section 6.2 we also brieﬂy discussed the social psychol-
ogist Daniel Batson’s (2011) experimental program de-
signed to test whether psychological altruism was
necessary to explain participants’ behavior in circumstances
where they could volunteer to aid someone in need.
Batson’s experiments used deception to create scenarios
that were as realistic as possible, and he found evidence
that some participants behaved altruistically. Tooby &
Cosmides’ discussions of List (2007) and Sheskin et al.
(2014) are incomplete. In List’s taking treatments, dictator
giving was substantially reduced relative to the standard
dictator game, but the amount of taking was quite
modest. In a treatment where dictators and their partners
had to work to earn their money, very few dictators chose
to take at all. List emphasizes that prosocial morality
plays a big role in his results. In Sheskin et al.’s study,
young children, but not older ones, chose to pay a cost to
reduce the welfare of others relative to their own.
Whether this change with age was a product of an innate
developmental process or socialization, or both, is unan-
swered by this study.
We agree that ancestral forager societies were small
compared to the giant societies in which many humans
lived during the last 5,000 years, but we question the sug-
gestion that they were so small that individual-level social
skills can explain their social structure. Human forager so-
cieties are already large compared to chimpanzee and
bonobo communities. Forager societies have culturally var-
iable norms and institutions regulating family life and inter-
family cooperation. As Hill et al. (2014) show, the band
scale units of forager tribes are ﬂuid, and cooperation
with many distantly related or unrelated people is
common. In ethnographic cases, and by at least the
Upper Paleolithic, trade networks linked local groups on
a subcontinental scale. It is true that these institutions
can be scaled up considerably with a more productive
economy than hunting and gathering. The Turkana, in
our example in sect. 5.1, use a subsistence economy
based on livestock raising and trade to support a society
numbering around one million with institutions hardly dif-
ferent from those of most forager societies. It is the largest
society known to us that remains without formal leadership
institutions, although people vary greatly in prestige. Most
societies larger than a few thousand people evolve formal
institutions of leadership and governance. We argue that
culture-led gene-culture coevolution had extensively re-
modeled our social psychology some time before 50,000
years ago. We agree with Tooby & Cosmides that major
new genetic adaptations supporting the formation of giant
societies are unlikely to have occurred during the last
5,000 years (although minor adjustments may have). It
seems likely that large-scale societies arose through a
process of institutional innovation, which we understand
in some detail in particular cases (e.g., Currie et al.
2010). In section 6, we pointed to evidence that language,
social control, and religion and ritual all show evidence of
“design” features consistent with the operation of CGS.
Tooby & Cosmides and Krasnow & Delton seem to
suggest that the study of cultural evolution should be post-
poned until research in evolutionary psychology has re-
vealed whether or not the patterns observed can be
entirely explained by evolved cognitive mechanisms. But
that is not how science works. Darwin’s explanation of evo-
lution based on heritable variation was valuable even
though his theory of inheritance was wrong. Even today
our understanding of the genetic inheritance system is in-
complete. Krasnow & Delton contrast the “detailed,
unique, and novel predictions” of Evolutionary Psychology1
with the “retrodictions” of CGS of facts we already know,
such as why humans have languages. Privileging prediction
over retrodiction in in this way leads to some odd conclu-
sions. Would they disparage Darwin’s work on the Origin
of Species because he was merely retrodicting facts he
already knew – that species existed and are generally well
adapted to their environments? Science often makes
good progress when some components of the phenomenon
being studied have to be treated like black boxes. Such in-
vestigations motivate and guide the science that aims to
open up the boxes.
We are as enthusiastic about the adaptationist approach
to human behavior as Krasnow & Delton. Boyd and
Richerson’s (1985) book is basically an extended evolution-
ary analysis of how human culture functions as an adapta-
tion. To do this analysis properly, you have to take into
account the population-level properties of culture, just as
you have to take the population-level properties of genes
into account to understand organic evolution. The theoret-
ical work outlined in sect. 2 suggests that one peculiarity of
the cultural inheritance system is that it can support consid-
erable variation at the level of groups, and accordingly that
it can support the evolution of group functions if there is
competition between groups. The target article is mostly
an empirical sketch of the evidence available on these axi-
omatic points. Krasnow & Delton do not impugn this
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evidence. Their objections depend upon an argument
based on G. C. Williams’ (1966) gene-centered view of evo-
lution, a view that he subsequently modiﬁed (Williams
1992) to include the idea of multi-level selection, based
on the work of Price (1970; 1972). Maynard Smith and
Szathmáry (1995) attributed the major transitions of evolu-
tion (including human origins) to rare innovations that led
to the operation of selection at higher levels. Regarding
parsimony, recall Einstein’s dictum “Everything should
be made as simple as possible, but no simpler.” Trying to
understand human evolution without taking into account
the population-level properties of culture is to use too
simple a framework.
The ﬁeld of Evolutionary Psychology, pioneered by
Tooby and Cosmides (1989; 1992), has received much crit-
icism for the narrowness of its program (e.g., Bolhuis et al.
2011), but their enterprise ﬁts well into a larger evolution-
ary science of human behavior along the lines of Henrich
& Boyd’s commentary. Barrett’s (2015) recent book, and
work such as Gervais et al. (2011), show how naturally psy-
chological and population based approaches ﬁt together. In
this regard Buss’ (2014) textbook Evolutionary Psychology,
cited by Krasnow & Delton, is interesting in that it does
not contain a discussion of the human social learning
system that has been well described by developmental
and comparative psychologists (sect. 3.1). This is an odd
omission, given that the human social learning system is
perhaps the best-described human cognitive module
known to have evolved considerably during the Pleistocene.
There is also no discussion of institutions or norms in Buss
(2014).
We appreciate Suárez & Koenig’s raising the evidence
on the selectivity of even young children’s social learning.
The broader theory of cultural evolution (e.g., Boyd &
Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 1981) devel-
oped mathematical models to investigate the effect on
social learning selectivity based on genetic predispositions
and social learning selectivity based on earlier acquired
culture. These early models of bias were derived from
the literature on persuasion and the acquisition of innova-
tions by adults. The more recent studies of social learning
in children have ﬁlled important gaps. The idea that chil-
dren are evaluating potential role models for expertise,
truthfulness, conformity to norms, and afﬁliation with the
child’s group are important planks in the Tribal Social In-
stincts hypothesis, showing that children do favor prosocial
and in-group models. This, we suggest, reﬂects an evolu-
tionary history of living in norm- and institution-bound so-
cieties, which create a tendency for norms and institutions
to culturally evolve in prosocial directions. We are also in-
terested in the variation in children’s social learning
biases. In section R4 we noted that young adults vary sub-
stantially in their strategies in the Public Goods Game.
When these young adults were younger, would they have
had different social learning biases that led them to
acquire a different set of moral norms?
This is consistent with the idea that selection of prosocial
tendencies under CGS will be frequency dependent. The
rational component of children’s imitation may tend to
smooth out intergroup differences. However, it is impor-
tant to remember the observation of Harris (2012) that in
many matters children have so little knowledge that they
must accept the testimony of adults. In the case of
complex artifacts and institutions, even adult experts do
not seem to have deep causal knowledge of how these cul-
tural constructs function (Sterelny 2012). Such causal
opacity will remove much of the inﬂuence of rational
choices, and causal clarity will make such choices very pow-
erful. In laboratory experiments with young adults, payoff-
biased social learning strategies are commonly used if
sufﬁcient information is available, and more conformity is
used when information is less deﬁnitive (McElreath et al.
2008).
Vigil & Kruger’s suggestion that honest communication
of pain is an important part of social life is plausible. It par-
allels the argument we made for the case of language in
section 6.1. More generally, it is common for people to
signal their emotional states, positive as well as negative.
Signaling systems in which self-interested deception is pos-
sible can evolve only if there is a certain level of trust
between senders and receivers of signals, especially if the
signals are inexpensive. Expressions of pain often trigger
helping behavior in others. This is a reliable reaction. It
has led to the development of the strategy of terrorist
bombers to set off a second bomb as people rush in to
aid the victims of the ﬁrst. Images of the pain suffered by
a particular group are used to recruit charitable donations
and volunteers to aid them in natural disasters and wars.
Vigil & Kruger provide evidence that people who identify
with an in-group can be powerfully affected by images of
harm done to in-group members. At the same time, some
people exaggerate their suffering to attract aid they do
not deserve, and such behavior is disparaged and policed
much like any other lie.
R7. Individual-level processes are important
Several commentaries remind us that cultural evolution
includes many phenomena that are distantly, if at all, con-
nected to group-level processes. Most cultural evolutionary
analysis asks how individual-level decisions affect the evolu-
tion of culture where the agents making the decisions are
assumed to be boundedly rational individuals pursuing
their inclusive ﬁtness interest (e.g., Boyd & Richerson
1985). In this regard we endorse many of the remarks in
the commentaries of Amir, Jordan, & Rand (Amir
et al.); Singh, Glowacki, & Wrangham (Singh et al.);
Tooby & Cosmides; Houdek & Novakova; and Nesse.
However, when it comes to human social life, we are con-
vinced that individual-level processes are often heavily in-
ﬂuenced by the products of CGS processes.
Amir et al. present an excellent model of individual de-
cision-making that we think is largely compatible with CGS.
In their social heuristics hypothesis (SHH), Amir et al.
argue that individuals internalize the strategies that are typ-
ically advantageous in daily life. We argue that institutions
substantially determine which strategies are typically ad-
vantageous. Institutions are group-level traits that evolve
due to CGS (sect. 4.3). Amir et al. give the example of
how voting institutions might guide individual behavior.
Importantly, voting institutions, and social choice institu-
tions more generally, vary widely across groups, even
across modern democratic states. While individual behavior
might be explained by SHH, given a particular set of voting
institutions, voting institutions themselves are group-level
traits because an individual cannot unilaterally decide to
use different voting rules than the rest of her group.
Since voting institutions can only change at the group
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level, they are subject to CGS. If, as Amir et al. suggest, in-
dividuals can migrate to join groups with voting institutions
more to their liking, this would be a mechanism by which
CGS could operate (sect. 2.1). Additionally, Amir et al.’s
idea that institutions homogenize individual behavior is
precisely what potentiates CGS processes by suppressing
individual-level variation and creating group-level variation.
Because sanctions and rewards can stabilize institutions
that have highly variable functionality, institutional innova-
tors cannot easily move from suboptimal to optimal institu-
tions (see sect. 4.3). In summary, we see SHH as a theory to
explain human behavior, given variation in norms, institu-
tions, and innate predispositions, whereas CGS and
gene-culture coevolution aim to explain norms, institutions,
and innate predispositions themselves. An important future
project might be formally integrating ideas from SHH and
CGS to more tightly link gene-culture coevolutionary
models with the ﬁndings of cross-cultural experimental psy-
chology and economics.
Both Singh et al., and Houdek & Novakova make
claims about how endogenous processes of cultural change
will affect the emergence of group-beneﬁcial institutions.
Singh et al. argue that endogenous processes of cultural
change can lead to norms that are group beneﬁcial
because the interest of powerful leaders align with the inter-
est of the group. They therefore argue that CGS is unneces-
sary for explaining group-beneﬁcial institutions. In contrast,
Houdek & Novakova point to the several pathways by which
the action of self-interested actors can wreck the success of a
group. We agree that punishment can sustain antisocial
behavior as readily as it can sustain prosocial behavior and
know that history is rife with examples of coercive, extractive
institutions that were not optimal for the group, but beneﬁt-
ed the people imposing these rules (e.g., Turchin & Nefedov
2009). And we argue that this is exactly why the processes of
CGS are needed to explain the unusual level of prosocial
outcomes that we do see in human societies, such as proper-
ty rights, redistributive mechanisms, safety nets for those
struck by misfortunes, military defense, and public capital
facilities.
We think the diversity of opinion on this issue reﬂects the
reality that both self-interest and cooperation do occur.
Self-interested actors maneuver rules to their advantage,
as evidenced by the corruption that plagues many institu-
tions. Furthermore, individuals with more bargaining
power in a situation – people with wealth, inﬂuence, coer-
cive authority, weapons, private militias, family ties, social
connections, and so forth –will try to extract more for
themselves. Such a situation often leads to rules and out-
comes that are not beneﬁcial for the group. In fact, it is
seldom (if ever) the case that rules and outcomes that are
optimal for the group are achieved.
If self-interested leaders often create rules that also
happen to beneﬁt the group, as Singh et al. argue,
shouldn’t group-beneﬁcial outcomes be widespread in
animals? Hierarchies and power differences are extremely
common in social animals. Yet, the presence of powerful
individuals with coercive capacity has not created animal
societies with complex rules for solving public goods prob-
lems, or enforcing property rights, or any of the myriad
other forms of cooperation commonplace in human socie-
ties. When cooperative outcomes are observed in animal
societies, they are typically among kin. Singh et al. do not
consider the full strategy space of rules that are available
to self-interested leaders. They bring up the example of
Cheyenne leaders, who implemented a rule regarding
thieving of horses: “Now we shall make a new rule. There
shall be no more borrowing of horses without asking.…
[If] the taker tries to keep them, we will give him a whip-
ping.” They conclude that the leaders impose such a rule
because preventing theft and maintaining social order ben-
eﬁts the leaders. But wouldn’t a rule in which the leader
takes this stolen horse for himself beneﬁt the leader even
more? What about a rule requiring such thieves to hand
over their wives to the leader? Or a rule that says that the
punishment only applies to people the leader does not
like? Let us assume for a moment that leaders do always
attempt to establish rules in their own interest. Neverthe-
less, they will occasionally make rules favoring group inter-
ests either because of an alignment of elite and non-elite
preferences, or because of errors of judgment or exogenous
changes. No matter the intent of the original rule-makers,
CGS processes will act to favor such rules and disfavor
rules that are actually selﬁsh. We do not want to say that
the interests of leaders and followers never align without
evolved institutional incentives, just that this mechanism
alone can only account for the limited amounts cooperation
found in societies with dominance hierarchies.
Tooby & Cosmides speculate that modern institutions
can be far better explained by neural adaptations in
dense persisting social networks of intelligent cultural
agents than by CGS. Once again, one cannot discuss indi-
vidual behavior without considering the possibility that
humans have adapted by gene-culture coevolution to live
in societies shaped by CGS. As we discussed in section
R4, it takes a largish minority of altruistic punishers to es-
tablish cooperation in laboratory public goods games, con-
sistent with CGS models (Boyd et al. 2003). In societies
with poor institutions, experimental participants can’t es-
tablish cooperation using the punishment tool (Herrmann
et al. 2008). Leaders are leaders either by virtue of coercive
power or by grants of prestige from their followers, or both.
Prestige is a strong motivator of behavior (Henrich & Gil-
White 2001), and even the powerful may act in the group
interest to gain prestige. Also, selﬁsh political operators
can’t advocate for new institutions based on selﬁsh advan-
tage unless they are dictators. To the extent that they
need the consent or at least the acquiescence of others,
they will at least need to convince followers that the inno-
vation is in the group’s interest even if the group is only a
narrow ruling class. If the new institution turns out to be
only in the leaders’ interests, their prestige and perhaps au-
thority will often by diminished by unpopularity, resistance,
and revolt (Insko et al. 1983). Thus, endogenous processes
can aid in the creation of group-beneﬁcial institutions, but
for this to work on any scale, the prosocial instincts would
have had to be favored by some process like CGS acting
via gene-culture coevolution in the past.
Nesse brings up the very important concept of social se-
lection. Certainly many non-human social phenomena are
shaped by social selection. Indeed, it seems likely that in
any social species social selection plays an important role.
For example, the mutual grooming seen in many social
mammals must be the product of social selection disfavor-
ing individuals who were unacceptably rough or ticklish.
The very ubiquity of social selection argues against it
being capable, on its own, of generating societies of the
size and complexity of human societies. Runaway sexual
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selection is a common phenomenon. If a runaway form of
partner choice social selection were possible, shouldn’t we
see many non-human societies with extensive cooperation
between non-relatives? As we argued in sections 2, 4.3,
and 6.2 of the target article, culturally transmitted institu-
tions act to greatly amplify social section. They are rules
that deliver rewards and sanctions to individuals, they
vary substantially from society to society, and they inﬂuence
the outcome of inter-organizational competition. We think
it is CGS on institutions that put humans on a runaway path
to semi-domestication. Pleistocene culture-driven gene-
culture coevolution would have favored the evolution of
guilt, pity, commitment, empathy, and generosity, much
as Darwin (1874) imagined in the epigraph from The
Descent of Man at the start of our target article. As we elab-
orate in sections R10 here and 4.3 in the target article, even
the ubiquitous simple partnerships, like marriage and
trade, are heavily institutionalized even in simple societies.
Lamba describes a ﬁeld study of variation in cooperation
(measured by an experimental public goods game) in a
sample of 14 villages within an ethnic group in India
(Lamba & Mace 2011). Some of this variation could be ex-
plained statistically by population size, age, and sex, which
Lamba attributes causally to individual-level effects. As far
as we can see, it could also involve some component of
micro-cultural variation, for example, norms of cooperation
might differ by gender. However, all experimental game
studies we know of ﬁnd ample individual-level variation, in-
cluding the studies of Henrich et al. (2004; 2006; 2010a).
Henrich et al. (2012a) report that the variation between
communities, estimated for some but not all of their
samples of societies, is approximately the same as the vari-
ation that Lamba and Mace (2011) reported and is rather
smaller than the between-cultures variation in the
Henrich et al. studies. We do not doubt that as the scale
of measurement of variation shrinks, individual-level
effects will become increasingly important, all the more
so to the extent that cultural variation is concentrated at a
larger scale. If people in a regional-scale society all
operate under the same institutions, perhaps the main
sources of individual variation in behavior are environmen-
tal and genetic. Lamba (2014) also reports ﬁnding only
modest effects of cultural transmission as measured by
changes in individuals’ behavior between two rounds of a
one-shot public goods game. In the second round, some in-
dividuals tended to conform to the mean contribution in
the ﬁrst round and some tended to adopt the payoff-
maximizing contribution, but there was a strong mode at
no change. This ﬁnding is in line with laboratory studies
of social learning (e.g., McElreath et al. 2008). A major lim-
itation of such studies is that one brief social learning expe-
rience cannot be expected to have a large impact on habits
and norms that have been acquired over a lifetime. The ex-
periments reported in section 4.2 of the target article show
that children acquire norms quite readily.
R8. On what units does CGS operate?
Some authors raise important issues concerning the units
and levels of selection. As we remarked in section 1, the
CGS framework can be applied to many different concrete
entities; it includes the concept of multi-level selection. It is
applicable to easily copied fragments of culture (which
Whiten & Erdal call “meme-complexes”); to structural el-
ements within a population, such as business organizations
(discussed in sect. 5.2); to ethnolinguistic groups, corporate
kin groups, clubs, nations, religions; and even to multi-
ethnic empires (Turchin 2009).
Whiten &Erdal suggest that the relevant groups forCGS
should be groups of cultural replicators (meme-complexes),
rather than groups of people. While meme-complexes, like
other cultural traits, can vary between groups or increase
and decrease in frequency as part of a CGS process, in the
CGS framework, they are not the groups themselves.
However, if meme-complexes are self-reinforcing, they may
become particularly stable within groups once adopted,
similar to Smaldino’s (2014) concept of a “group level trait.”
Groupsmay, as a result, become strongly inﬂuenced by partic-
ular meme-complexes, and cultural group selection may
operate on meme-complexes with particular force.
When applying the CGS framework to a particular case,
we think it is as important to analyze the ecology of compe-
tition and cooperation when deﬁning groups as it is to
analyze the patterns of cultural variation. CGS is likely to
be operating where there is a coincidence of a pattern of
cultural variation and a pattern of conﬂict. Lamba seems
to suggest that ethnolinguistic groups have a privileged
position in the CGS framework. That is not our view.
She ﬁnds considerable variation in cooperative behavior
within the ethnic group she studied, partly related to demo-
graphic and ecological processes. This is not surprising
once one takes into account the relevant scales of collective
action for the traits she examines. For example, Lamba de-
scribes an experiment where villagers are asked to divide a
measure of salt between themselves and other villagers. If
salt division is a collective action problem typically encoun-
tered at the scale of villages, then villages would be the rel-
evant group in the CGS framework. The ethnolinguistic
group would not be the relevant group unless the
problem of salt division could be solved by collective
action at that larger scale. Similarly, one of the best
studied possible examples of CGS is warfare between
clans within ethnic groups in Highland New Guinea
(Soltis et al. 1995). Mace & Silva and Acedo-Carmona
& Gomila also describe ﬁeld situations in which the
locus of cooperation and conﬂict is at smaller scales than
what a Western anthropologist might deﬁne as a cultural
group. In section 5.1 we described the cooperation and
competition among the Turkana which are organized at
the level of a large ethnic group. In section 5.2 we discussed
business organizations that are typically subnational in
scale, although large modern ﬁrms are often multinational
in their operations and multi-ethnic in their staff. Clearly,
human societies are both complex and diverse. Doing full
justice to this diversity is beyond the scope of our target
article, but we would not want to be misunderstood as
thinking that the CGS approach is committed to a particu-
lar claim about the kinds of groups that compete.
Acedo-Carmona &Gomila raise the important issue of
the persistence of medium-scale diversity within state-level
societies. They argue that CGS predicts regional cultural
homogenization in the long run, and that such homogeniza-
tion does not occur in their cases in Oaxaca and Northern
Ghana. This is not quite right because, while it is true
that, in a stable environment, a simple CGS model predicts
that competing groups will have similar group success at
equilibrium, social evolution is a complex design problem
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(Boyd & Richerson 1992a). There are likely to be many
equally successful but rather different ways of organizing
societies. Furthermore, medium-sized organizations often
evolve better institutions from the bottom up than can be
created by top-down organizations like nation-states
(Ostrom 2005). CGS for cooperative institutions at the
scale of neighborhoods, villages, churches, business organi-
zations, and the like probably often favors institutions that
protect the local autonomy of medium-sized organizations
which are successful at solving a particular problem. For
example, around Lake Titicaca, Peruvian lakeside villagers
actively defend ﬁshing territories that are completely illegal
under Peruvian law. Yet they succeed in defending these
rights against trespass by neighboring villagers, interfer-
ence from state ofﬁcials, and use by state-sanctioned
private companies (Levieil & Orlove 1990). Multiple equi-
libria in complex systems and relative efﬁciency of medium-
scale organization will therefore counter the homogenizing
tendency of CGS and preserve medium-scale diversity
within bigger units like states or ethnolinguistic groups.
Santana, Patel, Chang, & Weisberg (Santana et al.)
make a similar argument focused on the phenomenon of
religious syncretism. They point out that selective con-
quest, migration, or imitation seldom results in total re-
placement of pre-existing culture. More often there is a
new hybrid culture, a process sometimes called “ethnogen-
esis.” Among other things, ethnogenesis offers the possibil-
ity of cultural recombination, discovering favorable new
combinations of cultural traits not present in either of the
contributing lineages. As Santana et al. correctly observe,
there must be evidence that traits acquired or retained
during ethnogenesis actually had group functional effects
that drove acquisition or retention if we are to attribute
their evolution to CGS. We pointed to literatures in
section 5 that document how competing organizations
use techniques such as head-hunting and espionage in
highly organized ways to acquire the successful techniques
of rivals. (For the borrowing of military technology, see Ho-
rowitz [2010].) Still, Santana et al. are surely correct that
many cultural traits spread between groups or are retained
in ethnogenesis for their individual-level functions, not to
mention the frequent diffusion of harmful practices such
as tobacco smoking and the consumption of fast food.
The quantitative study they suggest to examine the levels
of organization that are affected by a sample of diffusing in-
novations would be very interesting.
Santana et al.’s case of the Catholic veneer adopted by
local Mexican communities is an interesting example
related to those described by Acedo-Carmona &
Gomila. As Foster’s (1960) classic account of America’s
Spanish heritage documented, the pattern of highly hetero-
dox local beliefs in America replicates a pattern found in
Spain, despite energetic and largely successful attempts
by colonial authorities to prevent the spread of unorthodox
religious ideas from Spain to the New World. Again, local
differentiation of beliefs could be related to multi-level
CGS favoring one set of institutions at the village scale cor-
related with local heterodox religious beliefs and another
associated with Catholic orthodoxy among national elites.
As we discuss in section 6.3, religions seem to function to
provide symbolic group boundaries, moral justiﬁcations
for institutions, and rituals that express group solidarity.
The “veneer” inter-level relationship between elite Catho-
lic orthodoxy and village-level heterodoxy is particularly
well studied in the case of the New Mexican Pueblos.
The Pueblo peoples resisted Spanish domination violently,
culminating in a spectacularly, if temporarily, successful
revolt in 1680. The Spanish returned 12 years later much
chastened. “Veneer” Catholicism symbolized the Pueb-
loans’ acquiescence to Spanish overlordship in exchange
for a Spanish tolerance of substantial Pueblo autonomy,
an arrangement that persisted under Mexican and U.S.
rule (Simmons 1979).
Regarding Mace & Silva’s Northern Ireland case study
(Silva & Mace 2014), we appreciate their raising the issue of
parochial altruism. Some plausible CGS models do predict
the evolution of a combination of in-group cooperation and
out-group hate, but in section 4.2 we dissociated ourselves
from the view that this relationship is a necessary product
of CGS in general. Empirically, no law-like association
between in-group cooperation and out-group dislike has
been found (Brewer 2007). This is not hard to understand.
Peaceful relations between groups make possible gains from
trade while warring with neighbors is generally negative
sum, costly to both sides. Only in very asymmetric conﬂicts
or surprise attacks are aggressors reasonably certain to come
out ahead and in the case of surprise attacks, victory is
usually temporary. Large organizations, like states and
empires, often offer mediation or legal services to settle dis-
putes between the smaller organizations they contain. When
such services are efﬁcient and just, the constituent organiza-
tions are typically happy with the results (North et al. 2009).
In simple societies, the lack of mediation institutions can
lead a society toward extinction, at least in a competitive envi-
ronment (Knauft 1985). Even in cases where enmities are raw
and deep-seated, as in Northern Ireland, mediation by the
United Kingdom and Ireland, assisted by the United States,
eventually damped down violent conﬂict there.
De Dreu & Balliet’s point that intergroup interactions
are mixed motive rather than zero sum is likewise appreci-
ated. Groups that trade and make peace may also be com-
petitors. Thus, ﬁrms in an industry may come together to
form a trade group that lobbies, advertises, and does re-
search to beneﬁt the industry as a whole, while still compet-
ing vigorously on price, quality, and so forth. In our
example of the 19th century dye industry in section 5.2, it
was cooperation between competing German ﬁrms to
lobby states to create research professorships in chemistry
that gave German ﬁrms collectively a decisive advantage
over their British rivals. Societies ﬁnd it expedient to ally
with others to ﬁght a threatening common enemy even if
they continue to compete vigorously in other spheres.
Any organization that does not have a robust set of institu-
tions to make possible trade and alliance is liable to be out-
competed by ones that do. The Comanche dominated the
Southern Plains of North America militarily for a couple
of centuries in part because they made alliances and
trade relations with other Indian tribes and with Europeans
(Hämäläinen 2008). A tight coupling between in-group
love and out-group hate would make alliance-forming difﬁ-
cult, something that CGS is likely to disfavor, all else equal.
Models also exist which show cooperation arising in a game
to survive in harsh unstable environments, even in the
absence of conﬂict between groups (Smaldino et al.
2013). A failure to cooperate may lead to group extinction
due to a failure to extract sufﬁcient resources to maintain a
viable population, even in the absence of competition. We
do not classify this as a form of CGS because it does not
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involve between-group variation and inter-group competi-
tion, but that does not mean it is unimportant in favoring
group-level cooperation. This process would also tend to
produce in-group love but not out-group hate.
Herzog proposes that pet-keeping can best be explained
by CGS. He presents no obvious group ﬁtness beneﬁts of
pet-keeping. The best evidence provided suggests only
that, as the author states, pet-keeping is like fashion, and
it spreads through cultural transmission. It is inﬂuenced
by parental preferences, prestige, and conformity. Pet-
keeping is apparently not a cultural trait that is appreciably
inﬂuenced by CGS processes. The fact that people readily
form attachments to pets illustrates how ﬂexible the human
attachment system is, but the capacity to form attachments
to social groups is a much more consequential example for
CGS processes.
R9. Variations in the strength of CGS
CommentatorsGelfand, Roos, Nau, Harrington, Mu, &
Jackson’s (Gelfand et al.’s) point that the strength of CGS
processes will vary as a function of the threats a society
faces makes sense. Some of the changes in the commitment
to groups are short term in nature, for example, the com-
pulsory mobilization of a society ﬁghting an existential
war. TheMu et al. (2015) study shows that priming subjects
to think of an out-group threat immediately increases coop-
eration. These are the sorts of psychological predispositions
that might result from a long evolutionary history of group
living (sect. 2.2). Boehm’s (1984) study of Montenegrin
feuding described institutions for suspending feuds when
it was necessary to raise a tribal army to fend off Muslim in-
vaders. Montenegrins’ willingness to suspend feuds was no
doubt aided by the clear danger to the whole society posed
by potential Muslim conquest. Other changes are longer
term, as evidenced by institutional differences across
American states. Some scholars have argued that these dif-
ferences have a historical character derived from patterns
of colonial immigration from different parts of Britain
(Fischer 1989; Nisbett & Cohen 1996). Immigrants may
also settle in regions and situations to which their norms
and institutions are adapted, making the correlations in
the Mu et al. study hard to interpret causally, as Gelfand
et al. recognize. The role of possible genetic adaptations
to living in tight versus loose societies is interesting, but
the arrow of causation also has to be established. Human
genetic diversity is strongly correlated with distance from
Africa, implying that drift was a strong factor in our evolu-
tion (Pickrell & Reich 2014). Institutions might coevolve
with gene frequency differences that were a product of
chance factors. Ancient DNA can be used to characterize
the genotypes of people before and during a putative
culture-caused selective sweep and hence rule out the pos-
sibility that a pre-existing genetic difference inﬂuenced cul-
tural evolution (Itan et al. 2009).
R10. Ancient preadaptations
It goes without saying that human culture and CGS pro-
cesses rest on ancient roots. Even something as novel as
our capacity to form large-scale societies is likely to be a
mere modiﬁcation of traits present in our ancestors.
Chisholm, Coall, & Atkinson (Chisholm et al.) offer
mother–infant attachment as an example. This is a bond
that is practically required by mammals and is thus phylo-
genetically ancient. It is one that has been remodeled for
many different purposes in the course of social evolution,
just as Chisholm et al. argue. See also Panksepp and Biven
(2012, Chapters 8–10). Attachment to groups, for example,
looks as if it depends upon some of the same subcortical
roots as individual–individual attachments (Haslam 2001).
Burkart & van Schaik argue that cooperative breeding
provides a much more recent precursor of why humans
rather than some other great ape evolved into the hyper-co-
operative niche. The comparative primatology of coopera-
tive breeding is certainly striking, as their experiments
show. Both generalized cooperation and social learning
appear to be enhanced in cooperative breeders. Cooperative
breeding is certainly a candidate to have favored more coop-
eration in early hominins and to have ampliﬁed the advantag-
es of social learning by exposing selective learners to a
greater number of potentially useful cultural variants.
Larger social groups could also have favored improved com-
munication. Our only worry is our original one in the target
article (sect. 1) that the paleoanthropological record is almost
silent on the evolution of social organization. Stiner and
Kuhn (2009) argue from diet and artifact types that a
sexual division of labor did not evolve until the Upper Paleo-
lithic, suggesting that large-brained hominins, closely related
to modern humans, had very different social organization.
Human cooperative breeding is heavily institutionalized
in ethnographically known small-scale societies by rules
about kinship and marriage. Mathew et al. (2013) suggest
that the human capacity to cooperate in many different ac-
tivities is based on our ability to create institutions to
manage diverse forms of cooperation (see sect. 4.3 of the
target article). Thus, an alternative hypothesis is that
simple institutions preceded cooperative breeding in
humans and made it possible. Perhaps families were one
of the earliest social institutions. On present evidence
both hypotheses seem equally plausible, not to mention
any number of more complex coevolutionary scenarios
one can imagine in which genes and culture played alter-
nating leading and lagging roles.
R11. Pleistocene adaptations generated by CGS
Commentators Gintis, Fuentes & Kissel, and Whiten &
Erdal observe that the target article includes little mention
of CGS and culture-driven gene-culture coevolution in the
Pleistocene. They outline several examples of adaptations
that may very well have been built by these processes far
earlier than the examples we discuss. We agree that these
are good candidates to be explained by CGS and culture-
driven gene-culture coevolution along the lines of the
tribal social instincts hypothesis (sect. 2.2). However, in
this article we emphasized empirical evidence that is as
close to unassailable as it is possible to get. Inevitably, this
resulted in an emphasis on more recent cases. Humans
seem to have been quite rare before about 50,000 years
ago (Li & Durbin 2011). Hence, the paleoanthropological
data record is scanty and hard to interpret. Language, insti-
tutions, and other traits that are central to the operation of
CGS leave poor proxies in that record. The temporal resolu-
tion of the record is poor, so it is hard to be sure whether
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cultural evolution is the leading or lagging variable in coevo-
lutionary events. Ongoing improvements in the paleoanthro-
pological record will help make hypotheses about deep time
events more testable, and there is great promise for extract-
ing more genetic history from living autosomal DNA, sup-
plemented by recovery of subfossil DNA (Richerson et al.
2010). Gintis, Fuentes & Kissel, and Whiten & Erdal raise
questions about the most important events in our evolution-
ary history. We look forward to advances that will help us
better understand them.
R12. Relationship of CGS to the expanded
evolutionary synthesis
We thank Fuentes & Kissel for raising the issue of the re-
lationship between CGS and the extended evolutionary
synthesis (EES). We are quite willing to include CGS as
part of the EES. Cultural evolutionists often cite and are
cited by other EES authors. For example, we cited
Laland et al. (2010; 2011) in our target article, and both
of these papers cite numerous publications by other cultur-
al evolutionists. If our tribal social instincts hypothesis is
correct, the evolution of the cultural inheritance system
under CGS had major impacts on the genetic component
of our social psychology, not to mention many other
aspects of our phenotype. Two of the three CGS mecha-
nisms we discuss are based on selective decisions, not
natural selection, and as we have remarked here in
section R4, individual and collective decisions regarding in-
stitutional innovation and adoption are potentially biased in
a prosocial direction due to the ancient remodeling of our
social psychology by CGS. In section 6.2, we discussed
the genetic evolutionary effect that punishment on deviants
would have if indeed there is (or was) genetic variation in
tendencies to deviate from the strictures of norms and in-
stitutions. Barclay & Krupp defend a decidedly non-
EES picture in their remark that proponents of CGS are
confusing proximate and ultimate causation. Exactly who
is confused is the central issue in the debate over EES.
For those who accept the evidence for culture-led gene-
culture coevolution, it is the opponents of the CGS who
are confused (Laland et al. 2011).
R13. Selection of extended behavior patterns
Simon makes a useful point in her commentary that selec-
tion on patterns of behavior has to consider the effects on
ﬁtness that accrue over time and across individuals. Individ-
uals may pay a cost for being prosocial at one time but be
rewarded later because they had achieved a reputation
for generosity. Carriers of a cultural variant or genotype en-
couraging generosity may incur a net lifetime cost not paid
by the ungenerous. In the case of such an altruistic group-
selected trait, generosity may increase because even though
it is counter-selected within every group where it is present,
the success of groups with many generous types relative to
those with few can result in the generous trait increasing in
frequency in the meta-population. Thus, Simon is not quite
correct to say that “cooperation … was selected because it
commonly enhanced the individual’s long-term ﬁtness” in
the sense that there is, by deﬁnition, always a within-
group disadvantage to altruistic generosity.
Much of evolutionary theory is devoted to understanding
how selection trades off costs and beneﬁts of extended pat-
terns of behavior. Life history theory studies how the effect
of sacriﬁce of reproduction at one stage of the life history
can or cannot be favored by increased reproduction at
another stage. Evolution in temporally varying environ-
ments will tend to favor types that have lower mean
ﬁtness in good times but that resist having very low
ﬁtness in bad times. We did not consider these important
issues in our target article in favor of issues more directly
relevant to the evolution of cooperation. As Equation 1 in
section 4.1 depicts, in the context of multi-level selection,
the ratio of group beneﬁts to individual costs that can be
favored by group selection depends upon the ratio of
within-group to between-group heritable variation for the
trait concerned.
R14. The evidence is incomplete
Commentators Mace & Silva, Barclay & Krupp, and
Turchin & Currie remark that the evidence supporting
CGS is inadequate to support any strong claims for the
utility of the framework. Mace & Silva point out that the
case for CGS to the exclusion of other explanations is
hard to prove. We feel that there is no need to prove the
case to the exclusion of all other processes that inﬂuence
or may inﬂuence human behavior. Given that human soci-
eties are complex and diverse, we do not expect a single
model derived from the CGS framework, or any other
framework, to provide a complete and universal explana-
tion. In many cases, competing hypotheses or models are
not mutually exclusive.
Barclay & Krupp say that we have established that CGS
processes are plausible, but that we have not shown that a
particular group trait was caused by cultural transmission
and directly caused differences in group ﬁtness. We did
point to evidence that norms are transmitted (see sects. 3
and 4.2) and that the outcomes of competition are often ex-
plained by institutional and other cultural differences
between groups (sect. 5). Institutions are group-level
traits by their nature (see sect. R5 here). We have
pointed to a small selection of concrete empirical cases in
our article and additional ones in this response, but
Barclay & Krupp are right that in no particular case can
we put all the pieces of a complete CGS explanation togeth-
er. This is a serious problem in the science of evolution gen-
erally (Brandon 1994). Biologists know a lot about genetic
transmission, mainly from laboratory studies, and a lot
about the evolution of phenotypic characters in the wild,
but in most cases, connecting genes to phenotypic charac-
ters has proven difﬁcult. Many good studies of the transmis-
sion of norms have been done, and the role of institutions in
inter-organizational competition has also been well-
studied. But it is hard to conceive of a study that would
allow us to understand how a complex institution is built
from the ground up by the social learning of norms. The
complexity of cultural inheritance and of cultural evolution
precludes easy progress on many important questions. Evo-
lutionary biology is still a thriving scientiﬁc ﬁeld 155 years
after theOrigin of Species; we do not think the study of cul-
tural evolution will be a perfected science a century from
now.
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In this regard,weenthusiastically endorse thepath forward
painted by Turchin & Currie. The gold standard in empir-
ical inference has become ﬁtting competing models to data
using techniques such asMarkov ChainMonte Carlo simula-
tions and testing the goodness of ﬁt of these models to data
using Bayesian and information theoretic measures (e.g.,
Gerbault et al. 2014). Advances in genomics have furnished
huge amounts of historical data on the course of evolution.
Human languages, living and dead, have long been mined
for human historical information, and to some extant non-lin-
guistic data have been used as well (see sect. 3.2). As Turchin
&Currie suggest, archaeological andhistorical data can surely
be assembled into databases that can support model-ﬁtting
and model-comparison approaches.
R15. Conclusion
Our commentators made many useful addenda to the main
argument in the target article but also introduced a number
of caveats. They retained varying degrees of skepticismabout
the reality of the CGS processes. However, none of the skep-
tics addressed the empirical foundations for applying the
Darwinian syllogism to human groups, except in special
cases. In the target article we presented evidence that:
1. Human groups often differ culturally.
2. Cultural variation is transmitted from generation to gen-
eration by social learning.
3. Success in intergroup competition is frequently deter-
mined by cultural differences.
We included only a small proportion of the vast amount of
evidence that exists to support these statements. We at-
tempted to select the best and admit that the quality of
this evidence varies. However, consider the possibility of ap-
plying the CGS framework to non-human species, even the
other great apes. Chimpanzee groups have appreciable
amounts of cultural variation, including traditional differ-
ences in social customs like grooming (Whiten et al. 1999).
Chimpanzees are comparatively good social learners, as
judged by the standards of other non-human animals,
albeit much less adept than human children (Dean et al.
2012; Whiten et al. 2009). Chimpanzee communities cer-
tainly compete vigorously. But so far as we are aware,
there is no evidence that success in competition is inﬂuenced
by a cultural trait. Some whale and dolphin species also have
signiﬁcant cultural traditions. Some group selection on them
is conceivable and the current evidence is suggestive
(Whitehead & Rendell 2015). Most nonhuman social learn-
ing systems are considerably less sophisticated than those of
chimpanzees and dolphins. No other vertebrate species has
societies that compare to those of humans in size and orga-
nizational complexity. Certainly, skeptics about the impor-
tance of CGS processes in other species can raise strong
doubts about their role. Only in humans is there abundant,
if not always unassailable, evidence for all of the legs of the
Darwinian syllogism operating at the group level.
NOTE
1. Krasnow & Delton represent a particular, highly
controversial brand of evolutionary psychology developed
by Tooby & Cosmides. It has become conventional to use
capitals to distinguish the particular brand from the
generic ﬁeld. Accordingly, whenever “Evolutionary Psy-
chology” appears capitalized in our text, we are referring
to this term in Tooby & Cosmides’ sense.
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